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Abstract ― This paper examines the determinants of the Euro/US Dollar exchange rate 
during the 2003-2011 period to investigate the possible effects of the financial crisis on 
dynamics of the Euro-Dollar rate. We use an EGARCH (3,1) news-type model with thrice-
daily frequency data to represent three temporal trading zones with unscheduled news in 
addition to the traditional scheduled macroeconomic news. In line with some behavioral 
finance insights, we find that when comparing pre-crisis and post crisis periods there are 
noticeable differences in agents’ attitudes across the three trading time zones in terms of 
asymmetric reactions, over/under-reactions to news, policies and fundamentals variables. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Euro/US Dollar rate is the youngest and the most traded among the major currency 
pairs
1
: it started with a value of 1.17 on January 4, 1999, it reached a value of 0.82 on 
October 26, 2000, increased up to a maximum level of 1.59 on July 17, 2008, and fell 
back down below 1.20 in mid-2010. Values so far apart have pointed to a persistence of 
misalignment vis-à-vis the Dollar for long periods, and prompted alternative new 
theories to explain exchange rate fluctuations. Back in seventies and eighties, the 
dynamics of the exchange rate was traditionally investigated in terms of equilibrium 
relationships between currencies and their fundamentals, a group of macroeconomic 
variables such as economic activity, inflation, interest rates, monetary and financial 
aggregates. The break-through study by Meese and Rogoff (1983), casting serious 
doubts on the forecasting performance of these classes of models, generated a parallel 
reconsideration of equilibrium schemes in favor, among other schemes, of news models. 
The central idea of this latter approach, influenced by the efficiency market/rational 
expectation paradigm, is that the exchange rate dynamic is affected by the surprise in 
the fundamentals rather than by the fundamentals themselves, where the surprise is the 
unexpected news, i.e. the difference between published values and its expected values. 
The news approach has thus grown out of the empirical counterpart of the main macro-
financial theories of exchange rate determination. In that initial phase, the lack (or the 
high cost) of data on market expectations led to generate macroeconomics and financial 
news by using econometric models, as in Edwards’s (1982, 1983) pioneering work’s. 
Later on Hoffman and Schlagenhauf (1985) made use of sampled forecasts to compute 
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 According to the 2010 Bank of International Settlements Eight Triennial Bank Survey of Foreign 
Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity (p.15, table B.6), at the end of 2010 the Euro-US Dollar 
exchange rate accounts for 28% of the global foreign exchange market turnover. 
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news and to estimate various versions of news-form equations. Since then, the foreign 
exchange market has become empirically richer and richer as various data providers 
started sampling the international financial market with tick data, while, at the same 
time, technology advances have enabled the main financial newswire services (e.g. 
Reuters, Bloomberg, Dow Jones Newswires, etc.) to follow the market continuously and 
to produce reports of events with time stamps during the entire global trading day, 
becoming in this way the main source of news. 
The developments in data collection and communication have enabled academics and 
practitioners to analyze the exchange rate market at various frequencies
2
 and to estimate 
directly the impact of a news-event on exchange rates, typically quoted against the US 
Dollar. As a result, the news literature has progressively adopted a more microstructure 
perspective in looking at the Forex market (Sarno and Taylor, 2003), a perspective that 
focuses on the traders’ behaviours and reactions and hence on very high frequency data 
and on the microscope. A vast body of literature has analyzed and explained intraday 
dynamics of the exchange rate. Ederington and Lee (1993, 1995) in their studies argue 
that most of the Dollar/Deutsche Mark (USD/DEM) intraday price adjustment to new 
information occurs within the first minute of macroeconomic variables release and that 
market reaction is resolved in the first 40 seconds. Also Andersen et al. (2003) find that 
announcements produce a very short-term effect reaction of news and the occurrence of 
quick jumps. They also point out to the market’s asymmetric reaction to positive and 
negative surprises, with more pronounced reaction to negative than to positive news. 
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 With a focus, among other rates, on the USD/EUR(DEM) exchange rate returns, at daily frequencies by 
Hardouvelis (1988); Aggarwal and Schirm (1992, 1998); Galati and Ho (2003); Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2005); Evans and Lyons (2005). At infra-daily frequencies using: hourly data by Tanner (1997); Evans 
and Lyons (2002); five-minute data by: Ederington and Lee (1993); Almeida et al. (1998); Andersen et al. 
(2003, 2007); Faust et al. (2007); Pearce and Solakoglu (2007); Evans and Lyons (2008); Conrad and 
Lamia (2012); 1-minute data by: Fair (2003); Love and Payne (2008);10-second and tick-by-tick data by 
Ederington and Lee (1995); Carlson and Lo (2006). 
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Despite the abundance of empirical studies based on the news-based approach
3
, we limit 
our description here only to the above two contributions, because they contend that the 
response of exchange rates to news is a very short-term phenomenon whereas our 
findings indicate that news have an impact that goes far beyond a few seconds and 
traders may over-react or under-react to news, indicating that old surprises can still 
influence the market beyond their immediate impact effect. 
In the light of the past theoretical and empirical contributions of the news models, 
largely used to study high frequency fluctuations of the Euro-Dollar rate over periods of 
relatively calmness, this paper aims to investigate the determinants of lower frequency 
intra-daily fluctuations of the same rate during rather turbulent times marked by the 
occurrence of the most serious international financial crises of the past seventy years. 
Our goal is to assess if and to what extent trading behaviour may have been affected by 
the crises epitomized with the collapse of Lehman. To this end we extend the news 
approach to take into account other factors influencing the Euro-Dollar rate such as the 
role of unscheduled news and that of geographical “trading styles”, hence providing 
some original contributions under different perspectives. Firstly, we employ an intra-
day frequency that reflects a natural partition of the trading day into three geographical 
trading areas; secondly, the reactions of heterogeneous market participants is extended 
to qualitative surprises news and events; thirdly we include possible asymmetric effects 
(to positive and negative surprises) to stale news, that is the reactions to past events that 
occurred in previous trading areas and we interpret these over-reaction and under-
reactions at the lights of some behavioural finance biases.
4
 
                                                          
3
 We refer the interested reader to Neely and Dey (2010) who provide an excellent review of all 
contributions in this field. 
4
 Research in behavioral finance explains the presence of anomalies and price patterns that contrast with 
the standard EMH by investigating the relevance and the effects of investors’ psychology on asset 
pricing. The field of behavioral finance thus combines methods originated in psychology with the more 
traditional finance research methods. In doing so, it offers an alternative theoretical approach to the study 
of financial markets, taking impetus from the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). For an 
overall overview in the stock markets see, for example, Barberis and Thaler (2003) and Shiller (2005). In 
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Our results are consistent with earlier studies on news-approach: macroeconomic news 
and unscheduled news increased volatility significantly, and news on the United States 
are the most important. The hypothesis of bad news having a greater impact on 
volatility was also re-confirmed in this study. Similarly to Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2005), who used daily data from 1993-2003 to study the Euro/DEM-US Dollar 
fluctuations, we find that the exchange rate responds more strongly to news in periods 
of large market uncertainty and when negative or large shocks occur. In their study, the 
larger importance of US macroeconomic news was in part explained by the earlier 
release time compared to corresponding German and Euro-area news. Due to our 
partition of the trading day, we were able to pair more accurately news releases and 
trading areas and we found that although many Euro-area news are actually released 
before American news, still American news (scheduled and unscheduled) play a major 
role, particularly after the crisis. We also confirm Fatum et al.’s (2012) previous results 
in founding that the exchange rate reaction to macro news depends on the state of the 
business cycle, on the type of news and on their content (good versus and bad news). 
However in this study we were able to show that also the conditional volatility of the 
Euro-Dollar rate also depends on the state of the cycle and that it responds 
asymmetrically to positive and negative unexpected surprises especially after the 
financial crisis. As in Hayo and Neuenkirch (2012) we found that the Euro-Dollar 
exchange rate responds more to shocks originating from the real economy than to price 
shocks and monetary policy news (interest rate) and that macro news that originating 
from the United States dominates but we also found that unscheduled news, particularly 
in the post financial crisis period are relevant. Finally, in line with Jansen and De Haan 
(2005), who used daily data of the Euro-Dollar rate from 1999 to 2002, we consider 
unscheduled news such as statements by European Central Bank and national central 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the foreign exchange markets, among others, Oberlechner and Hocking (2004), De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 
(2006) and Oberlechner and Osler (2012). 
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bank officials and comments on monetary policy to study the reaction of the conditional 
mean and volatility of the rate. In their study they highlight that the Bundesbank 
dominated the news coverage and that the ECB statements have mainly influenced 
conditional volatility and in some circumstances the conditional mean of the Euro–
Dollar exchange rates. Our results point out that after the crisis the events and 
comments originating from the American trading zones are the most influential in 
affecting the conditional mean and that positive Euro and negative Dollar news have 
larger impact on conditional volatility. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in 
Section 2 the econometric methodology is introduced and explained, then in Section 3 
the data are presented, while in Section 4 the specification and estimations issues are 
discussed. In Section 5 the results and limitations are presented and commented. Finally 
Section 6 concludes and indicates directions for further research. 
2. Methodology and econometric model 
In our analysis we estimate a news equation of the Euro-Dollar exchange rate to assess 
the market reaction of investors following the release of different typologies of news 
(scheduled and unscheduled) at different times of the global trading day (GTD). Our 
econometric model captures the feature that the global trading day never stops and it 
runs through three main intervals or eight-hour time zones: Asian Time Zone (ASTZ), 
European Time Zone (ETZ), and an American Time Zone, (ATZ). The eight-hour time 
series have been built in the following order: the trading day starts in Asia (ASTZ), to 
continue in Europe (ETZ), and then in America (ATZ). 
ASTZ goes from the closing of Wall Street at 4PM EST in the previous day (10PM in 
Central European Time, CET) to 6AM, CET. ETZ goes from 6AM to 2PM, CET, 
before the ECB Euro “fixing” and the publication of important macro news in the US 
(8:30AM EST, corresponding to 2:30PM, CET). The ATZ goes from 2PM, CET, to 
10PM CET (4PM EST) of the current day. We thus see that our GTD does not 
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correspond to the astronomical 24-hour day as it begins two hours before midnight 
CET, on the previous day, and ends two hours before midnight CET, on the current day. 
The three values of the exchange rates are then placed at 6AM, 2PM and 10PM, CET. 
All the explanatory variables in our empirical relationships are recorded and coded 
according to a thrice-daily frequency and are placed within the three time zones. 
Therefore they can explain the Euro-Dollar returns at the corresponding three hours 
defined above. It is worth mentioning that this tri-partition of the GTD into three equal 
parts of eight hours is an absolute novelty in empirical modelling of exchange rates. In 
the literature of more dated equilibrium models time frequencies ranges from quarterly, 
to monthly and daily data. The most recent models typically use much higher 
frequencies (from hourly to five, one minutes and tick by tick) as a way to integrate 
more closely finance and economics and to provide a more microstructural explanation 
of currency fluctuations. The thrice-daily choice allows a finer attribution of policy 
events and news to a more homogeneous set of market participants (belonging to the 
same trading zones) and to differentiate across heterogeneous traders (belonging to 
different trading areas), without being disturbed by noisy data (in the ultra-high 
frequency) and to overcome the scarce heuristics of the empirical results, stemming 
from their use. Experience and common sense (enriched by countless discussions with 
Forex traders) has suggested that in order to meaningfully connect exchange rate 
movements and news, it is necessary to allow for some time to go after the news (be it 
scheduled or, most of all, unscheduled). The eight-hour time interval turned out to be 
heuristically and operationally the best, although some statistical purity is lost as in 
eight hours some other shock can hit the market. 
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Figure 1 
Global Trading Day and Time Zones 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The 24 hours Gobal Trading Day is decomposed in three symmetric eight-hour time zones: the Asian Time 
Zone (ASTZ) goes from the closing of the US trading at 22:00 Central European Time (CET) of the previous day (t-
1) to 06:00 am Central European Time in current day (t), the European Time Zone (ETZ) starts at 06:00 am Central 
European Time when the Asian foreign market is going to close and goes to 14:00 Central European Time. The 
American Time Zone (ATZ) goes from 14:00 Central European Time (equivalent to 08:00 am Eastern Standard 
Time, EST) to 22:00 Central European Time (or 16.00 Eastern Standard Time). Exchange rate closing quotes at 
05:00 am, 13:00 and 21:00 Central European Time are taken by hourly series. 
 
In order to shed some extra light on how news, expectations and market sentiment 
determines the wild swings of Euro-Dollar, this study uses – together with the 
traditional scheduled macro news - a relatively novel kind of news variables, called 
unscheduled news
5
, consisting of political news, policy statements, market news, 
interventions by Central Banks, unexpected monetary policy decisions and other events, 
all occurring somewhat randomly overtime or, even though expected to occur at a 
known time, having an unknown content or an ex-ante unpredictable impact on 
exchange rates, because of time-inconsistent decoding by heterogeneous traders.
6
 
The general specification of our model is as follows: 
 
Where ∆St = log(St /St -1 ) is the thrice-daily return between two consecutive time zone (t 
                                                          
5
 This definition is proposed by Ederington and Lee (1996), Fornari and Mele (2001) and Tivegna and 
Chiofi (2004). 
6
 The same line of analysis is used by Fair (2002, 2003), Fatum and Hutchinson (2002), whose approach 
is probably the closest to the one in this paper. The most recent papers in this approach are by Fratzscher 
(2008a, 2008b). 
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and t-1) sampled at the end of each relevant time zone. The symbols μ, , β’, and γ’ are 
parameters or vectors of parameters to be estimated and t is a stochastic error expected 
to be normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance. The letter L is the lag 
operator, and its exponential index indicates the number of times that the associated 
variable has been lagged. A three lags structure would cover the length of one global 
trading day.
7
 Lagged values of fundamentals and news variables should capture the 
reactions of traders operating in a specific trading area to past events and news 
originated in preceding trading areas meaning that an event can still exert some effect in 
a time zone different from the one when it occurred. The letter Y indicates a vector of 
fundamentals, the letter Z is used to indicate the vector of macroeconomic indicators 
and E(Z) is the vector of their respective expected values, so that their difference, in 
brackets, is the news or surprise that would move the exchange rate. The letter U is used 
to indicate the unscheduled news, mentioned earlier on and explained more in detail in 
the next session of the paper. We also consider asymmetries
8
 in the Euro/Dollar 
exchange rate volatility produced by large swings of Euro-Dollar and unaccounted for 
in the mean part of the model using an exponential GARCH (EGARCH) specification 
(Nelson,1991). The conditional variance of error terms is modeled as: 
 
where  and  
assuming a Gaussian distribution for the innovation terms we obtain (Hamilton, 1994): 
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 On estimation we also tried a fourth lag which represents the same time zone one day earlier. Lags 
longer than 3 periods were never statistically significant. 
8
 Andersen et al. (2003) show evidence of asymmetries in the UDS foreign exchange market returns 
versus Euro, DM, UKP and JPY while Fatum et al. (2012) document asymmetric (different) market 
reactions on the JPY/USD exchange rate for negative and positive surprise. 
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and 
 
The parameter φ is the asymmetry parameter. When φj =0, then a positive unaccounted 
surprise has the same effect on volatility as a negative surprise of the same magnitude; 
if -1 < φj < 0 a positive unaccounted surprise increases volatility less than an negative 
surprise (negative leverage). The parameter θ indicates the sensitivity of volatility to 
large unaccounted news. A positive value implies that the large surprises of both sign 
will increase the volatility. 
3. Data   
The construction of thrice-daily time series of exchange rates and of other fundamental 
financial variables (stock indexes and interest rates) was carried out paying meticulous 
attention to the alignment and correct attribution of each observation to its correct time 
zones
9
, keeping also track of changes in Daylight-saving time between the ETZ and the 
ATZ. The same was true for the rest of the scheduled news and unscheduled news, 
                                                          
9
 The task of assigning the stock indexes to time zones was easy as they start and end trading well within 
their respective time zones. The time zone assignment of interest rates was a little trickier. Contacts with 
the help desk of Thomson Reuters Datastream allowed us to use those time series of 10-Year interest 
rates, traded within their respective time zones (or approximately so). Scheduled news fell very well in 
our time zones and great care was employed to do the same for unscheduled news, as mentioned in the 
previous paragraph. Daylight-saving time (DST) differences on the two sides of the Atlantic required 
some attention. Corrections were needed when the time difference between the countries in the Eurozone 
plus UK and the United States (East Coast) moved away from the normal 6 span, going to 7 or 5 hours, 
according to permanence in DST in one geographical block but not in the other and viceversa. That was 
all the most important because a large bunch of US scheduled news, those released at 2:30PM (CET, in 
regular times), move from ATZ to ETZ, when the US is in DST but Europe is not. Other scheduled news 
were also affected. From 2003 to 2006, the problem had limited dimensions (but corrections had to be 
made, anyway), from 2007 it was absolutely necessary to cope with this issue. In fact, between 2003 and 
2006 Europe moved into DST in the last weekend of March and USA used to follow suit one week later 
in April. Between the same years above, Europe and USA used to go back in October to solar time on the 
same day (last Sunday of October). Starting from 2007, however, the US started moving into DST three 
weeks earlier, in March, and hence before the European change into DST, occurring during the last week 
of March. Changes occurred also in October, when the US goes back into solar time a week later than 
Europe. 
10 
 
attributing the news to the time zone interval (ASTZ, ETZ, ATZ) during which the 
news was released. 
3.1. Data: Dependent Variable and Fundamentals 
Thrice-daily data on exchange rates, for the set-up shown in Fig. 1, were extracted from 
an hourly time series of Euro/US Dollar obtained from CQG Data and maintained with 
data controls overtime. The St time series begins in ASTZ on January 1, 2003 and ends 
in ATZ, 6849 8-hour periods later, on August 31, 2011.Traditional exchange rates 
empirics take into consideration also interest rates differentials and, in more recent 
times, also stock indexes. The same was done for the high frequency employed in this 
paper. Daily data for Dow Jones, DAX, Nikkei 225, FTSE All Shares, 10-Year 
Government bond yield for US, UK, Germany and Japan, were obtained from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream.
10
 The variation in ten years government bond yield is measured as 
the 24 hours variation in the yield of public debt of the US, Germany, UK and Japan, 
computed on the end of day annualized yields of the 10–year bonds. Daily returns for 
stock market indexes assuming reinvestment of dividends are computed as 24 hours 
(logarithmic) change of the cum-dividends values of the indices for national stock 
market. 
3.2. Data: Scheduled news 
The next set of explanatory variables in equation (1), is about scheduled news. These 
variables are “unexpected” values of main macroeconomic announcements made by 
Government statistical Agencies and Departments, Central Banks, Institutes or Centers 
of Economic Research, National or Supranational Institutions. Amongst the global area 
of the Euro-Dollar exchange rate, during our sample period, 2003–2011, United States, 
                                                          
10
 In this paper we use 10-Year rates instead of very short-term interest rates as we are dealing with 
intraday movements of Euro/US Dollar. We made this choice as long-term rates have a much higher 
signalling effect on the entire yield curve, which is what matters for most traders. Besides that, short-term 
interest did not explain anything, as being moved by occasional and unpredictable liquidity swings in 
their money markets. 
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Euro-Area as a whole, Germany and United Kingdom have had a calendar of statistical 
releases of economic indicators made known well ahead (in fact at scheduled times), 
typically in the early hours of their respective trading zones, with a few exceptions, 
though.The scheduled macroeconomic “surprises” are computed by taking the 
difference between the actual value of the macroeconomic release, announced by the 
statistical authorities, and its expected value, collected by specialized organizations. The 
set of macroeconomic announcements and market consensus we used is form 
Bloomberg News Service.
11
 Because these surprises have different units of account, we 
followed the convention to standardize them using the standard deviations of the entire 
sample period according to the Balduzzi et al.’s, 2001 procedure. Table 1 summarizes 
the main characteristics of the scheduled announcements we considered for our study. 
The total number of macroeconomic indicators is 68 (25 for the United States, 17 for 
the Euro-Area, 14 for the United Kingdom and 12 for Germany). For each country or 
area we first classify the announcements according to frequency of release (monthly, 
quarterly or weekly) and provide the unit of measure of the indicator. Echoing Andersen 
et al. (2003) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) each announcement is then ordered 
within its frequency group according to its temporal sequence in the calendar month of 
release.
12
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 Bloomberg provides results of a market survey conducted usually 48-72 hours prior to the release of important 
economic indicators. The survey polls economists across the industry for their estimate of a particular statistic. These 
estimates are then averaged to provide the Bloomberg Survey mean and median estimates. 
12 For most US indicators data are generally released in the subsequent month. Forward-looking indicators 
(Consumer Confidence Index, Philadelphia Manufacturing Index) refer to the same month of release. US GDP data 
deserve special attention as there are three monthly readings of GDP releases: Advance (about 30 days after the 
previous quarter ends), Preliminary (about 60 days after the previous quarter ends) and Final (about 90 days after the 
previous quarter ends). Since the Advance version is the earliest release of GDP one would expect, a priori, that the 
advanced data surprise should have the major impact in term of market reaction. The same temporal pattern is usually 
followed by the macro announcements for United Kingdom, Germany and the Euro-Area (more casually for these 
latter two entities). 
12 
 
Table 1  
Summary of macroeconomic announcements 
        
Name of announcement Unit of 
announcement 
Release coverage 
 
Start date Final Date Source Number of 
obs. 
Announcement Time 
Euro-Area Announcements a  
(European Time Zone) 
Monthly        
Business Climate Indicator Index Data are for same month as the release month 07-Jan-2003 30-Aug-2011 DG ECFIN 95 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
ECB Rate  % level Data are for same month as the release month 09-Jan-2003 04-Aug-2011 ECB 105 13:45 am CET/07:45 am EST 
Economic Confidence  Index Data are for same month as the release month 31-Jan-2003 30-Aug-2011 DG ECFIN 101 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
Consumer Confidence  Index Data are for same month as the release month 31-Jan-2003 30-Aug-2011 DG ECFIN 100 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
Industrial Confidence Index Data are for same month as the release month 31-Jan-2003 30-Aug-2011 DG ECFIN 101 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
CPI Flash Y-Y% change Data are for the previous month 03-Jan-2003 31-Aug-2011 ESTAT 105 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
CPI Final Y-Y% change Data are for the previous month 22-Jan-2003 17-Aug-2011 ETSAT 105 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
CPI M-M% change Data are for the previous month 22-Jan-2003 17-Aug-2011 ESTAT 105 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
M3 M-M% change Data are for the previous month 28-Jan-2003 26-Aug-2011 ECB 102 10:00 am CET/04:00 am EST 
Unemployment rate % of labour force  Data are for two months prior  to release month  07-Jan-2003 01-Aug-2011 ESTAT 105 11:00 am CET/05:00 pm EST 
PPI  M-M% change Data are for two months prior  to release month  07-Jan-2003 02-Aug-2011 ESTAT 101 11:00 am CET/05:00 pm EST 
Retail Sales M-M% change Data are for two months prior  to release month  08-Jan-2003 03-Aug-2011 ESTAT 104 11:00 am CET/05:00 pm EST 
Retail Sales  Y-Y% change Data are for two months prior  to release month  08-Jan-2003 03-Aug-2011 ESTAT 105 11:00 am CET/05:00 pm EST 
Industrial Production M-M% change Data are for two months prior  to release month  17-Jan-2003 12-Aug-2011 ESTAT 105 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
Quarterly        
GDP Real Advance Q/Q% change Data are for the prior quarter 06-Mar-2003 16-Aug-2011 ESTAT 34 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
GDP Real Preliminary Q/Q% change Data are for the prior quarter 09-Jan-2003 08-Jun-2011 ESTAT 36 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
GDP Real Final Q/Q% change Data are for the prior quarter 06-Feb-2003 06-Apr-2011 ESTAT 34 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
Total      1543  
a)except for EBC rate and M3, before March 20004, all the indicators were released at 12:00 am CET/06:00 am EST 
Germany  Announcements 
 (European Time Zone) 
Monthly        
ZEW Survey Index Data are for same month as the release month 21-Jan-2003 23-Aug-2011 ZEW 104 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
IFO Business Climate Index Data are for same month as the release month 28-Jan-2003 24-Aug-2011 IFO 104 10:00 am CET/04:00 am EST 
IFO Current Assessment Index Data are for same month as the release month 28-Jan-2003 24-Aug-2011 IFO 104 10:00 am CET/04:00 am EST 
IFO Expectation Index Data are for same month as the release month 28-Jan-2003 24-Aug-2011 IFO 104 10:00 am CET/04:00 am EST 
CPI Preliminary M-M% change Data are for same month as the release month 26-Feb-2003 29-Aug-2011 DSTATIS 103 varies 
Factory Orders M-M% change Data are for two months prior to release month  10-Jan-2003 04-Aug-2011 DB 103 12:00 am CET/06:00 am EST 
Industrial Production  M-M% change Data are for two months prior to release month  13-Jan-2003 05-Aug-2011 DSTATIS 105 12:00 am CET/06:00 am EST 
Retail Sales M-M% change Data are for the previous month 07-Jan-2003 31-Aug-2011 DSTATIS 103 08:00 am CET/02:00 am EST 
Unemployment Level b M-M change level Data are for the previous month 09-Jan-2003 31-Aug-2011 DSTATIS 105 08:55 am CET/02:55 am EST 
Unemployment Rate b M-M% change Data are for the previous month 09-Jan-2003 31-Aug-2011 DSTATIS 105 08:55 am CET/02:55 am EST 
PPI M-M% change Data are for the previous month 23-Jan-2003 19-Aug-2011 DSTATIS 104 08:00 am CET/02:00 am EST 
Quarterly        
GDP Real Preliminary Q-Q% change Data are for the prior quarter 26-Feb-2003 16-Aug-2011 DSTATIS 35 08:00 am CET/02:00 am EST 
Total      1179  
b)before July 2005, varies        
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United Kingdom Announcements  
(European Time Zone) 
Monthly        
BOE Rate % Level Data are for same month as the release month 09-Jan-2003 04-Aug-2011 BOE 103 13:00 am CET/07:00 pm EST 
GFK Consumer Confidence Index  Data are for same month as the release month 30-Jan-2003 31-Aug-2011 GFK NOP 104 11:30 am CET/05:30 pm EST 
PPI Output  Y-Y% change Data are for the previous month 13-Jan-2003 05-Aug-2011 ONS 104 10:30 am CET/04:30 am EST 
Jobless Claim Change M-M change level Data are for the previous month 15-Jan-2003 17-Aug-2011 ONS 104 10:30 am CET/04:30 am EST 
RPI Y-Y% change Data are for the previous month 21-Jan-2003 16-Aug-2011 ONS 104 10:30 am CET/04:30 am EST 
RPI ex mort. Int. payment Y-Y% change Data are for the previous month 21-Jan-2003 16-Aug-2011 ONS 104 10:30 am CET/04:30 am EST 
Retail Sales ex auto fuel Y-Y% change Data are for the previous month 23-Jan-2003 18-Aug-2011 ONS 104 10:30 am CET/04:30 am EST 
Visible Trade  Y-Y% change Data are for two months prior to release month  10-Jan-2003 09-Aug-2011 ONS 103 10:30 am CET/04:30 am EST 
Industrial Production Y-Y% change Data are for two months prior to release month  14-Jan-2003 09-Aug-2011 ONS 104 10:30 am CET/04:30 am EST 
Manufactoring Production   Y-Y% change Data are for two months prior to release month  14-Jan-2003 09-Aug-2011 ONS 104 10:30 am CET/04:30 pm EST 
ILO Unemployment M-M% change Data are for two months prior to release month  15-Jan-2003 17-Aug-2011 ONS 104 10:30 am CET/04:30 am EST 
Quarterly        
GDP Real Advance Y-Y% change Data are for the prior quarter  24-Jan-2003 26-Jul-2011 ONS 34 10:30 am CET/04:30 am EST 
GDP Real Preliminary Y-Y% change Data are for the prior quarter  26-Feb-2003 26-Aug-2011 ONS 35 10:00 am CET/04:00 am EST 
GDP Real Final Y-Y% change Data are for the prior quarter  27-Mar-2003 28-Jun-2011 ONS 34 10:30 am CET/04:30 am EST 
Total      1246   
United States Announcements  
(American Time Zone) 
Monthly         
Philadelfia Manufactoring Index Index Data are for the same month as the release month 16-Jan-2003 18-Aug-2011 FP 104 12:00 am EST/18:00 pm CET 
Consumer Confidence Index Index (1985 = 100) Data are for the same month as the release month 28-Jan-2003 26-Jul-2011 CF. B. 104 10:00 am EST/16:00 pm CET 
ISM Index  Index Data are for the previous month 02-Jan-2003 01-Aug-2011 ISM 103 10:00 am EST/16:00 pm CET 
Average Hourly Earnings USD per hour Data are for the previous month 10-Jan-2003 05-Aug-2011 BLS 104 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Nonfarm Payrolls Thousands Data are for the previous month 10-Jan-2003 05-Aug-2011 BLS 104 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Unemployment Rate % of Labour Force Data are for the previous month 10-Jan-2003 05-Aug-2011 BLS 104 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Retail Sales  M-M% change Data are for the previous month 14-Jan-2003 18-Aug-2011 CB 104 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Retail Sales less Autos Fuel M-M% change Data are for the previous month 14-Jan-2003 18-Aug-2011 CB 104 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Producer Price Index M-M% change, Index(1982=100) Data are for the previous month 15-Jan-2003 17-Aug-2011 BLS 104 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Producer Price Index (Core)  M-M% change, Index(1982=100) Data are for the previous month 15-Jan-2003 17-Aug-2011 BLS 104 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) M-M% change, Index(1982=100) Data are for the previous month 16-Jan-2003 18-Aug-2011 BLS 104 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Industrial Production M-M% change Data are for the previous month 17-Jan-2003 16-Aug-2011 FRB 104 09:15 am EST/15:15 pm CET 
Leading Indicators M-M% change Data are for the previous month 23-Jan-2003 18-Aug-2011 CF. B. 104 10:00 am EST/16:00 pm CET 
Durable Goods Orders M-M% change Data are for the previous month 28-Jan-2003 24-Aug-2011 CB 104 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Personal Income M-M% change Data are for the previous month 31-Jan-2003 02-Aug-2011 BEA 103 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Personal (Consumer) Spending M-M% change Data are for the previous month 31-Jan-2003 02-Aug-2011 BEA 103 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Factory Orders M-M% change Data are for two months prior to release month  07-Jan-2003 03-Aug-2011 CB 104 10:00 am EST/16:00 pm CET 
Trade Balance USD Billions Data are for two months prior to release month  17-Jan-2003 11-Aug-2011 BEA 104 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Quarterly        
GDP Real Advance Q/Q% change Data are for the prior quarter 30-Jan-2003 29-Jul-2011 BEA 35 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
GDP Real Preliminary Q/Q% change Data are for the prior quarter 28-Feb-2003 26-Aug-2011 BEA 35 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
GDP Real Final Q/Q% change Data are for the prior quarter 27-Mar-2003 24-Jun-2011 BEA 34 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
GDP Deflator Advance Q/Q% change Data are for the prior quarter 30-Jan-2003 29-Jul-2011 BEA 35 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
GDP Deflator Preliminary Q/Q% change Data are for the prior quarter 28-Feb-2003 26-Aug-2011 BEA 35 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
GDP Deflator Final Q/Q% change Data are for the prior quarter 30-Jan-2003 29-Jul-2011 BEA 34 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Weekly        
Jobless Claims Number of claims(thousands) Week-ending Saturday before the release. 02-Jan-2003 25-Aug-2011 ETA 462 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Total      2539  
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Note: This table presents the mean features of macroeconomic announcements issued between 01/01/2003 and 31/08/2011 for the United States, the Euro-Area, United Kingdom 
and Germany. Announcements are first classified by country or area and then by frequency of release (monthly, quarterly or weekly). The table reports the unit of measure of the 
announcements (column 2), the sequence of announcement date corresponding to data for month X (column 3), the chronological ordered starting date for each announcement 
according to its release coverage and frequency of release (column 4), the date of the last observation for the announcement (column 5), the total number of observations for each 
announcement (column 6) and the time schedule of the announcement release in Eastern Standard Time (EST) and Central European Time (CET). The global 24 trading hours 
day is decomposed in three consecutive 8-hour time-zone and each announcement is assigned to one the three time zone according to its time of release. M-M % change is the 
percent change from month to month, M-M level change is the change in level from month to month, Q/Q % change is the percent change quarter over quarter and Y/Y % change 
is percent change year over year. Actual values and median forecasts are collected from Bloomberg News Service, dates of release from Econoday Economic Calendar. The 
sources of announcements are: -for the Euro-Area: DG ECFIN, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs-European Commission; ECB, European Central Bank; 
ESTAT, Eurostat-European Commission; -for Germany: BD, Deutsche Bundesbank; DSTATIS, Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt)-German Federal Ministry of 
the Interior; IFO, Institute of Economic Research (Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung); ZEW, Centre for European Economic Research (Zentrum für Europäische 
Wirtschaftsforschung); -for the United Kingdom: BOE, Bank of England; GFK NPO, Gfk National Opinion Polls, London-based arm of GFK (Gesellschaft für 
Konsumforschung-Society for Consumer Research); ONS, Office for National Statistics-UK Statistics Authority; -for the United States: BEA, Bureau of Economic Analysis-U.S. 
Department of Commerce; BLS, Bureau of Labor Statistics-U.S. Department of Labor; CF. B, Conference Board; CB, Census Bureau-U.S. Department of Commerce; ETA, 
Labor’s Employment and Training Administration-U.S. Department of Labor; FP, Federal Reserve of Philadelphia; FRB, Federal Reserve Board of Governors; ISM, Institute for 
Supply Management. 
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3.3. Data: Unscheduled News 
The unscheduled news typology is less frequently used in the econometric estimation of 
exchange rates empirical models.
13
 This is due to their nature: interpretation is 
necessary as their definition and perception by traders is quite idiosyncratic and time-
varying. The decoding process by traders is non-homogeneous overtime. Economic, 
financial, and policy evaluation schemes do change according to expectations and 
market situations. That makes quite hard to propose an unambiguous taxonomy of 
unscheduled news. In principle, unscheduled news consists of an economic, an 
institutional or a policy event, a declaration or a disclosure, which can be either totally 
unexpected or - even though expected to occur - has an unknown timing, or an unknown 
content or both and frequently producing weird and ex-ante unpredictable reactions 
from financial markets. This news typology, therefore, implies a process of expectation 
formation very different from that of scheduled news and most likely to be variable 
overtime. A taxonomy, a description and examples are reported, at length, in Appendix 
2.  Once identified, unscheduled news were coded as qualitative variables attributing 
them the value of (+1) or (-1) according to the following convention: unscheduled news 
were given a value of (+1) if their a priori effect was likely to strengthen the Euro-
Dollar exchange rate -either because they had a content directly favourable to the Euro 
or because they had a content directly unfavourable to the Dollar. Alternatively, the 
surprises were coded with a value of (-1) if it was more likely that they would produce a 
weakening of the Euro-Dollar rate. This coding convention allowed us to test for 
asymmetric effects by separating the unscheduled news according to their sign and 
using an interaction term for the strengthening news. 
                                                          
13
 For recent studies that used macroeconomic surprises and unscheduled news in stock and interest rates 
markets see, for example, Birz and Lott.(2011), Rosa (2011), Jiang et al. (2012) and Beetsmaa et al. 
(2013). 
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We stress again that every single unscheduled news was attributed to its own time 
zone
14, often using Bloomberg time stamps, and that, to avoid “double counting” effects 
and correlation issues between scheduled and unscheduled news, a consistent criterion 
of “non-overlapping” recording was used. According to this criterion – violated only in 
exceptional circumstances
15
- whenever a scheduled news was released in a specific time 
zone, any related or unrelated unscheduled news falling in the same time interval would 
not be recorded. Moreover, whenever several unscheduled news had occurred within the 
same time zone interval, only one would be recorded. 
Those unscheduled news that conformed to the typologies described in Appendix 2, 
were extracted from a large archive of daily events dating from 1998 (and before, see 
Tivegna and Chiofi, 2004) until today. This unique hand-collected archive of news – 
called informally Newsmetrics – contains, each day, on average between ten and fifteen 
daily articles and extended newsflashes from the Financial Times, the Wall Street 
Journal, Bloomberg News, Reuters and Dow Jones Newswires. Within this group, there 
have always been the daily articles on the foreign exchange market and on the US stock 
market.
16
 The richness and completeness of Newsmetrics has helped to isolate the 
“main” news of each time zone (not “of the day”).17 
In this paper, for each time zone ASTZ, ETZ, ATZ, the unscheduled news have been 
aggregated into a single vector. This decision of aggregating different typologies was 
                                                          
14
 The assignment of this single aggregate unscheduled news group to the three time and trading zones 
(e.g ASTZ, ETZ, ATZ) was carried out not on a nationality or area-pertinence basis but by the timing of 
the news. 
15
 When, for instance, an unscheduled surprise had an opposite a priory sign effect of a scheduled surprise 
released in the same time zone interval. 
16
 The above reliance mostly on newspaper articles deserves some extra speculation. In fact, the same 
idea of a tri-partition of the GTD is to a large extent due to the news search process employed in this and 
previous studies, Fornari et al. (2002), Tivegna and Chiofi (2004) and Cagliesi and Tivegna (2006). 
17
 So, for instance, in recent times, the communication of ECB council decisions on interest rates to 
financial markets (at or a little before 1PM, CET, well within ETZ) does not move Euro-Dollar that 
much. The ECB press conference, generally at 2:30PM CET, is in ATZ and assigned to this area, even 
though it is the most European event for financial markets, after the beginning of the Euro era in 1999. 
And the real reaction occurs there. 
17 
 
taken for two reasons: to reduce the number of explanatory variables and because some 
unscheduled news categories have somehow evolved.
18
 Given their qualitative nature 
and trinary/binary representation, unscheduled surprises have not been standardized. 
 
4. Estimates 
Before proceeding to estimating our model all news were tested for normality and white 
noise
19
 and tested for current and cross-correlations, to avoid - as best as possible – 
issues of collinearity and distortions. After this first statistical screening process, the 
initial phase of econometric procedure was carried out using a standard OLS estimates 
for the entire sample period -running from January 1
th
, 2003 and August 31
st
, 2011 - as 
a first exploration of the general specification of the news model and of the stability of 
coefficients. OLS estimates indicates that the relevant scheduled news were only a small 
subset of the originals ones (68) while all unscheduled were highly statistically relevant. 
We then began dealing with one of the main objective of our paper: to investigate the 
stability of the relationship between news and exchange rate dynamics, as determined 
by the unfolding of the financial crisis (subprime plus European sovereign debt) on 
policy-makers’ and traders’ behaviours. We divided our sample into two statistically 
determined sub-periods – before February 2008 and thereafter - to better catch the 
consequences on our equations originating from structural breaks due to the financial 
crisis. 
                                                          
18
 The process of news collection has been a daily process between 1998 and today. So it is quite likely 
that decisions to include unscheduled news in one category, or rather in another one, somehow changed 
most of all because communication to and within financial markets evolved quite rapidly over the years. 
19
 Table A1.1 in Appendix1 (Supplementary Data) reports the main statistical features of the entire 
sample of news and the results of Jarque-Bera and Ljung-Box tests. In tables A1.2 to A1.9 of the 
Appendix1 (Supplementary Data) we show the results of the analyses for correlation between news and 
cross-correlation with lagged news. 
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We used the OLS specification reported in Table 3 to investigate the presence of a 
structural break around the financial crisis period. The table reports the value of the 
Hansen test and of the Chow test, while Figure 2 shows the analysis of recursive 
residuals. The Hansen test is a test for general parameter stability based on the 
behaviours of the partial sums of the regression’s normal equations for the parameters 
and for the variance. We produce statistics and approximate p-values for the overall 
regression (coefficients and variance) as well as for each coefficient and for the variance 
individually. The test indicated the presence of a structural break in the parameter and in 
the variance. The Chow test, and historical hindsight, helped to position the structural 
break at the end of February 2008. Although the collapse of Lehman Brother on 
September 15, 2008 might have appeared to be a natural choice, the subprime crisis in 
the US had been mounting up from early 2007, with the accelerated deflation of house 
prices and the market started showing level of anxieties already at the beginning for 
2008, as showed by the graph of the recursive residuals. 
The indication in the Hansen test and the use of financial time series sampled in high 
frequency prompted us to take into account the possible issue of heteroschedasticity and 
to consider an ARCH-type of models. Given our research interests, we chose the 
exponential GARCH (EGARCH) models which enable to test for asymmetric response 
of the conditional volatility of the exchange rate to positive and negative values of the 
innovation term t of the exchange rate equation, and to the order of magnitude of the 
innovation term itself. We quantify these effects in the analysis of the volatility curve 
which is presented in the final part of section 5. 
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Table 3 
OLS estimation and stability tests  
 
Variable Coeff. Signif. S.E. p-value 
Hansen 
Stat. 
Signif. p-value 
  ∆Euro-Dollar{1} -0.0938 *** [0.0151] (0.0000) 0.2280   (0.2100) 
  ∆Euro-Dollar{2} -0.1320 *** [0.0139] (0.0000) 2.1296 *** (0.0000) 
  ∆Euro-Dollar{3} -0.0186   [0.0152] (0.2220) 0.0806   (0.6700) 
  ∆10-Year US Treasury Bond -0.2730 *** [0.0411] (0.0000) 1.4420 *** (0.0000) 
  ∆10-Year US Treasury Bond{1} -0.0294 * [0.0165] (0.0749) 0.2556   (0.1800) 
  ∆10-Year US Treasury Bond{2} -0.0486 ** [0.0223] (0.0290) 0.0538   (0.8500) 
  ∆10-Year JBG -0.0736 *** [0.0147] (0.0000) 1.0716 *** (0.0000) 
  ∆10-Year JBG{1} 0.0226   [0.0188] (0.2286) 0.4656 * (0.0500) 
  ∆10-Year JBG{2} -0.0306   [0.0244] (0.2101) 0.0774   (0.6900) 
  ∆10-Year Bund -0.0256   [0.0228] (0.2624) 1.3224 *** (0.0000) 
  ∆10-Year Bund{1} 0.1049 *** [0.0302] (0.0005) 0.2777   (0.1500) 
  ∆10-Year Bund{2} 0.0248 * [0.0145] (0.0871) 0.0869   (0.6400) 
  ∆Dow Jones -0.1030 ** [0.0425] (0.0153) 3.3244 *** (0.0000) 
  ∆Nikkei 0.0199   [0.0203] (0.3267) 0.6517 ** (0.0200) 
  ∆Nikkei{1} -0.0028   [0.0257] (0.9120) 0.2519   (0.1800) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ASTZ 1.0610 *** [0.0929] (0.0000) 0.7120 ** (0.0100) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ASTZ{1} -0.3947 *** [0.0711] (0.0000) 0.7090 ** (0.0100) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ETZ 1.0025 *** [0.0415] (0.0000) 6.6745 *** (0.0000) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ETZ{3} -0.0476   [0.0370] (0.1987) 0.3798   (0.0800) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ATZ 1.2647 *** [0.0572] (0.0000) 1.3815 *** (0.0000) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ATZ{1} 0.2054 *** [0.0353] (0.0000) 1.5778 *** (0.0000) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ATZ{2} -0.1060 ** [0.0431] (0.0140) 3.0419 *** (0.0000) 
  EUR_CPI Flash 0.2571 *** [0.0954] (0.0070) 0.0554   (0.8300) 
  EUR_PPI -0.0290   [0.1152] (0.8010) 0.1215   (0.4700) 
  EUR_GDP Advance 0.1117   [0.1356] (0.4102) 0.0313   (0.9700) 
  EUR_GDP Advance{1} 0.2783   [0.2442] (0.2544) 0.1570   (0.3600) 
  EUR_GDP Advance{2} 0.2059 ** [0.0895] (0.0213) 0.0280   (0.9800) 
  EUR_GDP Preliminary 0.2018 *** [0.0314] (0.0000) 0.0194   (1.0000) 
  EUR_GDP Preliminary{1} -0.0704   [0.0593] (0.2353) 0.3531   (0.1000) 
  EUR_GDP Preliminary{2} -0.0526   [0.0519] (0.3110) 0.1128   (0.5100) 
  EUR_GDP Preliminary{3} 0.1687 ** [0.0767] (0.0279) 0.2891   (0.1400) 
  GER_IFO Expectation 0.2659 *** [0.0913] (0.0036) 0.1038   (0.5500) 
  GER_IFO Expectation{1} 0.0214   [0.1218] (0.8602) 0.0945   (0.5900) 
  GER_IFO Expectation{2} 0.0628   [0.0476] (0.1871) 0.3195   (0.1200) 
  GER_PPI -0.1418   [0.1187] (0.2322) 0.0405   (0.9300) 
  GER_PPI{1} 0.1851   [0.1472] (0.2086) 0.2060   (0.2500) 
  GER_PPI{2} -0.1782 * [0.0984] (0.0700) 0.1561   (0.3600) 
  UK_BOE Rate 0.1756 *** [0.0495] (0.0004) 0.0557   (0.8300) 
  UK_BOE Rate{1} -0.3636 ** [0.1665] (0.0290) 0.1696   (0.3200) 
  UK_BOE Rate{2} 0.0930 ** [0.0369] (0.0118) 0.3118   (0.1200) 
  UK_BOE Rate{3} -0.0346   [0.1034] (0.7383) 0.3596 * (0.0900) 
  UK_GDP Advance -0.0512   [0.1072] (0.6332) 0.0504   (0.8700) 
  UK_GDP Advance {1} -0.2032 ** [0.0997] (0.0414) 0.0587   (0.8100) 
  UK_Visible Trade Balance 0.0910   [0.0832] (0.2742) 0.0397   (0.9300) 
  UK_PPI Output 0.1247 * [0.0695] (0.0726) 0.1013   (0.5600) 
  UK_Unemployment Rate 0.0119   [0.0905] (0.8952) 0.1168   (0.4900) 
  UK_Unmeployment Rate{1} -0.1300   [0.1261] (0.3026) 0.0509   (0.8600) 
  UK_Unemployment Rate{2} -0.0906   [0.0567] (0.1101) 0.1321   (0.4300) 
  UK_Unemployment Rate{3} 0.0766   [0.0898] (0.3938) 0.0824   (0.6600) 
  UK_Jobless Claims -0.0168   [0.1335] (0.8996) 0.0151   (1.0000) 
  UK_Jobless Claims{1} -0.2367   [0.2019] (0.2411) 0.0954   (0.5900) 
  UK_Jobless Claims{2} -0.1891 ** [0.0960] (0.0489) 0.0560   (0.8300) 
  UK_Jobless Claims{3} 0.0311   [0.1800] (0.8630) 0.1317   (0.4300) 
  US_GDP Advance -0.4826   [0.4118] (0.2412) 0.1115   (0.5100) 
  US_GDP Advance{3} 0.1190   [0.1177] (0.3120) 0.1936   (0.2700) 
  US_GDP Preliminary -0.2100   [0.1661] (0.2062) 0.1376   (0.4100) 
  US_GDP Preliminary{1} 0.0998   [0.0848] (0.2395) 0.2039   (0.2500) 
  US_ISM Manufactoring Index -0.4286 *** [0.1352] (0.0015) 0.4863 ** (0.0400) 
  US_ISM Manufacturing Index{1} 0.0587   [0.0516] (0.2556) 0.0459   (0.9000) 
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  US_ISM Manufactoring Index{2} -0.1204 * [0.0627] (0.0550) 0.0165   (1.0000) 
  US_ISM Manufactoring Index{3} 0.0875   [0.0922] (0.3424) 0.1005   (0.5600) 
  US_Nonfarm Payrolls -0.6740 *** [0.2568] (0.0087) 0.0986   (0.5700) 
  US_Producer Price Index (Core) 0.2069 ** [0.0854] (0.0154) 0.1882   (0.2800) 
  Constant 0.0085   [0.0103] (0.4092) 0.2569   (0.1800) 
  R2 0.3616       
  Durbin Watson 1.9846       
  Hansen stability test statistic        
  Joint 29.6271 ***  (0.0000)    
  Variance 4.2251 ***  (0.0000)    
  Chow stability test statistic        
  F (33, 6655) 5.3330 ***  (0.0000)    
 
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regression of intra-daily Euro/US Dollar exchange rate 
variations (∆Si,t) on interest rates yields (∆yi,t), stock market indexes returns (∆Ii,t), macroeconomic 
scheduled news for Euro-Area, Germany, United States and United Kingdom, unscheduled news and 
relative lags between January 2003 and August 2011. The model is first regressed for the entire sample 
period. Only variables with significant coefficient are retained and then used in a second-stage regression. 
The variables, except for unscheduled news, are standardized using the sample period standard 
deviations. Standard errors for coefficients estimates are in brackets, p-values in parentheses and lags 1,2 
and 3 for eight, sixteen and twenty-four hours intervals are in braces. To assess the stability of parameter 
estimates, we use the Hansen’s stability test. The Hansen stability test is performed using a joint test 
statistic and individual test statistics for each parameter in the model. We also test the existence of a 
structural break using a Chow test. Data from 1-Jan-2003 to 31-Aug-2011. (***) = statistically significant 
at the 1% level; (**) = statistically significant at the 5% level; (*) = statistically significant at the 10% 
level. 
 
In addition to asymmetric reactions in volatility we also investigate, with the help of 
auxiliary variables, the presence of asymmetric reactions of the exchange rate to the 
scheduled or unscheduled news included in the linear part of the EGARCH. To 
distinguish between those (accounted for) news included in the mean and those 
(unaccounted for) news that are embedded in the innovation term and affect the 
conditional volatility, we shall refer to the latter ones as to “unaccounted surprises”. 
EGARCH estimations are carried out in using the Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno 
(BFGS) optimization method. Given the explorative nature of our study, we did not run 
any test to evaluate higher order EGARCH and the specification and choice of the 
models was based on criteria such as convergence, t-test values, and a parsimonious use 
of lags. Many empirical studies use basic GARCH(1,1) to model daily conditional 
volatility.
20
 Based on this practice, and because our daily volatility is composed by three 
                                                          
20
 See for example Andersen et al. (2000) who point out the use of daily GARCH (1,1) as benchmark 
model in exchange rates volatility determination. 
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time intervals, we propose to use EGARCH with up to 3 lags.
21
 In discussing our results 
in the coming section we will generally make reference to the EGARCH(3,1) sub-
period1 and sub-period2 to indicate the models we estimated prior and after the 
financial crisis. 
 
Figure 2 
Recursive Residuals and Standard Error Band 
 
 
Note: This figure shows the recursive residuals and the upper and lower recursively generated standard 
error bands. The recursive residuals are obtained from recursive Least Squares estimations. If there is a 
break, the residuals will lie outside the band until the coefficients or the variance estimates adjust. 
 
5. Estimations Results 
The econometric results of EGARCH equations, are reported in Table 3.
22
 Before 
discussing results, we stress again the presence of lagged news. A statistically 
significant coefficient on a lagged news implies that a particular news produces its 
effect also in the following time zone(s). For instance, when American traders enter the 
market, they can still react to stale news that were released during the earlier European 
ETZ trading time, something which is frequently observed in practice. A reaction 
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 For both sub-periods –prior and post financial crisis- we also tried lower order EGARCH but they did 
either not converge (EGARCH 1,1) or converge too soon (iterations number lower than number of 
estimated parameters indicates inaccurate values of estimates) so we accepted our initial choice of an 
EGARCH(3,1) structure. 
22
 Table A.10 in the Appendix1 (Supplementary Data) reports the results of the OLS regressions for the 
two sub-periods. 
22 
 
elicited by a past event can confirm or counteract the original reaction produced at the 
time when the news was released. In the case when subsequent traders reinforce the 
original under-reaction or over-reaction of previous traders, the exchange rate will 
trend. In the alternative case, when subsequent traders counteract the over-reaction or 
under-reaction of the previous traders, the exchange rate will revert back. Behavioural 
theories have provided several explanations for the occurrence of traders’ under-
reaction and over-reaction to news ranging from loss aversion and disposition effect, to 
overconfidence. This will be discussed later. In what follows we discuss results of 
different categories of explanatory variables from fundamentals to scheduled news. We 
end this section with the discussion of the volatility curve. 
 
5.1. Results: Lagged exchange rate and fundamentals 
We, first of all, observe in all estimation techniques that the autoregressive component 
of the exchange rates includes three lags, (the equivalent of a one day dynamics of the 
adjustment). This lag structure was to a large extent expected given the convention that 
we use to split of the Global Trading Day into three trading zones and the fluctuating 
profile of exchange rates in high frequency domain produced by day-traders, who 
represent today a large share of world currency markets. The coefficients of the 
autoregressive process have all negative signs indicating the presence of mean reverting 
behaviour of the exchange rate. In accordance to the results of the Hansen test (Table 2) 
the coefficients of the autoregressive components differ significantly before and after 
the financial crises and this is particularly noticeable for the coefficient of the second 
lag.  
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Table 3 
EGARCH estimations of Euro-Dollar Exchange rate 
 
 PART A. EGARCH (3,1) Sub-Period1      PART B. EGARCH (3,1)  Sub-Period2     
 01/01/2003-29/02/2008      29/02/2008-31/08/2011     
Variable Coeff. Signif. S.E. p-value Variable Coeff. Signif. S.E. p-value 
Constant 0.0112   [0.0081] (0.1640)  Constant 0.0183 *** [0.0037] (0.0000) 
∆Euro-Dollar{1} -0.0772 *** [0.0108] (0.0000) ∆Euro-Dollar{1} -0.1282 *** [0.0090] (0.0000) 
∆Euro-Dollar{2} -0.1133 *** [0.0111] (0.0000) ∆Euro-Dollar{2} -0.0276 *** [0.0068] (0.0000) 
∆Euro-Dollar{3} -0.0262 ** [0.0106] (0.0133) ∆Euro-Dollar{3} -0.0225 *** [0.0054] (0.0000) 
∆10-Year US Treasury Bond -0.3093 *** [0.0199] (0.0000) ∆10-Year US Treasury Bond -0.1878 *** [0.0174] (0.0000) 
∆10-Year US Treasury Bond{1} -0.0345 *** [0.0114] (0.0024) ∆10-Year US Treasury Bond{1} -0.0677 *** [0.0200] (0.0007) 
∆10-Year US Treasury Bond{2} -0.0524 ** [0.0204] (0.0103) ∆10-Year US Treasury Bond{2} -0.0716 *** [0.0179] (0.0001) 
∆10-Year  JGB -0.0595 *** [0.0133] (0.0000) ∆10-Year JGB -0.0320 *** [0.0073] (0.0000) 
∆10-Year  JGB{1} 0.0123   [0.0135] (0.3640) ∆10-Year JGB{1} -0.0305   [0.0227] (0.1791) 
∆10-Year  JGB{2} -0.0304 *** [0.0116] (0.0085) ∆10-Year JGB{2} -0.0601 ** [0.0251] (0.0164) 
∆10-Year Bund -0.0194   [0.0178] (0.2766) ∆10-Year Bund 0.1354 *** [0.0130] (0.0000) 
∆10-Year Bund{1} 0.1075 *** [0.0164] (0.0000) ∆10-Year Bund{1} 0.1503 *** [0.0169] (0.0000) 
∆10-Year Bund{2} 0.0511 *** [0.0166] (0.0021) ∆10-Year Bund{2} 0.0419 *** [0.0119] (0.0004) 
∆Dow Jones -0.0490 ** [0.0226] (0.0298) ∆Dow Jones 0.2992 *** [0.0195] (0.0000) 
POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ASTZ 0.9329 *** [0.0514] (0.0000) ∆Nikkei 0.1284 *** [0.0116] (0.0000) 
POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ASTZ{1} -0.3628 *** [0.0343] (0.0000) POS_NEG Euro-Dollar _ASTZ 1.0026 *** [0.0122] (0.0000) 
POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ETZ 1.0039 *** [0.0349] (0.0000) POS_NEG Euro-Dollar _ASTZ{1} -0.2459 *** [0.0038] (0.0000) 
POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ETZ{2} 0.0918 *** [0.0353] (0.0092) POS Euro-Dollar _ASTZ{1} -0.1186 ** [0.0604] (0.0496) 
POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ATZ 1.1824 *** [0.0362] (0.0000) POS Euro-Dollar _ASTZ{2} -0.1836 *** [0.0537] (0.0006) 
POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ATZ{1} 0.1431 *** [0.0372] (0.0001) POS_NEG Euro-Dollar _ETZ 1.3972 *** [0.0291] (0.0000) 
POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ATZ{2} -0.1199 *** [0.0319] (0.0002) POS_NEG Euro-Dollar _ETZ{2} -0.0681 ** [0.0347] (0.0496) 
EUR_GDP Advance 0.0912   [0.1685] (0.5884) POS Euro-Dollar _ETZ -0.0913   [0.0640] (0.1538) 
EUR_GDP Advance{1} 0.3432 ** [0.1646] (0.0370) POS Euro-Dollar _ETZ{2} 0.0845   [0.0678] (0.2129) 
GER_IFO Expectation 0.2615 *** [0.0733] (0.0004) POS_NEG Euro-Dollar _ATZ 1.2523 *** [0.0647] (0.0000) 
UK_BOE Rate 0.1028   [0.1250] (0.4107) POS_NEG Euro-Dollar _ATZ{2} 0.0629   [0.0579] (0.2778) 
UK_BOE Rate{1} -0.4407 *** [0.1051] (0.0000) POS Euro-Dollar _ATZ 0.3557 *** [0.0881] (0.0001) 
UK_BOE Rate{2} 0.1000 *** [0.0164] (0.0000) POS Euro-Dollar _ATZ{2} -0.0787   [0.0637] (0.2167) 
US_ISM Manufactoring Index -0.4434 *** [0.0676] (0.0000) EUR_PPI -0.0961   [0.1107] (0.3852) 
US_ISM Manufactoring Index{2} -0.0995   [0.0786] (0.2056) EUR_CPI Flash 0.0258   [0.0970] (0.7903) 
US_Nonfarm Payrolls -0.5810 *** [0.0688] (0.0000) EUR_CPI Flash{1} -0.1471 * [0.0798] (0.0654) 
US_Producer Price Index (Core) 0.1509 ** [0.0606] (0.0128) EUR_CPI Flash{2} -0.0102   [0.0723] (0.8874) 
     EUR_CPI Flash_POS 0.1002   [0.1088] (0.3569) 
     GER_IFO Expectation 0.2348 ** [0.0957] (0.0142) 
     UK_BOE Rate 0.0742 *** [0.0038] (0.0000) 
     UK_BOE Rate{2} -0.1020 *** [0.0192] (0.0000) 
     US_GDP Advance -0.6660 *** [0.1920] (0.0005) 
     US_GDP Preliminary -0.2401 *** [0.0363] (0.0000) 
     US_GDP Preliminary{1} 0.0907 *** [0.0075] (0.0000) 
     US_GDP Preliminary{2} -0.2058   [0.1969] (0.2959) 
     US_Nonfarm Payrolls -1.0362 *** [0.0768] (0.0000) 
     US_Producer Price Index (Core) 0.2253 ** [0.0887] (0.0111) 
𝜔 -0.1069 *** [0.0129] (0.0000) 𝜔 -0.1775 *** [0.0226] (0.0000) 
γ{1} 0.1362 *** [0.0154] (0.0000) γ{1}  0.2391 *** [0.0538] (0.0000) 
δ{1} -0.1855 *** [0.0239] (0.0000) δ{1}  -0.4512 *** [0.0196] (0.0000) 
δ{2} 0.2704 *** [0.0155] (0.0000) δ{2}  0.7257 *** [0.0440] (0.0000) 
δ{3} 0.9075 *** [0.0158] (0.0000) δ{3}  0.7120 *** [0.0089] (0.0026) 
φ{1} 0.0154 * [0.0086] (0.0752) φ{1} 0.0268 *** [0.0226] (0.0000) 
 
Note: This table presents the results of exponential GARCH (EGARCH) estimations of intra-daily Euro/US Dollar exchange rate variations 
(∆Si,t) on interest rates yields (∆yi,t), stock market indexes returns (∆Ii,t), macroeconomic scheduled news for the Euro-Area, Germany, 
United States and United Kingdom, unscheduled news and relative lags between January 2003 and August 2011. Only variables with 
significant coefficient obtained in the entire sample period OLS regression model are retained and then used in second-stage EGARCH 
estimations. In the second step the model is computed for two consecutive sub-sample periods. Panel A and Panel B report the results for the 
EGARCH (3,1) models in the first sub-period (01 January 2003 22:00 CET to 29 February 2008 at 06:00 am CET; 4040 8-hourly 
observations) and in the second sub-period (29 February 2008 at 6:00 am to 31 August 2011 22:00 CET; 2744 8-hourly observations) 
respectively. The variables, except for unscheduled news, are standardized using the sample period standard deviations. The label _POS after 
the macroeconomic news name denotes variables computed only with realized positive surprises. The label POS before the unscheduled 
news denotes variables computed only with positive expected sign on the Euro/Dollar exchange rate. Standard errors for coefficients 
estimates are in brackets, p-value in parentheses and lags 1,2 and 3 for eight, sixteen and twenty-four hours intervals are in braces. In the 
conditional variance EGARCH models, 𝜔  is the intercept term,  (j=1) is the magnitude parameter,  (l = 1,2,3) the GARCH parameters 
and  (j=1) the asymmetry parameter. (***) = statistically significant at the 1% level; (**) = statistically significant at the 5% level; (*) = 
statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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The change in value of this coefficient affects the shape of the lag profile and mean 
reversion in the following way: in the second sub-period the autoregressive component 
of the exchange rate shows a progressively declining profile, as it would be normal to 
expect. However, during the period prior the financial crisis the autoregressive 
component shows a quite unnatural humped shaped profile.
23
 
The sum of the lag coefficients indicates that, over a period of one day, the exchange 
rate is expected to revert back by about 20% (18% in the second sub period). The main 
differences between the period preceding and the period following the financial crisis is 
the time frame of the mean reversion which would occur mainly within the following 8 
hours of trading (-0.128 after the 2008), rather than within the subsequent 16 hours of 
trading (-0.113 before the 2008) as shown in Table 3. One possible explanation of this 
phenomenon is that the uncertainty brought about by the financial crisis could have 
prompted day-traders having long positions to close them (and cash profits) more 
quickly than what they would have done prior to the crisis (16 hours)
24
 when the Euro 
was appreciating and expected to keep strong. 
Talking about mean reverting coefficients, a further remark can be made. Fluctuation is 
the standard movement in world Forex markets. In accordance to that, our analysis 
indicates that this can be clearly observed at jumps of 8 hours. Besides, periods of 
swinging appreciations, depreciations and flat trends certainly come to an end, but the 
fluctuations around trends are much more frequent than the trend reversions. Therefore 
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 To study this result further, we introduced an interaction term to capture possible different asymmetric 
effects of appreciations and depreciations of the exchange rate and tested for asymmetric adjustments. 
This version of the model is reported in Table A.11 of the Appendix1 (Supplementary Data). We obtained 
the following results: keeping all the rest constant, an appreciating exchange rate (as observed in the first 
sub-period, prior to the financial crisis) will cause a progressively declining mean reverting effect, 
because traders will expect an ever appreciating Euro-Dollar. In the second sub-period the rate had wide 
fluctuations around a flat-to-declining trend so the lag distribution had its traditional declining shape. 
24
 The main financial institutions typically work on two shifts for traders, across the three time zones. 
Most of them have an office on all three zones, allowing them to manage a trading positions opened in 
earlier time zones. 
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mean reverting trading protocols can impose an oscillating profile to Euro-Dollar and 
yield great money for day-traders. 
The relationship between interest rates and exchange rates is confirmed here with the 
expected signs in both sub-periods: an increase in the long term German rate (the main 
Eurozone financial market) strengthens the Euro whereas an increase in long term US 
rates produces the opposite effects. Japanese interest rates do not belong directly to 
movements of our currency pair. They enter mostly with a negative sign in sympathy – 
and because of the much wider business – with the US rates. The effect of Japanese 
interest rates on the Dollar-yen exchange rate is probably much bigger than that on the 
Euro-Dollar rate. That is consistent with our results. 
Looking at the lag structure of interest rates and comparing the magnitude of 
coefficients between sub-periods the following three observations can be drawn: firstly, 
all lagged reactions, all shorten than a day, are under-reactions meaning that traders of 
subsequent trading areas confirm reactions of the traders of the preceding area. 
Secondly, ranking the overall effect (the sum of the current impact and lagged effects) 
the USA rates exert the strongest effects (-0.328 in the second sub-period, -0.395 in the 
first sub-period), followed by German rates (0.327 in the second sub-period and 0.158 
in the first sub-period) and Japanese rates (-0.092 in the second sub-period and -0.089 in 
the first sub-period). Thirdly, following the financial crisis, the overall effects of the 
German rate on the exchange rate it almost doubles in magnitude (from 0.158 to 0.327) 
while the overall effect of the US rate is almost the same (from -0.395 to -0.328) but, 
interestingly its impact effects almost halve (from -0.309 to -0.188). The reduced impact 
sensitivity of the exchange rate to the US rate and the increased overall sensitivity to 
German rates can be a result of policies and growing fears about the stability of the 
Eurozone. After the financial crisis central banks of developed economies, led by the 
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Fed, have flooded the market with liquidity. Their massive purchases of government 
bonds, together with regulations forcing banks to hold safer and more liquid assets, and 
the flight to safety by investors fearing a breakdown of the Eurozone, have driven the 
UK, Germany and US government nominal costs of borrowing and yields to historical 
low while creating a government bond bubble. Expectation and implementation of 
Operation Twist led to a widespread lowering of yields on safer assets (government 
bonds) across developed economies. 
At the same time, the sovereign debt difficulties in the Eurozone caused wide 
expectations of a break-up of the Euro which may have induced a reduction of the Euro-
Dollar’s immediate reactions to the US interest rate, as investors have most likely not 
been so interested into moving Dollars into Euros and may have also induced an 
increased attention of traders to the rate of the strongest of the Eurozone economies. 
Another interesting result of Table 3 is the change in the relation between Dow Jones 
(DJ)
25
 and the Euro-Dollar rate in the second sub-period, which is something in line 
with what traders around the world have come to realize. Our estimates indicate that 
prior to the financial crisis an increase in the DJ would mildly strengthen the Dollar (-
0.049) by attracting financial flows into the US, the leading stock market in the world. 
In the second sub-period the effect of the DJ is much stronger and reverted in sign 
(0.299). As we said, this phenomenon has been a standard – and puzzling - feature in 
financial markets which has been partly explained by time-varying risk appetite.
26
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 The European indexes such as the German DAX and British FTSE do not appear here because they 
turned out to be non-statistically significant or because of their high correlation with the DJ. 
26
 This is connected with risk attitude and role of emerging markets, the primary beneficiary of the 
increased global liquidity, injected into world financial markets, as we recalled above, with increasing 
values in their assets ad currencies. It has been frequently observed that the positive relation between 
Euro-Dollar and DJ holds even at tick frequency. And when Wall Street is closed, the relationship holds 
also with the DJ futures. We have many ad hoc explanations. The risk appetite is the most popular 
(Kumar and Persaud, 2002) in the post financial crisis period, when the DJ started trending upwardly 
back again a positive DJ signalled an increase in risk appetite favouring investment in Emerging Markets 
and higher yielding currencies (the Australian, New Zealand Dollars and also the Euro). So a short-term 
27 
 
This is also justified in terms of a behavioural loss aversion bias as proposed by 
Prospect Theory.
27
 
Another possible explanation is that the negative relationship between the DJ and the 
Dollar is a good hedging opportunity for short-term trading in both markets, so it is 
possible that some kind of a stable relationship has established itself after the 
uncertainty brought by the financial crisis. At a time of very low US yields it is possible 
that hedged trading in the stock market and currency market has been seen as good 
opportunity. But the issue of the causality direction from the stock market to the 
currency market – or viceversa - remains wide open. Here it rather seems to exists some 
kind of a signalling simultaneous relationship as for some quite long periods in the GTD 
the Dollar and the Dow Jones (jointly with other US stock indexes) move together at 
tick frequency. The Nikkei index becomes relevant in the second sub-period (0.128) and 
this is because of the nature of the Dollar-Yen rate: a better yield on yen-denominated 
assets, stimulates carry trade and depreciates the Dollar, causing its appreciation vis-à-
vis the Euro, as the carry trade is stronger with the Dollar than with the Euro given the 
liquidity of the US Dollar market. 
 
5.2. Results: Unscheduled news 
Among the unscheduled news, the dominant ones in both first and second sub-period 
are those occurring in the ATZ trading zone –the American zone- and presumably these 
                                                                                                                                                                          
upward swing of the DJ would weaken the Dollar, more than the Euro for its very nature of having a 
higher worldwide circulation than the Euro. 
27
 An increased appetite for risk, in a period of uncertainty and of realized or expected financial losses 
seems a contradiction but it is actually much in line with the explanation offered by Prospect Theory 
(PT): loss aversion bias (an asymmetry in the value function between gain and losses which renders 
losses loom larger than corresponding gains) induces investors to become risk seeker on the loss domain 
so they tend to ride losses because in the attempt to avoid/reduce them or to regain profits, they engage in 
risk seeking behaviour, Kahneman and Tversky  (2000), page 41. 
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types of unscheduled news are more likely to be directly Dollar-related.
28
 Table 4 
reports calculations of the effects of unscheduled news on the exchange rate, as derived 
from the estimated coefficients reported in Table 3. For each sub-period these effects 
are distinguished in impact, delayed and net effect (which is the algebraic sum of the 
impact and lag coefficients). We also introduced interaction terms to test for the 
presence of asymmetric reactions to the sign of the unscheduled news and asymmetric 
effects were present whenever the interaction terms of the positive unscheduled news 
were statistically relevant. 
29
 Four comments can be drawn from our results. 
The first element to notice in Table 4 is the “time -zone bias”: as expected, for both sub-
periods, traders in each area react more strongly to their own news than to news of other 
time zones. The ranking of the magnitude of the effects of unscheduled news for both 
sub-periods is as follows: ATZ
30
, ETZ, ASTZ. The reason is clear enough: most of 
Euro-US Dollar trading occurs when London and New York are open at the same time. 
That occurs in ATZ. ETZ is the home of Euro trading. In ASTZ Euro-Dollar is mainly 
moved by other currency pairs and more rarely by events in this time zone (sometimes 
by events after ATZ closing, typically downgrades of European countries by US based 
rating agencies). The main movements in ASTZ come from foreign reserve 
diversification out of the Dollar by Asia central banks (China first). 
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 As to the US Dollar, it is worth remembering the famous “the Dollar is our currency and your 
problem”, pronounced by US Treasury Secretary John B, Connally, after the de-pegging of the Dollar 
from gold in 1971, at a time when international monetary relations were really tight. Solomon (1977, page 
179) and Sparke (2013, chapter 5). 
29
 The effect of a negative unscheduled news is given directly by the coefficient of the overall vector of 
unscheduled news which includes both positive and negative. However, the coefficient of the positive 
news would need to be computed by adding together the coefficient of the interaction term and the 
coefficient of the overall vector of unscheduled news (positive and negative). Asymmetric effects can also 
be computed for delayed reactions whenever the lag of the interaction term occurs to be statistically 
significant. 
30
 This is true except for the “dollar positive” (euro negative) unscheduled news released in the in the 
ATZ area during the second sub-period. The coefficient of this ATZ unscheduled news is smaller than the 
coefficient of the ETZ unscheduled news. 
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The second observation is about over and under-reaction of traders operating in 
subsequent trading areas. An over-reaction occurs when subsequent traders counteract 
the reactions of previous traders (inducing a reverting behaviour of the exchange rate). 
Under-reactions occur whenever traders in subsequent areas reinforce and confirm the 
reactions of previous traders (inducing a drifting behaviour of the exchange rate). 
Tables 3 and 4 show that lagged reactions are more common in the first sub-period than 
in the second and this is especially noticeable for the ATZ unscheduled surprises which, 
in the second sub-period, do not elicit any lagged reaction in subsequent areas and that 
exerts a noticeable bigger impact effect on the exchange rate when their content is 
adverse to the dollar (the coefficient is 1.608). This finding, that will be confirmed later 
on in the analysis of the volatility curve, suggests that the uncertainty of the financial 
crisis, in the second period, may have prompted a “higher sensitivity” and a quicker 
response to unscheduled Dollar-content news, especially when these unscheduled 
surprises are unfavourable to the dollar. The situation is different for the Asian market 
unscheduled news. In both sub-periods the Asian news-induced movements, tend to be 
partially corrected in European time (ETZ). This action of European traders tends thus 
to offset the over-reaction of Asian traders to ASTZ unscheduled news. By looking at 
other delayed reactions, it is interesting to notice again, in the first sub-period, a 
tendency of Asian traders to act to increase rather than to reduce the effects of 
unscheduled news coming from other trading zones, showing a sort of herding 
behaviour. In fact, as showed in Table 4, in the first sub-period both ETZ and ATZ 
news produce under-reactions mainly coming from Asian trading area (0.092 to 
European news and 0.143 to American news). This can be due to the fact that Asian 
markets are closed when a new market-moving event occurs in Europe or in the US, so 
Asian traders react when their market re-opens the following day, confirming previous 
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traders’ reaction and hence, under ceteris paribus conditions, producing a “drift” of the 
Euro-Dollar rate. This herding behaviour disappears in the second sub-period, which is 
characterized by abundant liquidity and frequent trading oscillations, and when actually 
Asian traders tend to correct European traders’ reactions (-0.068). 
The third observation is about asymmetric reactions to Euro or to Dollar 
positive/negative events. During the first sub-period there are no asymmetric reactions 
to ETZ or ATZ unscheduled news. In the second period, however, when markets were 
disturbed by the financial crisis and by the policy measures taken to contrast it, our 
results show a quite different picture. Asymmetric reactions are elicited by ASTZ and 
ATZ unscheduled news only (so presumably news refers more to Dollar-related events) 
mainly coming from American traders who correct more strongly Asian traders’ 
immediate reaction to ASTZ unscheduled news when these news are weakening the 
dollar (-0.365 which is the sum of -0.119 and -0.246) than when these news are in 
favour of it (-0.119). Overall the reaction to Euro-favourable (or Dollar unfavourable) 
news released in the Asian trading zone, leads to an appreciation of the Euro which is 
smaller (0.454) than the depreciation resulting from Euro-negative (Dollar positive) 
news. 
As explained earlier on, the second sub-period is characterized by the fact that 
unscheduled surprises occurring in the ATZ zone do not longer elicit any lagged 
reaction. However, these events provoke the asymmetric reactions of American traders 
who respond to ATZ dollar weakening unscheduled (ATZ) news more strongly than to 
ATZ dollar strengthening unscheduled. This asymmetric reaction can be interpreted as 
the working of a negativity bias, a well-documented bias in behavioural finance to 
indicate the human tendency to pay more attention to bad news about a reference point.  
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The availability bias (the tendency to weight more heavily most recent information) 
could also explain the reduced reaction to lagged information during sub-period 2. It is 
not unlikely in fact that these biases may have become stronger in the period following 
the world-wide financial crisis because of the higher expected or realized losses and 
overall increased uncertainty created by the crisis. 
 
Table 4 
 
Effects of Unscheduled News in the Time Zones 
 
 Pre-crisis (Sub-period1) 
 01/01/2003-29/02/2008 
Post -crisis (Sub-period2) 
29/02/2008-31/08/2011 
 Asia Europe USA Asia Europe USA 
    (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
Impact Effect 0.9329 1.0039 1.1824 1.0026 1.0026 1.3972 1.6080 1.2523 
Delayed 
reaction(s) 
-0.3628 0.0918 0.0232 -
0.5481 
-
0.2459 
-0.0681   
Net effect  0.5701 1.0957 1.2056 0.4545 0.7567 1.3291 1.6080 1.2523 
Type of effect  Over-
reaction 
Under- 
reaction 
Under-
reaction 
Over- 
reaction 
Over-
reaction 
 
 
Note: This table shows the effect of EGARCH estimated parameters of unscheduled news according the time-zone of reference. (1) 
are Euro Positive/Dollar Negative news and (2) are Euro Negative/Dollar Positive news. Over-reaction occurs when the initial effect is 
subsequently partially reverted while under-reaction occurs when the initial effect is successively reinforced. 
 
5.3. Results: Scheduled news 
As reported already, out of the 68 variables we collected, only a few scheduled news 
appear to affect significantly the exchange rate. As market experience indicates, many 
of the scheduled news are popular in some phases of the Forex markets but without the 
continuity which would make them significant over the entire sample period. By virtue 
of standardization, coefficients of scheduled news can be compared across themselves
31
 
and our results indicate that there are a group of surprises that are reliably relevant in 
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 We cannot compare orders of magnitude of coefficients of unscheduled and scheduled news since the 
former ones are binary not continuous variables and the latter are standardized. 
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both sub-periods, and these are: the German IFO Business Climate Indicator, in ETZ, 
and the Nonfarm Payroll, and the Producer Price Index, net of food and energy, 
corrected to take into account of the differences in daylight saving time weeks between 
Europe and the US in ATZ. Some other news, such as the first two readings of GDP in 
the European Monetary Union (EMU) in the ETZ area and the Manufacturing Index in 
the ATZ area are relevant only during the first sub-period, while some others such as the 
first Consumer Price Index Flash in Europe (EMU) and the first two of readings of the 
US GDP, become relevant only in the second sub-period. In discussing their effects we 
would also attempt a justification of this finding. 
The only non-Euro/Dollar variable, the surprise in the Bank of England rate, elicits 
some impact and lagged reaction. As indicated in Table 3, in the first sub-period the 
impact coefficient of this variable is positive but not statistically significant
32
 whereas 
its lagged coefficients indicate some effects. Thus for instance, an unexpected hike in 
the UK rate would likely lead to an immediate increase in demand for Pounds relative to 
Dollars and to Euros, which is recorded for a short period, till ETZ ends. In moving into 
the ATZ trading zone, the reaction of American traders in closing their positions in 
Dollars leads to a weakening of the euro (-0.441). Asian market (coming the following 
day) correct mildly this action (0.100) and the overall net effect is that an unexpected 
increase in the BOE rate leads to a depreciation of the Euro and vice versa mainly due 
to American action. In the second sub-period the situation is somehow different 
although the net effect of a positive surprise in the BOE rate is still to depreciate the 
Euro but the effect is much smaller (-0.028 after the crisis versus -0.340 of the first sub-
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 Possibly due to the fact that decisions are announced in late morning, almost a the end of the European 
trading time, prompting sharp end quick movements in the UK Pound-US Dollar rate. 
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period) and mainly due to a reverting Asian correction to the European traders’ impact 
reaction. American reaction to BOE rate seems to disappear after the crisis. 
Forward-looking business climate indicators, such as the German IFO and the US ISM 
manufacturing index, both very popular among traders, provide different information. 
Surprises of the IFO maintain very similar, stable and statistically relevant coefficients 
in both periods with no lags, whereas the US ISM Index is significant in the first sub-
period only. The coefficients have the expected signs (positive for the IFO and negative 
of the ISM). Why this difference in the two periods for ISM? Careful and informed 
market observation shows that, in recent years, the appetite in the US for these business 
confidence forward- looking indicators has grown considerably. All the District Banks 
of the Federal Reserve System publish their own business index, as the main tool to 
write the Beige Book.
33
 The Chicago, Philadelphia, Empire State (New York), 
Richmond, San Francisco indexes have all gained a national reputation. So, financial 
markets are well informed, when the ISM is published in the first day of the month and 
the resulting surprise (actual less expected values) very much “flattened”. 
It is interesting to note that as the surprises in this indicator lose power, the Nonfarm 
Payroll doubles in magnitude in the second period becoming the most powerful 
scheduled news to affect traders’ behaviour, after the financial crisis (form -0.581 
before the crisis to -1.036 after the crisis). This indicator is released in at the opening of 
the ATZ trading time when overlapping of ETZ and ATZ is at its peak. This contributes 
to explain partly the magnitude of its coefficient which captures the actions of European 
and American traders. The US Non-farm Payroll is published on the first Friday of each 
month and it is the most influential among all news in the financial world. The reason of 
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 This publication, assembled by the Board of Governors in Washington, gives a regional description of 
the economic situation in the various parts of the US. 
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its popularity resides in the very flexible nature of the US labour market, where hiring 
(when the economy is expected to pick up) and firing (in the opposite circumstance) is 
deemed to be a very simple process. As such, Nonfarm payroll is one of the most 
valuable indicator of the world.
34
 Its coefficient has the expected sign (a positive 
surprise would strengthen the Dollar) and, as mentioned above, its effect almost doubles 
from the first sub-period (of buoyant growth) to the second sub-period, where 
uncertainty over the US business cycle looms larger. 
US inflation has a small but important presence in our analysis. The Producer Price 
Index, net of food and energy, is a good forward looking indicator of future US CPI 
inflation. It keeps its positive, rather stable (slightly higher in the second sub-period) 
and significant coefficient in both sub-periods (0.225 post crisis versus 0.151 before the 
crisis). Interestingly, surprises in the EMU Consumer Price Flash index (an early 
estimate of the CPI) prompt only some lagged effects all coming from ATZ zone 
(0.026) and only after the crisis. Under normal circumstances, one would reasonably 
expect that higher than expected inflation would trigger a strengthening of the Euro via 
expectations of higher interest rates. However the liquidity trap and the European 
sovereign debt problems have possibly weakened this theoretical link, as indicated by 
the impact coefficient of the CPI flash which turns out to be not statistically relevant. 
The massive and widespread use of unconventional monetary tools to fight the “great 
recession” and to help a weak recovery has emptied the theoretical role of the CPI 
indicator in its own zone. In the second sub-period, central banks in developed 
economies, and the ECB in particular, have become noticeably less worried about their 
inflation targeting, more concerned to avoid choking off a feeble recovery and more 
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 That was all the most true at the time of the adage “when the US sneezes, the rest of the world takes a 
cold” was popular. It is to some extent true today as well, after the emersion of the “emerging” markets, 
because a sizable share of their production is drawn by US consumption. But beyond this situation, the 
Nonfarm payroll still represents a good and widely respected “excuse” to buy or sell financial assets. 
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willing to act unconventionally and do “whatever it takes”35 to avoid the currency crisis. 
This new attitude is captured by the lag coefficient of the CPI: an increase in the index 
has an effect in the American zone, when European traders close their position, and it 
weakens the Euro. In other words, higher than expected CPI inflation is perceived as 
“more troubles” for the Euro, given the limited margin of manoeuvring left to the 
European Central bank in front of the urgency to help the recovery and avoid the Euro 
collapse. 
The GDP readings in the US have always raised a lot of interest in financial markets, 
and not only there. Our results show that this indicator (in its advanced and preliminary 
versions) is never significant in the first sub-period (where the ISM Index is) but it is so 
in the second sub-period (when the ISM is not). Financial market experience suggests 
that in the first sub-period (2003-2007) the US economy has been growing quite fast 
and regularly, so it is possible that attention to GDP was smaller than in the second sub-
period, when growth has been crippled by the sub-prime financial crisis. Probably 
politicians and market participants have been scanning GDP numbers much more 
anxiously and thus have probably recorded much sharper reactions to this type of 
scheduled news. The same explanation given for attention to the Nonfarm Payroll 
announcements is valid here: in bad times, important macro surprises produce much 
wider reactions. 
If surprises in the USA GDP become particularly relevant in the post crisis period, 
surprises in the EMU GDP lose their role after the crisis. In fact, the EMU GDP first 
reading advance) news produced some effects only in the first sub-period and mainly 
because of American traders’ reactions (0.343). In the earlier years of the Euro, GDP 
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 ECB Governor Mario Draghi on July 26, 2012 in London. Adding: “ Believe me, it will be enough”. 
Financial Times, online edition, same day. This date is outside our estimation sample, but use of 
unconventional instruments by, ECB and the Fed, dates  much earlier. One of the most unconventional for 
the ECB, namely the LTRO (Long Term Refinancing Operation), was taken in 2011. 
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numbers were computed more quickly by domestic statistical offices than by Eurostat. 
So European traders were in those years were well informed, ahead of the aggregate 
Eurozone data. It reasonable to imagine that American traders (from banks not 
represented in London) could most likely have been more reactive to aggregate 
European data, as they have traditionally done so to their own GDP releases for many 
years.  
5.4. Analysis of the volatility curves  
The estimated coefficients of the EGARCH volatility equations are: 
 
 
 + 
 
The first observation to make is that for both sub-periods the conditional variance of 
each trading interval is affected by its past values up to a 24 hours delay because all 
coefficients of past volatility are statistically relevant up to three lags. The transmission 
is high and in the absence of any new “unaccounted“ surprise, the volatility would die 
out, although slowly, as it can be showed by summing up the coefficients of the lags of 
the conditional variance. 
For the first sub-period the asymmetric coefficient (0.015) is barely statistically relevant 
(significant only at 10%) but it becomes relevant and substantially bigger (0.027) after 
the financial crisis. For both sub-periods the asymmetric coefficient is positive, meaning 
that a positive surprise (for instance large positive movements, not accounted for in the 
specification of the EGARCH mean and hence left in the error term, due, for instance, 
to trading positioning causing sharp swings in Euro-Dollar) increases the conditional 
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volatility of the Euro-Dollar rate more than a negative surprise of the order of 
magnitude would. 
Studies on volatility of stock returns have found evidence of what they described as 
“leverage effect”: a negative (bad) surprise increased the volatility of stock prices more 
than positive (good) surprises of the same magnitude.
36
 However, in dealing with 
exchange rate, one ought to remember that it is a relative price and that the Dollar holds 
the privileged status of being the international reserve currency. A positive 
“unaccounted” news in the Euro-Dollar rate equation is Euro-positive but at the same 
time Dollar-negative, because of our definition of this currency pair. Therefore, an 
asymmetric reaction to positive innovations implies the market becomes more 
“nervous” in terms of increased volatility in the immediate future when hit by 
“unaccounted” surprises that weaken the Dollar rather than to unaccounted surprise of 
the same magnitude that weaken the Euro. This is especially true after the occurrence of 
the financial crisis. 
The coefficient associated with the size of the standardized innovation (i.e. the 
coefficient that multiplies the standardized absolute innovation) is statistically relevant 
and positive in both sub-periods and it becomes substantially bigger after the financial 
crisis (0.133 in sub-period1 and 0.239 in sub-period2). Again the financial crisis seems 
to have amplified the reaction of volatility to “big” surprises of both signs. In other 
words, the swing in the exchange rate triggered by a big unexplained surprise would be 
more pronounced after the crisis than before due perhaps the increased uncertainty 
brought by the crisis and fears of losses. 
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 The leverage effect is due to the fact that a bad news, by reducing the price of the stock, increases the 
risk of holding equity because of the reduced values of the stock relative to corporate debt. 
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Taking into account the combined effects of sign and size of unaccounted surprises, we 
can conclude that unaccounted news that weaken the Dollar and strengthen the Euro 
tend to increase the conditional volatility in the immediate future much more than same 
size news that strengthen the Dollar and weaken the Euro, a result similar to the 
“leverage effect” in the stock market literature. 
To quantify the impact of positive and large “unaccounted” surprises on volatility, one 
ought to transform equations into a non-logarithmic form. This is because the 
quantification of the asymmetric and magnitude effects on volatility is made 
complicated by the fact that the EGARCH is a semi-log form with the regressand 
expressed in logs and the regressors expressed in both logarithmic and linear forms; and 
by the fact that the regressand is in variance term while part of the regressors are in 
volatility terms (standard deviations) terms. 
We then compute the news impact curve coming from the EGARCH specification of 
each sub-period, and we compare the curves to see if and to what extent the financial 
crisis produced any effect on the behavior conditional volatility of the Euro-Dollar rate. 
The volatility curves are obtained by computing the square root of the anti-log 
transformation of the conditional variance (equations 3.1 and 3.2) for different values of 
the standardized and absolute standardized innovations (z-variable).
37
 Table 5 reports 
the results. To understand the magnitude of the effects of unaccounted surprises on 
volatility we consider 3 different sizes of the “volatility” surprises: the small/medium 
positive surprises that fall in the interval between zero to 1 and that can occur with a 
probability of 34%; the larger positive surprises that range from 1 to 1.65 and that occur 
with a probability of 11%; and the big positive surprises that range between 1.26 and 
                                                          
37
 The probability of a positive standardized innovation falling between 0 and 1 is 34%, while the one 
associated with one falling between 0 and 1.65 is 45% and one falling between 0 and 2.33 is 49%. 
Negative innovations have same values of probabilities taken on the left side of the standardized curve. 
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2.33 and can occur with a probability of 4%. The same classification applies to negative 
surprise.
38
 For each of these possible intervals we consider only one value: the value of 
each interval’s upper bound. So we have 6 possible cases: 3 cases when (standardized) 
positive surprises take the value of 1, 1.65 and 2.33 and 3 cases when (standardized) 
negative surprises take the values of (-1), (-1.65) and (-2.33). 
We can now quantify the post financial crisis increase in the reaction of volatility to 
unaccounted surprises of any sign and size: for instance a large Euro positive/Dollar 
negative surprise (+2.33) would increase the conditional volatility of about 36.32% after 
the crisis compared to an increase of 19.32% prior to the crisis. The same result is 
obtained when looking at negative surprises: for instance a large negative surprise        
(-2.33) increases the volatility by 28% compared to an increase of 15% prior to the 
crisis. Similar results hold for positive and negative medium (+1.65 and -1.65) surprises 
and for positive and negative smaller surprises (+1 and -1). Thus, as expected, the crisis 
brought along a general and pronounced increase in Euro/Dollar volatility. So, when we 
compare sizes of surprises we can see that with a probability of 4% (which is the 
probability of a surprise to fall between + 1.65 and +2.33) the volatility would increase 
between 24.53% and 36.32% in the second sub-period but only between 13.32% and 
19.32% in the first sub-period. 
It is also possible to quantify the second interesting result of our EGARCH estimates, 
namely the post financial crisis increase in the asymmetric reaction of the conditional 
volatility to positive and negative surprise. From the table above, we can see that, for 
instance, after the crisis the percentage impact on volatility of a large Euro positive 
(+2.33) and of a large Euro negative (-2.33) surprises are about 36.32% for positive and 
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 Small/medium negative surprises range between (-1) and zero with a probability of 34%. The larger 
negative range from (-1.65) to (-1) with a probability of 11%. The big negative surprises range between  
(-2.33) and (-1.65) with a probability of 4%. 
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about 28.06% for negative surprise. However, the volatility reaction to the same size of 
surprises before the crisis would have been smaller and less asymmetric with a 
percentage impact of 19% for large Euro positive surprises and of 15% for large Euro 
negative surprises. Thus the financial crisis brought not only an increase in volatility to 
any size and sign of surprises but also an increase in the “spread” of the asymmetric 
reactions to positive and negative surprises of any order of magnitude. 
To summarize our results: after the financial crisis the market has become much more 
“nervous” and hence volatile in front of unaccounted surprises, particularly so when 
these surprises have been Dollar weakening and Euro strengthening. This is not 
surprising: although the financial crisis originated in the Dollar (with the subprime 
crisis), it moved later towards the Euro (with Europe’s sovereign debt problems), 
making the Dollar a “safer” option, especially if one considers its privilege of being the 
international reserve currency. Financial behavioral insights can also explain this 
finding: in a period of increased uncertainty, characterized by global economic 
recession or feeble recover and by acute political issues that threatened the very 
existence of the Euro, the traders’ behavior of increased sensitiveness to Dollar 
weakening surprises is in line with a human behavioral bias (negativity bias) that make 
us pay more attention and give more weight to negative rather than positive information 
about our reference point. 
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Table 5 
Effects of EGARCH parameters on volatility 
 
 Negative unaccounted surprises    Positive unaccounted surprises 
        
  
-1 
 
-1.65 
 
2.33 
  
 +1 
 
+1.65 
 
+2.33 
Sub-period1 
01/01/2003-29/02/2008 
       
 
0.9923 0.9874 0.9822  1.0077 1.0128 1.0181 
(% effect on  ) 
-0.77% -1.26% -1.78%  0.77% 1.28% 1.81% 
 
1.0705 1.1189 1.1720  1.0705 1.1189 1.1720 
(% effect on  ) 
7.05% 11.89% 17.20%  7.05% 11.89% 17.20% 
 
1.0623 1.1048 1.1511  1.0787 1.1332 1.1932 
(% effect on  ) 
6.23% 10.48% 15.11%  7.87% 13.32% 19.32% 
Sub-period2 
29/02/2008-31/08/2011 
       
 
0.9867 0.9781 0.9693  1.0135 1.0224 1.0317 
(% effect on  ) 
-1.33% -2.19% -3.07%  1.35% 2.24% 3.17% 
 
1.1270 1.2181 1.3212  1.1270 1.2181 1.3212 
(% effect on  ) 
12.70% 21.81% 32.12%  12.70% 21.81% 32.12% 
 
1.1120 1.1914 1.2806  1.1422 1.2453 1.3631 
(% effect on  ) 
11.20% 19.14% 28.06%  14.22% 24.53% 36.31% 
  
 Note: This table shows the effects of EGARCH estimated parameters on the volatility of the error terms. The EGARCH (3,1) 
coefficients are taken from the estimated logarithmic equation of the conditional variance as reported in Table 3 for the two 
consecutive sub-sample periods. To quantify the effects of different sizes of unaccounted surprises we take the square root of the 
anti-log transformation of the conditional variance equations. In the EGARCH the absolute standardized innovation is centered at 
0.79 (square root of 2/π). The simplification used in the specification affect only the constant term as showed below. The base case 
is  equal to zero and can be compared with the impact of the coefficient of the sign. 
 
 
 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
This study aimed to investigate the determinants of the Euro-Dollar exchange rate 
behaviour and to assess if the financial crisis had contributed to alter its dynamics. Our 
approach differs from previous contributions in several ways: firstly we employ a 
thrice-daily frequency that reflects a “natural” partition of the trading day into three 
geographical trading areas, namely Asian, European and American trading time 
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intervals; secondly we use both quantitative and qualitative news and events to ascertain 
the market reactions to different surprises that hit the market during the 24 hour trading 
day; thirdly we test for the presence of asymmetric effects to positive and negative 
surprises and for the presence of over-reaction and under-reaction to past news; lastly, 
we put trading behavior into an historical perspective and use some behavioural insights 
to study if and to what extent traders’ behaviour may have been affected by the 
international financial crisis initiated in 2007-2008. We believe that this enriched 
approach can provide some useful insights to better understand differences across 
trading areas and structural changes triggered by the 2007-2008 events. We found that 
indeed the financial crisis affected the Euro-Dollar dynamics and its conditional 
volatility. Following the crisis we highlight that the Euro-Dollar displays a quicker and 
stronger mean reverting process as if traders would be more inclined to keep their 
position for shorter periods. We also observe an increased propensity to show 
asymmetric reactions, in the mean (via unscheduled news) and in the conditional 
volatility of the EGARCH to surprises and events weakening dollar vis-à-vis the euro, 
as if traders were affected by a sort of behavioural negativity bias to unfavourable news 
related to the dollar. Moreover, some changes in the fundamentals, noticeably the 
relevance and the sign of the DJ seems to suggest a “risk” reaction to policies and a 
more pronounced loss aversion attitude, which might have induced an appetite for risk 
during a period of higher realized or potential losses. Our results shows that there is an 
increased importance of unscheduled events, particularly those ones generated in the 
American trading zone. There is also difference in the pattern of over-reaction and 
under-reaction to past event and a clear reduced importance of lagged scheduled and 
unscheduled news, with a parallel stronger effects of current news (showing a possible 
availability bias effect), particularly the news of pro-cyclical leading (IFO, Nonfarm 
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Payroll) and coincident indicators (USA GDP) of the real economy. Although the use of 
the EGARCH (3,1) allowed us to account for asymmetries and lags of surprises, we 
recognize that one potential limitation of our study is that a multivariate EGARCH 
model specification that includes other currencies (UK Pound and Japanese Yen), and 
scheduled/unscheduled news related to alternative pairs could further improve our 
comprehension on how investors in different trading time zones react to a broader set of 
information. Another promising avenue of our research is to use the estimated models 
for day-trading decisions in two ways. First of all, for the information offered by the 
paper on the possible strategies by traders, across time zones, in response to news of the 
current zone or of the previous ones. Secondly, the models, by themselves, can be used - 
in forecasting mode - to give thrice-daily trading signals to go long or short on the Euro-
Dollar. 
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Appendix 1 - Supplementary Data 
 
Table A1.1  
Descriptive Statistics Macroeconomics News 
 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Positive 
Surprises 
Negative 
Surprises 
Zero 
Surprises 
Jarque-Bera p-value Q(1) p-value Q(2) p-value 
Euro-Area News               
Business Climate Indicator  0.0087 0.2013 -0.1468 3.2703 49 46 0 1.11 (0.5727) 3.1476* (0.0760) 8.9519** (0.0114) 
ECB Rate  0.0000 0.0004 1.8120 34.7951 2 1 102 85.83*** (0.0000) 0.0011 (0.9733) 0.0023 (0.9989) 
Economic Confidence  0.0218 1.5208 -0.6649 5.2053 51 42 8 16.23*** (0.0003) 3.1466* (0.0761) 8.8948** (0.0117) 
Consumer Confidence  -0.1150 1.1892 0.1812 6.8348 27 33 40 15.72*** (0.0004) 1.1305 (0.2877) 7.9700** (0.0186) 
Industrial Confidence  0.0188 1.3874 -0.4457 3.8333 35 33 33 6.44** (0.0400) 5.9728** (0.0145) 15.9307*** (0.0003) 
CPI Y-Y Flash  0.0000 0.0012 0.1817 4.0513 29 29 47 4.62* (0.0995) 1.5483 (0.2134) 1.6836 (0.4309) 
CPI Y-Y Final  0.0000 0.0005 -0.0584 3.6099 12 17 76 2.08 (0.3528) 0.4045 (0.8169) 1.5483 (0.2134) 
CPI M-M  -0.0001 0.0007 -0.5951 5.7601 16 21 68 17.67*** (0.0001) 0.0094 (0.9228) 3.6844 (0.1585) 
M3   0.0002 0.0017 -0.1507 3.2686 45 37 20 1.170 (0.5576) 3.4351* (0.0638) 7.526** (0.0232) 
PPI M-M  -0.0002 0.0016 -1.8898 12.806 26 33 46 65.95*** (0.0000) 5.627** (0.0177) 14.2352*** (0.0008) 
Retail Sales M-M  -0.0017 0.0055 -0.2445 2.9396 31 60 10 1.15 (0.5639) 0.3617 (0.5475) 2.0704 (0.3552) 
Retail Sales Y-Y  -0.0023 0.0096 0.0145 2.8108 43 57 4 0.03 (0.9874) 10.48*** (0.0012) 10.706*** (0.0047) 
Unemployment Rate  0.0000 0.0009 0.6360 5.9629 22 27 56 19.25*** (0.0001) 1.2445 (0.2646) 2.2597 (0.3231) 
Industrial Production  -0.0008 0.0053 -0.3759 3.3287 45 55 5 3.58 (0.1672) 0.2808 (0.5962) 0.3495 (0.8397) 
GDP Advance  0.0000 0.0018 -0.1456 3.7631 13 14 7 2.02 (0.3647) 3.4601 (0.1773) 3.4601 (0.1773) 
GDP Preliminary  0.0000 0.0003 0.8800 11.8289 2 1 33 22.85*** (0.0000) 4.6806** (0.0305) 4.6955* (0.0956) 
GDP Final  -0.0001 0.0005 -0.3982 4.6933 2 5 27 5.44* (0.0658) 0.0607 (0.8054) 2.8168 (0.2445) 
Total      450 511 582       
Germany News                
Zew Survey  -0.3625 8.1997 0.1665 2.7861 46 58 0 0.58 (0.7478) 14.7086*** (0.0001) 17.7065*** (0.0001) 
IFO Business Climate  0.3010 1.2942 0.0484 3.5087 63 39 2 1.64 (0.4395) 3.9087** (0.0480) 3.9198 (0.1409) 
IFO Current Assessment  0.3904 1.5110 0.3431 2.9167 62 41 1 2.21 (0.3305) 0.1672 (0.6826) 4.2870 (0.1172) 
IFO Expectation  0.2971 1.4807 -0.3860 3.5700 64 35 5 4.60 (0.1005) 7.5347*** (0.0061) 11.4566*** (0.0033) 
CPI Preliminary  -0.0001 0.0016 -0.3563 2.5604 39 36 28 3.14 (0.2078) 5.6592** (0.0174) 6.9445** (0.0310) 
Factory Orders  0.0007 0.0262 -0.0730 2.4409 51 49 3 1.88 (0.3907) 0.5154 (0.4728) 0.8205 (0.6635) 
Industrial Production  -0.0019 0.0149 -0.0327 3.2501 46 56 3 0.70 (0.7032) 1.7187 (0.1899) 2.8066 (0.2458) 
Retail Sales  -0.0061 0.0156 0.5554 3.5960 30 68 5 7.29** (0.0261) 4.3465** (0.0371) 7.2296** (0.0269) 
Unemployment Level  -8486 3282 0.0612 3.8283 40 62 3 3.04 (0.2192) 6.5531** (0.0105) 6.559** (0.0376) 
Unemployment Rate  -0.0003 0.0011 -0.5009 2.7811 26 39 40 4.56 (0.1021) 6.9332*** (0.0085) 8.5596** (0.0138) 
PPI  0.0006 0.0039 -0.6693 6.1370 54 39 11 20.43*** (0.0000) 0.9863 (0.3206) 7.9861** (0.0184) 
GDP Preliminary  0.0002 0.0034 0.56880 3.8176 13 16 6 4.31 (0.1162) 0.4580 (0.4985) 1.6326 (0.4421) 
Total      534 538 107       
United Kingdom News               
BOE Rate  -0.0001 0.0012 -6.2659 54.2893 2 5 96 169.92*** (0.0000) 3.0419* (0.0811) 3.0619 (0.2163) 
GDP Real Advance  -0.0007 0.0024 -1.2958 5.6883 10 15 9 15.91*** (0.0004) 0.1607 (06885) 4.7395* (0.0935) 
GDP Real Preliminary  0.0000 0.0010 0.4687 4.6853 8 9 18 5.91* (0.0521) 0.1587 (0.6904) 7.0439** (0.0295) 
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GDP Real Final  -0.0003 0.0020 -1.0303 5.1393 11 13 10 11.80 (0.0027) 0.5265 (0.4681) 0.9529 (0.6210) 
Gfk Consumer Confidence  0.0096 2.8778 0.7542 4.3329 37 48 19 14.46*** (0.0007) 0.0024 (0.9613) 0.6124 (0.7362) 
Industrial Production  -0.0031 0.0071 -0.6876 3.9318 30 67 7 11.28*** (0.0036) 0.0776 (0.7806) 0.1999 (0.9049) 
Jobless Claim Change  -1013 11880 0.4987 8.8012 46 58 0 25.94*** (0.0000) 0.1919 (0.6613) 0.4040 (0.8171) 
Manufactoring Production  -0.0059 0.0438 -1.4951 5.0500 59 43 2 4.44 (0.1085) 0.0129 (0.9096) 0.0179 (0.9911) 
PPI Output  0.0007 0.0032 0.6341 3.9830 52 35 17 10.47*** (0.0053) 5.624** (0.0177) 5.8645* (0.0533) 
RPI  0.0003 0.0018 0.4476 4.4658 43 33 28 9.49*** (0.0087) 0.0779 (0.7802) 0.2333 (0.8899) 
RPI ex mort. Int. payment  0.0004 0.0019 0.0481 3.9712 48 30 25 3.61 (0.1641) 0.3540 (0.5519) 0.3566 (0.8367) 
Retail Sales ex auto fuel  0.0016 0.0095 0.2449 5.4538 60 39 5 11.34*** (0.0034) 5.282** (0.0215) 6.4708** (0.0393) 
ILO Unemployment   0.0000 0.0009 0.2472 2.9387 26 29 49 1.20 (0.5496) 0.0637 (0.8008) 1.6710 (0.4337) 
Visible Trade   -153 578 0.2379 2.8736 36 68 0 1.08 (0.5820) 3.6277* (0.0568) 5.7692* (0.0559) 
Total      468 492 286       
United States News               
Philadelphia Manufactoring Index  -1.4192 9.2262 -0.6189 3.8249 47 56 1 9.48*** (0.0087) 0.0002 (0.9874) 0.7740 (0.6791) 
ISM Index (formerly NAPM Survey)  0.2548 2.1441 0.2133 3.6352 53 47 4 2.99 (0.2246) 0.3588 (0.5492) 1.6676 (0.4344) 
Consumer Confidence Index  -0.1476 5.1508 -0.2761 2.9778 52 50 1 1.51 (0.4711) 1.2524 (0.2631) 5.225* (0.0734) 
Average Hourly Earnings  -0.0125 0.1391 0.1375 2.7243 35 41 28 0.52 (0.7729) 3.6643* (0.0556) 3.8985 (0.1424) 
Nonfarm Payroll  -218367 83086 -0.1889 4.3252 37 66 1 5.90* (0.0524) 0.8082 (0.3687) 0.8369 (0.6581) 
Unemployment Rate  -0.0250 0.1531 0.0509 3.5874 27 48 29 1.97 (0.3742) 0.8632 (0.3529) 1.8328 (0.4000) 
Retail Sales  -0.0298 0.5738 0.1595 4.1028 48 51 5 4.68* (0.0963) 4.8637** (0.0274) 4.9543* (0.0840) 
Retail Sales less Autos Fuel  -0.0010 0.5322 -0.0669 4.3672 42 49 13 5.49* (0.0643) 3.805* (0.0511) 3.8254 (0.1477) 
Producer Price Index (PPI)  0.0712 0.5503 0.1283 3.6576 54 42 8 2.53 (0.2826) 6.3011** (0.0121) 8.4364** (0.0147) 
PPI less food & energy (Core PPI)  0.0125 0.3036 -0.2619 6.0829 44 35 25 14.02*** (0.0009) 16.1593*** (0.0001) 22.0275*** (0.0000) 
 
 
Consumer Price Index (CPI)  -0.0077 0.1405 -0.0950 3.4607 34 33 37 1.59 (0.4520) 2.6869 (0.1012) 3.9264 (0.1404) 
Industrial Production  -0.0625 0.4202 -1.4467 9.6329 46 50 8 48.58*** (0.0000) 1.8861 (0.1696) 6.8173** (0.0331) 
Leading Indicators  -0.0058 0.2009 0.7870 4.1503 30 45 29 14.3*** (0.0008) 0.0831 (0.7732) 0.0845 (0.9586) 
Durable Goods Orders  -0.3596 2.3466 -0.1161 4.0522 40 62 2 4.22 (0.1213) 4.8107** (0.0283) 8.1387** (0.0171) 
Personal (Consumer) Spending  -0.0388 0.2102 -1.2050 7.3624 33 45 25 36.25*** (0.0000) 0.4732 (0.4915) 2.2548 (0.3239) 
Personal Income  0.0515 0.3061 2.1941 10.738 43 39 21 67.66*** (0.0000) 0.0670 (0.7958) 3.5479 (0.1697) 
Factory Orders  -0.0356 0.8445 -0.7210 4.1986 50 46 8 13.16*** (0.0014) 1.1343 (0.2869) 1.6548 (0.4372) 
Trade Balance  -0.0538 3.4556 0.1992 3.7488 52 49 3 3.36 (0.1862) 2.6315 (0.1048) 3.1079 (0.2114) 
GDP Real Advanced  -0.1400 0.6921 0.5109 3.3975 10 23 2 2.86 (0.2387) 0.1056 (0.7452) 1.4051 (0.4953) 
GDP Real Preliminary  0.0029 0.3285 -0.3286 2.9504 15 15 5 0.98 (0.6124) 0.0348 (0.8521) 5.7463* (0.0565) 
GDP Real Final  -0.0588 0.2583 -0.2505 2.6863 10 13 11 0.47 (0.7918) 1.2557 (0.2625) 1.7691 (0.4129) 
GDP Deflator  Advanced  0.0229 0.1592 1.0391 2.7090 16 17 2 0.65 (0.7217) 0.3920 (0.5313) 1.4337 (0.4883) 
GDP Deflator  Preliminary  0.0229 0.1592 1.0391 6.5821 14 8 13 15.48*** (0.0004) 0.0496 (0.8238) 0.1275 (0.9383) 
GDP Deflator  Final  0.0235 0.1689 -0.2611 2.3763 16 11 7 0.92 (0.6313) 0.5282 (0.4674) 0.5818 (0.7476) 
Initial Unemployment (Jobless) 
CClamisClaims 
 1.1106 18.6400 0.1683 4.0092 233 218 11 12.74*** (0.0017) 4.3667** (0.0366) 5.6362* (0.0597) 
Total      1081 1159 299       
 
The variables are represented by news (positive, negative and null surprises) for Euro-Zone indicators, US indicators, Germany indicators, and UK indicators. News are obtained 
as the difference between the actual value of a macroeconomic announcement issued at day t and its expected value from Bloomberg. The table provides the mean, standard 
deviation, skewness, kurtosis of the news (surprises), the p-values for the Jarque-Bera test statistic of the null hypothesis of normal distribution and the p-values for the Ljung-
Box test statistic for the null hypothesis that autocorrelation coefficients up to 2 lags are zero. The p-values are contained in parentheses. Data are from 1-Jan-2003 to 31-Aug-
2011. (***) = statistically significant at the 1% level; (**) = statistically significant at the 5% level; (*) = statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table A1.2 
Correlations between US Macroeconomic News 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
                       
(1) Consumer Confidence 1                     
(2) CPI 0.0000 
(0.9976) 
1                    
(3) Durable Goods -0.0014 
(0.9088) 
-0.0001 
(0.9916) 
1                   
(4) Avg Hourly Earnings  -0.0001 
(0.9961) 
-0.0001 
(0.9950) 
-0.0002 
(0.9863) 
1                  
(5) Factory Orders 0.0049 
(0.6834) 
0.0000 
(0.9977) 
-0.0001 
(0.9935) 
-0.0411*** 
(0.0007) 
1                 
(6) GDP Deflator -0.0065 
(0.5912) 
0.0000 
(0.9978) 
0.0003 
(0.9801) 
-0.0001 
(0.9964) 
0.0000 
(0.9983) 
1                
(7) GDP Real 0.0062 
(0.6096) 
-0.0001 
(0.9923) 
-0.0007 
(0.9559) 
-0.0002 
(0.9875) 
-0.0001 
(0.9941) 
-0.2824*** 
(0.0000) 
1               
(8) Industrial Production -0.0001 
(0.9936) 
-0.0310** 
(0.0103) 
-0.0003 
(0.9774) 
-0.0002 
(0.9867) 
-0.0001 
(0.9937) 
-0.0001 
(0.9942) 
-0.0003 
(0.9794) 
1              
(9) Leading Indicators 0.0000 
(0.9988) 
0.0206* 
(0.0887) 
-0.0001 
(0.9956) 
0.0000 
(0.9974) 
0.0000 
(0.9988) 
0.0000 
(0.9989) 
-0.0021 
(0.8616) 
0.0159 
(0.1894) 
1             
(10) ISM Index 0.0001 
(0.9951) 
0.0001 
(0.9937) 
0.0003 
(0.9826) 
-0.0118 
(0.3303) 
-0.0038 
(0.7558) 
0.0001 
(0.9955) 
0.0002 
(0.9841) 
0.0003 
(0.9831) 
0.0001 
(0.9967) 
1            
(11) Nonfarm Payrolls -0.0002 
(0.9889) 
-0.0002 
(0.9859) 
0.0006 
(0.9610) 
-0.1734*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0244** 
(0.0432) 
-0.0002 
(0.9899) 
-0.0005 
(0.9644) 
-0.0006 
(0.9621) 
-0.0001 
(0.9926) 
-0.0128 
(0.2892) 
1           
(12) Jobless  Claims 0.0015 
(0.9044) 
0.0167 
(0.1669) 
-0.0112 
(0.3560) 
0.0019 
(0.8719) 
-0.0251** 
(0.0378) 
-0.0608*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0264** 
(0.0291) 
-0.0061 
(0.6139) 
0.0072 
(0.5499) 
0.0036 
(0.7674) 
0.0006 
(0.9573) 
1          
(13) Consumer Spending -0.0067 
(0.5774) 
-0.0001 
(0.9908) 
0.0065 
(0.5922) 
-0.0035 
(0.7744) 
0.0186 
(0.1236) 
0.0032 
(0.7940) 
-0.0004 
(0.9768) 
-0.0004 
(0.9753) 
-0.0023 
(0.8476) 
0.0298** 
(0.0135) 
0.0028 
(0.8149) 
0.0166 
(0.1687) 
1         
(14) Personal Income -0.0091 
(0.4514) 
0.0001 
(0.9909) 
-0.0188 
(0.1194) 
0.0002 
(0.9851) 
0.0232* 
(0.0554) 
-0.0007 
(0.9568) 
0.0004 
(0.9769) 
0.0004 
(0.9754) 
0.0001 
(0.9952) 
0.0984*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0026 
(0.8311) 
0.0002 
(0.9888) 
-0.0391*** 
(0.0012) 
1        
(15) Philadelphia Fed Survey -0.0001 
(0.9932) 
-0.0572*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0004 
(0.9761) 
-0.0002 
(0.9859) 
-0.0001 
(0.9934) 
-0.0049 
(0.6857) 
0.0029 
(0.8111) 
0.1184* 
(0.0000) 
-0.1195* 
(0.0000) 
0.0003 
(0.9821) 
-0.0006 
(0.9599) 
-0.0394*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0004 
(0.9739) 
0.0004 
(0.9740) 
1       
(16) PPI (Core) -0.0077 
(0.5223) 
0.0000 
(0.9977) 
0.0001 
(0.9937) 
0.0001 
(0.9963) 
0.0000 
(0.9982) 
0.0000 
(0.9984) 
0.0001 
(0.9942) 
-0.0150 
(0.2160) 
-0.0016 
(0.8965) 
-0.0001 
(0.9953) 
0.0002 
(0.9894) 
0.0227* 
(0.0599) 
0.0001 
(0.9931) 
-0.0001 
(0.9931) 
-0.0145 
(0.2314) 
1      
(17) PPI -0.0148 
(0.2211) 
0.0001 
(0.9929) 
0.0003 
(0.9803) 
0.0002 
(0.9884) 
0.0001 
(0.9945) 
0.0001 
(0.9949) 
0.0003 
(0.9820) 
0.0098 
(0.4192) 
0.0001 
(0.9963) 
-0.0051 
(0.6736) 
0.0005 
(0.9670) 
0.0241** 
(0.0463) 
0.0003 
(0.9785) 
-0.0003 
(0.9786) 
-0.0213* 
(0.0786) 
0.4761*** 
(0.0000) 
1     
(18) Retail Sales 0.0000 
(0.9977) 
-0.0241** 
(0.0465) 
-0.0010 
(0.9920) 
-0.0001 
(0.9953) 
0.0000 
(0.9978) 
0.0000 
(0.9979) 
-0.0010 
(0.9927) 
0.0070 
(0.5601) 
0.0000 
(0.9985) 
0.0001 
(0.9940) 
-0.0002 
(0.9867) 
0.0174 
(0.1510) 
-0.0001 
(0.9913) 
0.0001 
(0.9913) 
-0.0072 
(0.5499) 
0.0634*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1642*** 
(0.0000) 
1    
(19) Retail Sales (Net) 0.0000 
(0.9999) 
0.0181 
(0.1332) 
0.0000 
(0.9997) 
0.0000 
(0.9998) 
0.0000 
(0.9999) 
0.0000 
(0.9999) 
0.0000 
(0.9997) 
-0.0262** 
(0.0301) 
0.0000 
(0.9999) 
0.0000 
(0.9998) 
0.0000 
(0.9995) 
0.0096 
(0.4259) 
0.0000 
(0.9997) 
0.0000 
(0.9997) 
-0.0058 
(0.6339) 
0.0468*** 
(0.0001) 
0.1637*** 
(0.0000) 
0.7921*** 
(0.0000) 
1   
(20) Trade Balance 0.0000 
(0.9993) 
0.0018 
(0.8827) 
0.0000 
(0.9976) 
0.0014 
(0.9087) 
0.0000 
(0.9993) 
0.0000 
(0.9994) 
0.0000 
(0.9978) 
0.0089 
(0.4618) 
0.0080 
(0.5101) 
0.0000 
(0.9982) 
0.0000 
(0.9990) 
-0.0111 
(0.3574) 
0.0000 
(0.9974) 
0.0000 
(0.9974) 
0.0152 
(0.2071) 
-0.0586*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0167 
(0.1676) 
-0.0016 
(0.8930) 
-0.0051 
(0.6750) 
1  
(21) Unemployment Rate -0.0001 
(0.9930) 
-0.0001 
(0.9911) 
-0.0004 
(0.9753) 
0.0222* 
(0.0664) 
-0.0090 
(0.4573) 
-0.0001 
(0.9936) 
-0.0003 
(0.9774) 
-0.0004 
(0.9760) 
-0.0001 
(0.9953) 
0.0026 
(0.8296) 
0.2158*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0059 
(0.6247) 
0.0025 
(0.8358) 
0.0004 
(0.9731) 
-0.0004 
(0.9746) 
0.0001 
(0.9933) 
0.0003 
(0.9791) 
-0.0001 
(0.9915) 
0.0000 
(0.9997) 
-0.0013 
(0.9139) 
1 
 
 
This table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between news (positive, negative and null surprises) for 25 US macroeconomic indicators: Consumer Confidence Index, 
Consumer Price Index (CPI), Average Hourly Earnings, Factory Orders, Durable Goods Orders, GDP Deflator, GDP Real, Industrial Production, Leading Indicators Index, ISM 
Index (formerly NAPM Survey), Nonfarm Payrolls, Initial Unemployment (Jobless) Claims, Personal (Consumer) Spending, Personal Income, Philadelphia Manufactoring Index 
(Fed Survey), Producer Price Index (PPI) Net of Food and Energy, Producer Price Index (PPI), Retail Sales, Retail Sales (Net) less Autos Fuel, Trade Balance, Unemployment 
Rate. GDP Deflator and GDP Real surprises are aggregated using the Advance, Preliminary and Final releases. News are obtained as the difference between the actual value of the 
macroeconomic variable and its expected value. The associated p-value is contained in parentheses below the correlation coefficient estimate. Data from 1-Jan-2003 to 31-Aug-
2011. (***) = statistically significant at the 1% level; (**) = statistically significant at the 5% level; (*) = statistically significant at the 10% level.  
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Table A1.3 
Correlations between Euro-Area Macroeconomics News 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between news (positive, negative and null surprises) for 17 Euro-Area macroeconomic indicators: Business 
Climate Indicator, Consumer Confidence, Consumer Price Index (CPI) Month-over-Month, ECB Rate, Economic Confidence, Consumer Price Index (CPI) Final 
Year-over-Year, Consumer Price Index (CPI) Flash Year-over-Year, GDP Final, GDP Advanced, GDP Preliminary, Industrial Confidence, M3 Money Supply, 
Producer Price Pndex (PPI), Retail Sales Month-over-Month,  Retail Sales Year-over-Year, Unemployment Rate. News are obtained as the difference between the 
actual value of the macroeconomic variable and its expected value. The associated p-value is contained in parentheses below the correlation coefficient estimate. 
Data from 1-Jan-2003 to 31-Aug-2011. (***) = statistically significant at the 1% level; (**) = statistically significant at the 5% level; (*) = statistically significant at 
the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
 
 
                 
(1) Business Climate  Indicator 1 
                     
(2) Consumer  Confidence 0.1896*** 
(0.0000) 
1 
                
(3) CPI M-M Final 
 
0.0029 
(0.8085) 
0.0115 
(0.3424) 
1                
(4) ECB  Rate 
 
0.0000 
(0.9985) 
0.0000 
(0.9972) 
-0.0001 
(0.9964) 
1               
(5) Economic Confidence 0.5948*** 
(0.0000) 
0.3834*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0019 
(0.8775) 
0.0000 
(0.9995) 
1              
(6) CPI Y-Y Final 
 
0.0048 
(0.6905) 
-0.0155 
(0.2006) 
0.5200*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001 
(0.9966) 
0.0122 
(0.3116) 
1             
(7) CPI Y-Y Flash 
 
0.0803*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1125*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0118 
(0.3308) 
0.0000 
(1.0000) 
0.0612*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(1.0000) 
1 
           
(8) GDP Final 
 
0.0001 
(0.9954) 
-0.0001 
(0.9916) 
-0.0002 
(0.9893) 
-0.0001 
(0.9959) 
0.0000 
(0.9984) 
-0.0002 
(0.9899) 
0.0000 
(1.0000) 
1 
          
(9) GDP Advance 
 
0.0000 
(0.9996) 
0.0000 
(0.9993) 
0.0000 
(0.9991) 
0.0000 
(0.9996) 
0.0000 
(0.9999) 
0.0000 
(0.9991) 
0.0000 
(1.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.9989) 
1          
(10) GDP Preliminary 
 
0.0000 
(0.9976) 
0.0001 
(0.9957) 
0.0001 
(0.9945) 
0.0000 
(0.9979) 
0.0000 
(0.9992) 
0.0001 
(0.9948) 
0.0000 
(1.0000) 
0.0001 
(0.9937) 
0.0000 
(0.9995) 
1 
        
(11) Industrial  Confidence 0.7175*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2311*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0303** 
(0.0122) 
0.0000 
(0.9995) 
0.5728*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0134 
(0.2674) 
0.1101*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.9985) 
0.0000 
(0.9999) 
0.0000 
(0.9992) 
1        
(12) Industrial  Production 0.0001 
(0.9940) 
-0.0002 
(0.9892) 
0.0150 
(0.2130) 
-0.0001 
(0.9947) 
0.0000 
(0.9980) 
-0.0305** 
(0.0115) 
0.0000 
(1.0000) 
-0.0071 
(0.5566) 
0.1217*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0001 
(0.9919) 
0.0000 
(0.9981) 
1       
(13) M3 0.0026 
(0.8300) 
-0.0261** 
(0.0309) 
0.0001 
(0.9913) 
0.0001 
(0.9966) 
0.0121 
(0.3172) 
0.0001 
(0.9918) 
-0.0097 
(0.4242) 
0.0002 
(0.9899) 
0.0000 
(0.9991) 
-0.0001 
(0.9949) 
0.0124 
(0.3039) 
0.0002 
(0.9871) 
1     
(14) PPI M-M 0.0007 
(0.9547) 
-0.0051 
(0.6706) 
-0.0001 
(0.9902) 
-0.0001 
(0.9962) 
-0.0016 
(0.8963) 
-0.0001 
(0.9908) 
0.0000 
(1.0000) 
0.0228* 
(0.0593) 
0.0000 
(0.9990) 
0.0001 
(0.9943) 
-0.0022 
(0.8576) 
-0.0002 
(0.9855) 
0.0001 
(0.9908) 
1 
    
(15) Retail Sales M-M -0.0564*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0040 
(0.7427) 
-0.0004 
(0.9713) 
-0.0002 
(0.9889) 
-0.0223* 
(0.0648) 
-0.0004 
(0.9728) 
0.0044 
(0.7176) 
-0.0005 
(0.9668) 
0.0000 
(0.9971) 
0.0003 
(0.9831) 
-0.0400*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0006 
(0.9575) 
0.0004 
(0.9730) 
-0.0036 
(0.7644) 
1 
   
(16) Retail Sales Y-Y -0.0582*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0064 
(0.5980) 
-0.0003 
(0.9780) 
-0.0001 
(0.9915) 
-0.0226* 
(0.0612) 
-0.0003 
(0.9792) 
0.0017 
(0.8893) 
-0.0004 
(0.9746) 
0.0000 
(0.9978) 
0.0002 
(0.9871) 
-0.0440*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0005 
(0.9674) 
0.0003 
(0.9794) 
-0.0022 
(0.8570) 
0.7978*** 
(0.0000) 
1   
(17) Unemployment  Rate -0.0234* 
(0.0533) 
-0.0429*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0000 
(0.9990) 
0.0000 
(0.9996) 
-0.0198 
(0.1019) 
0.0000 
(0.9991) 
0.1392*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.9989) 
0.0000 
(0.9999) 
0.0000 
(0.9994) 
0.0000 
(0.9999) 
0.0000 
(0.9985) 
0.0000 
(0.9991) 
-0.0126 
(0.2966) 
0.0072 
(0.5537) 
0.0052 
(0.6693) 
1 
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Table A1.4 
Correlations between Germany Macroeconomics News 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
              
(1) CPI 1            
(2) IFO Current Assessment 0.0485*** 
(0.0001) 
1           
(3) IFO  Expectations -0.0088 
(0.4652) 
0.4200*** 
(0.0000) 
1          
(4) Factory Orders 0.0000 
(0.9991) 
-0.0001 
(0.9933) 
-0.0001 
(0.9943) 
1         
(5) GDP Real Advance 0.0025 
(0.8336) 
0.0000 
(0.9969) 
0.0000 
(0.9974) 
0.0000 
(0.9997) 
1        
(6) IFO Business Climate 0.0279** 
(0.0209) 
0.8305*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8245*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001 
(0.9939) 
0.0000 
(0.9972) 
1       
(7) Industrial Production -0.0001 
(0.9955) 
0.0005 
(0.9679) 
0.0004 
(0.9729) 
0.0001 
(0.9966) 
0.0000 
(0.9984) 
0.0004 
(0.9709) 
1      
(8) PPI 0.0001 
(0.9946) 
-0.0146 
(0.2261) 
-0.0034 
(0.7793) 
0.0622*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.9981) 
-0.0104 
(0.3913) 
0.0003 
(0.9805) 
1     
(9) Retail  Sales -0.0045 
(0.7110) 
0.0013 
(0.9136) 
0.0011 
(0.9268) 
-0.0024 
(0.8408) 
-0.0001 
(0.9957) 
0.0012 
(0.9214) 
0.0193 
(0.1105) 
0.0008 
(0.9475) 
1    
(10) Unemployment Rate -0.0164 
(0.1759) 
0.0010 
(0.9361) 
0.0008 
(0.9460) 
-0.0286** 
(0.0180) 
0.0000 
(0.9968) 
0.0009 
(0.9420) 
0.0117 
(0.3314) 
0.0006 
(0.9612) 
-0.0178 
(0.1418) 
1   
(11) ZEW 0.0000 
(0.9984) 
0.0002 
(0.9889) 
0.0001 
(0.9906) 
0.0000 
(0.9988) 
-0.0124 
(0.3047) 
0.0002 
(0.9899) 
-0.0112 
(0.3535) 
0.0029 
(0.8087) 
-0.0002 
(0.9847) 
-0.0002 
(0.9887) 
1  
(12) Unemployment Level -0.0286** 
(0.0181) 
0.0010 
(0.9347) 
0.0008 
(0.9447) 
-0.0255** 
(0.0346) 
0.0000 
(0.9968) 
0.0009 
(0.9406) 
0.0097 
(0.4199) 
0.0006 
(0.9603) 
-0.0440*** 
(0.0003) 
0.8563*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0002 
(0.9884) 
1 
 
This table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between news (positive, negative and null surprises) for 12 German macroeconomic 
indicators: Consumer Price Index (CPI), IFO Current Assessment, IFO Expectations, Factory Orders, GDP Real Advance, IFO Business Climate 
Indicator, Industrial Production, Producer Price Index (PPI), Retail Sales, Unemployment Rate, ZEW Survey, Unemployment Level. News are 
obtained as the difference between the actual value of a macroeconomic variable and its expected value. The associated p-value is contained in 
parentheses below the correlation coefficient estimate. Data from 1-Jan-2003 to 31-Aug-2011. (***) = statistically significant at the 1% level; (**) 
= statistically significant at the 5% level; (*) = statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Table A1.5 
Correlations between UK Macroeconomics News 
 
   (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
               
 (1) BOE Rate 
 
1            
 (2) GDP -0.0003 
(0.9810) 
1           
 (3) Gfk Consumer Confidence  0.0000 
(0.9996) 
0.0187 
(0.1212) 
1          
 (4) Industrial Production 0.0019 
(0.8735) 
-0.0009 
(0.9381) 
0.0000 
(0.9986) 
1         
 (5) Jobless Claims -0.0002 
(0.9879) 
-0.0002 
(0.9854) 
0.0000 
(0.9997) 
-0.0122 
(0.3122) 
1        
 (6) Manufactory Production 0.0051 
(0.6759) 
-0.0006 
(0.9595) 
0.0000 
(0.9991) 
0.8620*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0332*** 
(0.0060) 
1       
 (7) PPI Output 
 
0.0004 
(0.9727) 
0.0005 
(0.9672) 
0.0000 
(0.9993) 
-0.0613*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0003 
(0.9790) 
-0.0919*** 
(0.0000) 
1      
 (8) RPI (Net) 0.0004 
(0.9755) 
0.0004 
(0.9705) 
0.0000 
(0.9993) 
0.0012 
(0.9202) 
0.0003 
(0.9811) 
0.0008 
(0.9478) 
-0.0006 
(0.9576) 
1     
 (9) RPI 0.0004 
(0.9762) 
0.0004 
(0.9713) 
0.0000 
(0.9994) 
0.0012 
(0.9225) 
0.0003 
(0.9817) 
0.0008 
(0.9493) 
-0.0006 
(0.9589) 
0.9019*** 
(0.0000) 
1    
 (10) Retail Sales (Core) 0.0003 
(0.9789) 
-0.0459*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0077 
(0.5242) 
0.0010 
(0.9314) 
0.0002 
(0.9838) 
0.0007 
(0.9551) 
-0.0006 
(0.9636) 
-0.0005 
(0.9673) 
-0.0005 
(0.9682) 
1   
 (11) Unemployment Rate 0.0000 
(1.0000) 
0.0000 
(1.0000) 
0.0000 
(1.0000) 
0.0112 
(0.3539) 
-0.0005 
(0.9701) 
0.0317*** 
(0.0087) 
0.0000 
(1.0000) 
0.0000 
(1.0000) 
0.0000 
(1.0000) 
0.0000 
(1.0000) 
1  
 (12) Visible Trade 
 
-0.0005 
(0.9668) 
-0.0006 
(0.9600) 
0.0000 
(0.9991) 
0.0258** 
(0.0327) 
-0.0242** 
(0.0453) 
0.0333*** 
(0.0059) 
0.0371*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0127 
(0.2918) 
-0.0078 
(0.5204) 
0.0007 
(0.9557) 
0.0114 
(0.3444) 
1 
 
 
This table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between news (positive, negative and null surprises) for 12 UK macroeconomic indicators: BOE 
Rate, GDP Real, Gfk Consumer Confidence Survey, Industrial Production, Jobless Claim Change, Manufactory Production, Producer Price Index (PPI) 
Output no Seasonally Adjusted, Retail Price Index (RPI) ex Mort. Interest Payment, Retail Price Index (RPI Net), Retail Sales (Core) less Auto Fuel, 
Unemployment Rate, Visible Trade Balance. GDP Real surprises are aggregated using the Advance, Preliminary and Final releases. News are obtained as 
the difference between the actual value of a macroeconomic variable and its expected value. The associated p-value is contained in parentheses below the 
correlation coefficient estimate. Data from 1-Jan-2003 to 31-Aug-2011. (***) = statistically significant at the 1% level; (**) = statistically significant at 
the 5% level; (*) = statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Table A1.6 
Correlations between US macroeconomics news and lagged news 
 
Consumer 
Confidence 
CPI Durable 
Goods 
Avg. Hourly 
Earnings 
Factory 
Orders 
GDP 
Deflator 
GDP 
Real 
Industrial 
Production 
Leading 
Indicators 
ISM Index 
 
Nonfarm 
Payroll 
Jobless 
Claims 
Consumer 
Spending 
Personal 
Income 
Philadelphia Fed Survey PPI (Core) PPI Retail Sales Retail Sales 
(net) 
Trade 
Balance 
Unempl. 
Rate 
L3  
Consumer 
Confidence      
0.0590*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0635*** 
(0.0000) 
     -0.0200* 
(0.0983) 
         
L3  
CPI 
              -0.0425*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0205* 
(0.0904) 
      
L3  
Durable  
Goods 
     -0.0726*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0216* 
(0.0740) 
               
L3 
Factory  
Orders 
   -0.0896*** 
(0.0000) 
      0.0696*** 
(0.0000) 
           
L3  
GDP  
Deflator 
         -0.0438*** 
(0.0003) 
  -0.0967*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0521*** 
(0.0000) 
      -0.0211* 
(0.0806) 
L2  
GDP 
Real 
         0.0624*** 
(0.0000) 
   -0.0642*** 
(0.0000) 
        
L3  
Industrial 
Production 
        -0.0376*** 
(0.0019) 
     -0.0518*** 
(0.0000) 
 -0.0533*** 
(0.0000) 
     
L3 
Leading  
Indicators 
 0.0412*** 
(0.0007) 
                    
L3 
ISM Index 
    0.0985*** 
(0.0000) 
     0.0462*** 
(0.0001) 
 0.0252** 
(0.0368) 
       0.0310** 
(0.0102) 
L3  
Jobless  
Claims 
 0.0342*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0246** 
(0.0417) 
-0.0560*** 
(0.0000) 
 -0.0513*** 
(0.0000) 
    -0.0514*** 
(0.0000) 
 0.0488*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0258** 
(0.0325) 
  -0.0269** 
(0.0261) 
-0.0316*** 
(0.0088) 
    
L3  
Consumer 
Spending 
-0.0444** 
(0.0002) 
  -0.0585*** 
(0.0000) 
     -0.1928*** 
(0.0000) 
            
L3  
Personal 
Income 
0.0295** 
(0.0147) 
                     
L3  
Philadelph. 
Fed Survey 
 0.0260** 
(0.0316) 
     -0.0526*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0461*** 
(0.0001) 
             
L3  
PPI (Core) 
 0.0659*** 
(0.0000) 
            -0.0330*** 
(0.0064) 
       
L3 
PPI 
 0.2674*** 
(0.0000) 
     0.1099*** 
(0.0000) 
              
L3 
Retail Sales 
 0.1140*** 
(0.0000) 
     0.0361*** 
(0.0028) 
   -0.0363*** 
(0.0027) 
       0.0499*** 
(0.0000) 
  
L3 
Retail Sales  
(Net)  
0.0933*** 
(0.0000) 
            -0.0252** 
(0.0368) 
0.0835*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0470*** 
(0.0001) 
  0.0333*** 
(0.0059) 
  
L3  
Trade Balance 
 
 0.0219* 
(0.0694) 
               -0.0618*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0524*** 
(0.0000) 
   
This table shows the Pearson cross-correlation coefficients between the lagged news (positive, negative and null surprises) up to three lags for each of the 25 US macroeconomic indicators. The announcements are: 
Consumer Confidence Index, Consumer Price Index (CPI), Average Hourly Earnings, Factory Orders, Durable Goods Orders, GDP Deflator, GDP Real, Industrial Production, Leading Indicators Index, ISM Index 
(formerly NAPM Survey), Nonfarm Payrolls, Initial Unemployment (Jobless) Claims, Personal (Consumer) Spending, Personal Income, Philadelphia Manufactoring Index (Fed Survey), Producer Price Index (PPI) Net of 
Food and Energy, Producer Price Index (PPI), Retail Sales, Retail Sales (Net) less Autos Fuel, Trade Balance, Unemployment Rate. GDP Deflator and GDP Real surprises are aggregated using the Advance, Preliminary 
and Final releases. News are obtained as the difference between the actual value of the macroeconomic variable and its expected value. Lagged news are computed considering the previous 8 hours (L1), 16 hours (L2) and 
24 hours (L3) before the announcement. Only lagged news with statistically significant correlations coefficients are displayed. Correlations between a variable and its own 3 lags are not considered. The associated p-value 
is contained in parentheses below the correlation coefficient estimate. Data from 1-Jan-2003 to 31-Aug-2011. (***) = statistically significant at the 1% level; (**) = statistically significant at the 5% level; (*) = statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
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Table A1.7  
Correlations between Euro-Area macroeconomics news and lagged news 
 
 Business 
Climate 
Indicator 
Consumer 
Confidence 
CPI M-M ECB Rate Economic 
Confidence 
CPI Y-Y 
Final 
CPI Y-Y 
Flash 
GDP 
Final 
GDP 
Advance 
Industrial 
Confidence 
Industrial 
Production 
M3 PPI Retail 
Sales M-M 
Retail 
Sales Y-Y 
Unememployment 
Rate 
L3 
Business Climate  
Indicator 
      0.0829*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0599*** 
(0.0000) 
     -0.0283** 
(0.0190) 
 -0.0993*** 
(0.0000) 
L3 
Conumer 
Confidence 
      -0.0215* 
(0.0750) 
0.0249** 
(0.0395) 
   -0.0989*** 
(0.0000) 
 -0.0204* 
(0.0907) 
 -0.0763*** 
(0.0000) 
L3  
CPI M-M 
          0.0252** 
(0.0369) 
     
L3 
Economic 
Confidence 
      -0.0232* 
(0.0552) 
    -0.0447*** 
(0.0002) 
 -0.0351*** 
(0.0037) 
 -0.0907*** 
(0.0000) 
L3 
CPI Y-Y 
Final 
      0.0312*** 
(0.0099) 
         
L3 
CPI Y-Y 
Flash 
            0.0918*** 
(0.0000) 
  -0.0522*** 
(0.0000) 
L3 
GDP 
Final 
             0.0389*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0261** 
(0.0305) 
 
L3 
GDP 
Advance 
     -
0.0549*** 
(0.0000) 
          
L3 
GDP 
Preliminary 
             -0.0799* 
(0.0000) 
-0.1214*** 
(0.0000) 
 
L3 
Indusrtial 
Confidence 
      0.1058*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0545*** 
(0.0000) 
     -0.0212* 
(0.0792) 
 -0.1487*** 
(0.0000) 
L3 
Industrial 
Production 
  0.0303** 
(0.0122) 
     -0.1252*** 
(0.0000) 
       
L3 
M3 
0.0512*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0199* 
(0.0999) 
0.0324*** 
(0.0074) 
   0.0483*** 
(0.0001) 
  0.0228* 
(0.0593) 
     -0.0477*** 
(0.0001) 
L3 
PPI M-M 
0.1251*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1808*** 
(0.0000) 
 -0.0230* 
(0.0568) 
0.1638*** 
(0.0000) 
    0.1139*** 
(0.0000) 
   0.0839*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0703*** 
(0.0000) 
 
L3 
Retail Sales 
M-M 
   0.0261** 
(0.0309) 
           -0.0217* 
(0.0732) 
L3 
Retail sales 
Y-Y 
   0.0226* 
(0.0614) 
   0.0602*** 
(0.0000) 
       -0.0219* 
(0.0704) 
L3 
Unemployment 
Rate 
   0.0784*** 
0.0000 
        -0.0819*** 
0.0000 
   
This table shows the Pearson cross-correlation coefficients between the lagged news (positive, negative and null surprises) up to three lags for each of the 17 Euro-Area macroeconomic 
indicators. The announcements are: Business Climate Indicator, Consumer Confidence, Consumer Price Index (CPI) month-over-month, Economic Confidence, Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) Final year-over-year, Consumer Price Index (CPI) Flash year-over-year, GDP Final, GDP Advanced, GDP Preliminary, Industrial Production, M3 Money Supply, Producer price 
index (PPI), Retail Sales month-over-month, Retail Sales year-over-year, Unemployment Rate. News are obtained as the difference between the actual value of the macroeconomic 
variable and its expected value. Lagged news are computed considering the previous 8 hours (L1), 16 hours (L2) and 24 hours (L3) before the announcement. Only lagged news with 
statistically significant correlations coefficients are displayed. Correlations between a variable and its own 3 lags are not considered. The associated p-value is contained in parentheses 
below the correlation coefficient estimate. Data from 1-Jan-2003 to 31-Aug-2011. (***) = statistically significant at the 1% level; (**) = statistically significant at the 5% level; (*) = 
statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Table A1.8  
Correlations between German Macroeconomics News and lagged News 
 
 IFO Current 
Assessment 
IFO 
Expectations 
Factory 
Orders 
Business 
Climate 
Industrial 
Production 
PPI Retail 
Sales 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Unemployment 
Level 
          
L3 CPI 
0.0505*** 
(0.0000) 
  0.0391*** 
(0.0012) 
   0.1188*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1063*** 
(0.0000) 
L3 Factory Orders 
    0.3498*** 
(0.0000) 
 -0.0767*** 
(0.0000) 
   
L3 PPI 
0.0548*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0251** 
(0.0378) 
 0.0312*** 
(0.0098) 
0.0809*** 
(0.0000) 
     
L3 Unemployment Rate 
  -0.0370** 
(0.0022) 
   0.0691*** 
(0.0000) 
   
L3 ZEW 
 0.0300** 
(0.0129) 
 0.0212* 
(0.0795) 
 -0.0870*** 
(0.0000) 
    
L3 Unemployment Level 
  -0.0210* 
(0.0829) 
   0.0428*** 
(0.0004) 
   
 
This table shows the Pearson cross-correlation coefficients between the lagged news (positive, negative and null surprises) up to three lags for each of the 
12 German macroeconomic indicators. The announcements are: Consumer Price Index (CPI), IFO Current Assessment, IFO Expectations, Factory 
Orders, GDP, Business Climate Indicator, Industrial Production, Producer Price Index (PPI), Retail Sales, Unemployment Rate, ZEW Survey, 
Unemployment Level. News are obtained as the difference between the actual value of the macroeconomic variable and its expected value. Lagged news 
are computed considering the previous 8 hours (L1), 16 hours (L2) and 24 hours (L3) before the announcement. Only lagged news with statistically 
significant correlations coefficients are displayed. Correlations between a variable and its own 3 lags are not considered. The associated p-value is 
contained in parentheses below the correlation coefficient estimate. Data from 1-Jan-2003 to 31-Aug-2011. (***) = statistically significant at the 1% 
level; (**) = statistically significant at the 5% level; (*) = statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Table A1.9 
Correlations between UK Macroeconomics News and lagged News 
 
 
BOE Rate Jobless 
Claims 
Manufactory 
Production 
PPI Output RPI (Net) RPI Retail Sales (Core) Unemployment 
Rate 
Visible trade 
Balance 
L3 BOE Rate          
0.0205* 
(0.0903) 
L3 Industrial Production         
0.0280** 
(0.0205)   
L3 Jobless Claims        
0.0516*** 
(0.0000)    
L3 Manufactory Production 
0.0857*** 
(0.0000)       
0.0274** 
(0.0236)   
L3 PPI Output       
0.1306*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1029*** 
(0.0000)     
L3 RPI (Net)   
-0.1147*** 
(0.0000)      
-0.0732*** 
0.0000   
L3 RPI   
-0.1643*** 
(0.0000)      
-0.0792*** 
(0.0000)   
L3 Unemployment Rate        
0.0542*** 
(0.0000)    
L3 Visible Trade     
0.0379*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0265** 
(0.0285)    
-0.0436*** 
(0.0003)   
 
This table shows the Pearson cross-correlation coefficients between the lagged news (positive, negative and null surprises) up to three lags 
for each of the 14 UK macroeconomic indicators: BOE Rate, GDP Real, Gfk Consumer Confidence Survey, Industrial Production, Jobless 
Claim Change, Manufactory Production, Producer Price Index (PPI) Output no Seasonally Adjusted, Retail Price Index (RPI) ex Mort. 
Interest Payment, Retail Price Index (RPI Net), Retail Sales (Core) less Auto Fuel, Unemployment Rate, Visible Trade Balance. GDP Real 
surprises are aggregated using the Advance, Preliminary and Final releases. Lagged news are computed considering the previous 8 hours 
(L1), 16 hours (L2) and 24 hours (L3) before the announcement. Only lagged news with statistically significant correlations coefficients are 
displayed. Correlations between a variable and its own 3 lags are not considered. The associated p-value is contained in parentheses below 
the correlation coefficient estimate. Data from 1-Jan-2003 to 31-Aug-2011. (***) = statistically significant at the 1% level; (**) = 
statistically significant at the 5% level; (*) = statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Table A1.10 
OLS estimations of Euro-Dollar Exchange Rate 
  Part A.  Sub-Period1       Part B. Sub-Period2      
  Variable Coeff. Signif. S.E. p-value   Variable Coeff. Signif. S.E. p-value 
  ∆Euro-Dollar{1} -0.0949 *** [0.0153] (0.0000)   ∆Euro-Dollar{1} -0.1490 *** [0.0205] (0.0000) 
  ∆Euro-Dollar{2} -0.1410 *** [0.0148] (0.0000)   ∆Euro-Dollar{2} -0.0259  [0.0194] (0.1821) 
  ∆Euro-Dollar{3} -0.0288 * [0.0149] (0.0543)   ∆10-Year US Treasury Bond -0.1630 *** [0.0610] (0.0075) 
  ∆10-Year US Treasury Bond -0.2754  *** [0.0411] (0.0000)   ∆10-Year JGB -0.0361  [0.0287] (0.2085) 
  ∆10-Year US Treasury Bond{1} -0.0308  * [0.0165] (0.0629)   ∆10-Year JGB{1} -0.0784 ** [0.0346] (0.0236) 
  ∆10-Year US Treasury Bond{2} -0.0517  ** [0.0223] (0.0205)   ∆10-Year Bund  0.0913 *** [0.0328] (0.0054) 
  ∆10-Year JBG -0.0664  *** [0.0131] (0.0000)   ∆10-Year Bund {1} 0.0898  [0.0607] (0.1391) 
  ∆10-Year JBG{1} 0.0222   [0.0169] (0.1884)   ∆Dow Jones 0.2293 *** [0.0515] (0.0000) 
  ∆10-Year JBG{2} -0.0296   [0.0241] (0.2188)   ∆Dow Jones{1} -0.0532  [0.0331] (0.1072) 
  ∆10-Year Bund -0.0279   [0.0226] (0.2171)   ∆Dow Jones{2} -0.0568  [0.0384] (0.1395) 
  ∆10-Year Bund{1} 0.1041  *** [0.0302] (0.0006)   ∆Dow Jones{3} 0.1241 *** [0.0448] (0.0056) 
  ∆10-Year Bund{2} 0.0352  ** [0.0148] (0.0174)   ∆Nikkei 0.1674 *** [0.0475] (0.0004) 
  ∆Dow Jones -0.1026  ** [0.0429] (0.0167)   ∆Nikkei{1} 0.0985 ** [0.0468] (0.0355) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ASTZ 1.0590  *** [0.0930] (0.0000)   ∆Nikkei{2} -0.1443 *** [0.0473] (0.0023) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ASTZ{1} -0.4021  *** [0.0710] (0.0000)   POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ASTZ 1.1902 *** [0.0498] (0.0000) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ETZ 1.0050  *** [0.0415] (0.0000)   POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ASTZ{1} -0.3310 *** [0.0662] (0.0000) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ETZ{2} 0.0977  *** [0.0315] (0.0019)   POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ETZ 1.5420 *** [0.0613] (0.0000) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ATZ 1.2621  *** [0.0571] (0.0000)   POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ATZ 1.7432 *** [0.1094] (0.0000) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ATZ{1} 0.1835  *** [0.0357] (0.0000)   EUR_CPI Flash{1} -0.0020 * [0.0012] (0.0988) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ATZ{2} -0.1047  ** [0.0415] (0.0116)   EUR_PPI -0.0026 *** [0.0007] (0.0004) 
  EUR_CPI Flash 0.0022  ** [0.0009] (0.0226)   EUR_PPI_POS 0.0023 ** [0.0011] (0.0450) 
  EUR_GDP Advance 0.0010   [0.0013] (0.4654)   EUR_GDP Advance 0.0012  [0.0020] (0.5648) 
  EUR_GDP Advance{2} 0.0019  ** [0.0010] (0.0431)   EUR_GDP Advance{1} -0.0018  [0.0026] (0.4930) 
  EUR_GDP Preliminary 0.0025  *** [0.0001] (0.0000)   EUR_GDP Advance{2} 0.0021 ** [0.0010] (0.0421) 
  EUR_GDP Preliminary{3} 0.0028  *** [0.0001] (0.0000)   EUR_GDP Preliminary 0.0017 *** [0.0003] (0.0000) 
  EUR_GDP Preliminary_POS -0.0008  ** [0.0004] (0.0335)   EUR_GDP Preliminary{1} -0.0064 *** [0.0005] (0.0000) 
  EUR_GDP Preliminary_POS{3} -0.0018  *** [0.0003] (0.0000)   EUR_GDP Preliminary{2} -0.0020 *** [0.0002] (0.0000) 
  GER_IFO Expectation 0.2678  *** [0.0917] (0.0035)   EUR_GDP Preliminary{3} 0.0007 ** [0.0003] (0.0204) 
  GER_PPI -0.0015  [0.0012] (0.1943)   GER_IFO Expectation 0.3204 * [0.1705] (0.0603) 
  GER_PPI{1} 0.0019  [0.0015] (0.2007)   GER_IFO Expectation {1} 0.1036  [0.1464] (0.4791) 
  GER_PPI{2} -0.0017  * [0.0010] (0.0800)   GER_IFO Expectation {2} 0.1825 ** [0.0928] (0.0492) 
  UK_BOE Rate 0.0017  *** [0.0005] (0.0006)   GER_PPI -0.0002  [0.0024] (0.9386) 
  UK_BOE Rate{1} -0.0034  ** [0.0015] (0.0237)   GER_PPI{1} -0.0036 *** [0.0009] (0.0000) 
  UK_ BOE Rate{2} 0.0017  *** [0.0005] (0.0011)   GER_PPI_POS -0.0004  [0.0027] (0.8858) 
  UK_BOE Rate_POS{2} -0.0016  *** [0.0006] (0.0089)   GER_PPI_POS{1} 0.0051 ** [0.0026] (0.0451) 
  UK_GDP Advance -0.0006   [0.0011] (0.5999)   UK_BOE Rate 0.0003  [0.0003] (0.3776) 
  UK_GDP Advance {1} -0.0021  ** [0.0010] (0.0358)   UK_BOE Rate{1} -0.0013 *** [0.0004] (0.0007) 
  UK_PPI Output 0.0013  * [0.0007] (0.0699)   UK_BOE Rate{2} -0.0009 *** [0.0001] (0.0000) 
  UK_Jobless Claims -0.0084   [0.1282] (0.9479)   UK_BOE Rate{3} -0.0007 *** [0.0001] (0.0000) 
  UK_Jobless Claims {2} -0.2009  ** [0.0936] (0.0318)   UK_PPI Output 0.0033  [0.0029] (0.2534) 
  US_ISM Manufactoring Index -0.4308  *** [0.1349] (0.0014)   UK_PPI Output{1} 0.0095 *** [0.0026] (0.0003) 
  US_ISM Manufactoring Index{2} -0.1232  * [0.0632] (0.0512)   UK_PPI Output_POS -0.0025  [0.0031] (0.4210) 
  US_Nonfarm Payrolls -0.6683  *** [0.2543] (0.0086)   UK_PPI Output_POS{1} -0.0103 *** [0.0038] (0.0064) 
  US_Producer Price Index (Core) 0.2216  *** [0.0822] (0.0070)   UK_Unemployment Rate 0.0013  [0.0008] (0.1132) 
  Constant 0.0105   [0.0104] (0.3138)   UK_Jobless Claims -0.0182  [0.1152] (0.8747) 
       UK_Jobless Claims{3} 0.2534 ** [0.1234] (0.0400) 
       US_GDP Advance -0.4885 * [0.2684] (0.0688) 
       US_GDP Advance{1} -0.0533  [0.1206] (0.6584) 
       US_GDP Advance{2} -0.1308  [0.1928] (0.4974) 
       US_GDP Advance{3} 0.3585 * [0.2172] (0.0988) 
       US_GDP Preliminary_US -0.5105 *** [0.1811] (0.0048) 
       US_GDP Preliminary_US{1} 0.2065 ** [0.0910] (0.0232) 
       US_ISM Manufactorin Index -0.1836  [0.3307] (0.5787) 
       US_ISM Manufacturing Index {1} -0.1751  [0.1086] (0.1069) 
       US_ISM Manufacturing Index 0.4631  [0.3920] (0.2375) 
       US_ ISM Manufacturing Index_POS{1} 0.3239 ** [0.1451] (0.0256) 
       US_Nonfarm Payrolls -0.5523 * [0.3032] (0.0685) 
       Constant 0.0251  [0.0181] (0.1659) 
R
2
 = 0.36; D-W Stat =1.9986       R
2
 = 0.42; D-W Stat =1.9943     
This table presents the results of OLS regression of intra-daily Euro/US Dollar exchange rate variations (∆Si,t) on interest rates yields (∆yi,t), stock market indexes 
returns (∆Ii,t), macroeconomic scheduled news for Euro-Area, Germany, United States and United Kingdom, unscheduled news and relative lags between January 2003 
and August 2011. The model is first regressed for the entire sample period. Only variables with significant coefficient are retained and then used in second-stage 
regressions for two consecutive sub-sample periods. Panel A and Panel B report the results for the first sub-period (01 January 2003 22:00 CET to 29 February 2008 at 
06:00 am CET; 4040 8-hourly observations) and the second sub-period (29 February 2008 at 6:00 am to 31 August 2011 22:00 CET; 2744 8-hourly observations) 
respectively. The label _POS after the macroeconomic news name denotes variables based on realized positive surprises. Standard errors for coefficients estimates are 
in brackets, p-values in parentheses and lags 1,2 and 3 for eight, sixteen and twenty-four hours intervals are in braces.(***) = statistically significant at a 1% level, (**) 
= statistically significant at a 5% level, (*) =statistically significant at 10% level. 
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Table A1.11 
OLS  and EGARCH estimations with positive effects 
 
Panel A. OLS regression 
Variable Coeff. Signif. S.E. p-value 
∆Euro-Dollar{1} -0.1088 *** [0.0234] (0.0000) 
∆Euro-Dollar{2} -0.0934 *** [0.0240] (0.0001) 
∆Euro-Dollar{3} -0.0300 ** [0.0149] (0.0445) 
∆Euro-Dollar_Pos{1} 0.0266  [0.0319] (0.4048) 
∆Euro-Dollar_Pos{2} -0.0880 *** [0.0327] (0.0072) 
∆10-Year US Treasury Bond -0.2758 *** [0.0411] (0.0000) 
∆10-Year US Treasury Bond{1} -0.0309 * [0.0166] (0.0622) 
∆10-Year US Treasury Bond{2} -0.0499 ** [0.0223] (0.0251) 
∆10-Year JBG -0.0655 *** [0.0131] (0.0000) 
∆10-Year JBG{1} 0.0215  [0.0168] (0.1994) 
∆10-Year JBG{2} -0.0292  [0.0242] (0.2267) 
∆10-Year Bund -0.0288  [0.0225] (0.2011) 
∆10-Year Bund{1} 0.1039 *** [0.0301] (0.0006) 
∆10-Year Bund{2} 0.0355 ** [0.0147] (0.0157) 
∆Dow Jones -0.1031 ** [0.0427] (0.0159) 
POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ASTZ 1.0610 *** [0.0926] (0.0000) 
POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ASTZ{1} -0.4040 *** [0.0710] (0.0000) 
POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ETZ 1.0051 *** [0.0416] (0.0000) 
POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ETZ{2} 0.0941 *** [0.0315] (0.0028) 
POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ATZ 1.2627 *** [0.0570] (0.0000) 
POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ATZ{1} 0.1814 *** [0.0357] (0.0000) 
POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ATZ{2} -0.1035 ** [0.0414] (0.0123) 
EUR_CPI Flash 0.0023 ** [0.0009] (0.0144) 
EUR_GDP Advance 0.0009  [0.0013] (0.4691) 
EUR_GDP Advance{2} 0.0020 ** [0.0009] (0.0313) 
EUR_GDP Preliminary 0.0025 *** [0.0001] (0.0000) 
EUR_GDP Preliminary{3} 0.0028 *** [0.0001] (0.0000) 
EUR_GDP Preliminary_POS -0.0010 ** [0.0004] (0.0226) 
EUR_GDP Preliminary_POS{3} -0.0018 *** [0.0003] (0.0000) 
GER_IFO Expectation 0.2708 *** [0.0908] (0.0029) 
GER_PPI -0.0014  [0.0012] (0.2259) 
GER_PPI{1} 0.0018  [0.0015] (0.2108) 
GER_PPI{2} -0.0017 * [0.0010] (0.0847) 
UK_BOE Rate 0.0015 *** [0.0006] (0.0091) 
UK_BOE Rate{1} -0.0033 ** [0.0015] (0.0255) 
UK_BOE Rate{2} 0.0017 *** [0.0006] (0.0018) 
UK_BOE Rate_POS{2} -0.0017 *** [0.0006] (0.0079) 
UK_GDP Advance -0.0004  [0.0011] (0.7172) 
UK_GDP Advance {1} -0.0021 ** [0.0010] (0.0340) 
UK_PPI Output 0.0012 * [0.0007] (0.0887) 
UK_Jobless Claims 0.0007  [0.1277] (0.9955) 
UK_Jobless Claims {2} -0.1962 ** [0.0959] (0.0407) 
US_ISM Manufactoring Index -0.4276 *** [0.1366] (0.0017) 
US_ISM Manufactoring Index{2} -0.1221 * [0.0634] (0.0542) 
US_Nonfarm Payrolls -0.6649 *** [0.2541] (0.0089) 
US_Producer Price Index (Core) 0.2205 *** [0.0815] (0.0068) 
Constant 0.0281  [0.0174] (0.1051) 
R2 0.3604    
Durbin-Watson 1.9975    
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
Panel B. EGARCH(3,1) 
  Variable Coeff. Signif. S.E. p-value 
  Constant 0.0331 ** [0.0134] (0.0136) 
  ∆Euro-Dollar{1} -0.0941 *** [0.0202] (0.0000) 
  ∆Euro-Dollar{2} -0.0567 *** [0.0183] (0.0019) 
  ∆Euro-Dollar{3} -0.0254 ** [0.0111] (0.0228) 
  ∆Euro-Dollar{1}_POS 0.0326  [0.0274] (0.2342) 
  ∆Euro-Dollar{2}_POS -0.1029 *** [0.0275] (0.0002) 
  ∆10-Year US Treasury Bond -0.3129 *** [0.0221] (0.0000) 
  ∆10-Year US Treasury Bond{1} -0.0372 ** [0.0183] (0.0416) 
  ∆10-Year US Treasury Bond{2} -0.0538 *** [0.0194] (0.0055) 
  ∆10-Year  JGB -0.0594 *** [0.0128] (0.0000) 
  ∆10-Year  JGB{1} 0.0113  [0.0144] (0.4304) 
  ∆10-Year  JGB{2} -0.0285 * [0.0148] (0.0538) 
  ∆10-Year Bund -0.0215  [0.0181] (0.2348) 
  ∆10-Year Bund{1} 0.1081 *** [0.0199] (0.0000) 
  ∆10-Year Bund{2} 0.0496 *** [0.0173] (0.0042) 
  ∆Dow Jones -0.0486 ** [0.0244] (0.0463) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ASTZ 0.9365 *** [0.0452] (0.0000) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ASTZ{1} -0.3614 *** [0.0545] (0.0000) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ETZ 1.0028 *** [0.0322] (0.0000) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ETZ{2} 0.0816 *** [0.0289] (0.0047) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ATZ 1.1817 *** [0.0365] (0.0000) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ATZ{1} 0.1408 *** [0.0374] (0.0002) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ATZ{2} -0.1210 *** [0.0353] (0.0006) 
  EUR_GDP Advance 0.0838  [0.1950] (0.6674) 
  EUR_GDP Advance{1} 0.3261 * [0.1824] (0.0738) 
  EUR_GDP Preliminary 0.1817  [0.1444] (0.2082) 
  EUR_GDP Preliminary{1} -0.2525 * [0.1505] (0.0935) 
  GER_IFO Expectation 0.2661 *** [0.0818] (0.0011) 
  UK_BOE Rate 0.1409  [0.1080] (0.1922) 
  UK_BOE Rate{1} -0.3943 *** [0.1034] (0.0001) 
  UK_BOE Rate{2} 0.0913 *** [0.0198] (0.0000) 
  US_ISM Manufactoring Index -0.4378 *** [0.0700] (0.0000) 
  US_ISM Manufactoring Index{2} -0.0839  [0.0750] (0.2632) 
  US_Nonfarm Payrolls -0.5752 *** [0.0717] (0.0000) 
  US_Producer Price Index (Core) 0.1836 *** [0.0587] (0.0018) 
  𝜔 -0.1083 *** [0.0112] (0.0000) 
  γ{1} 0.1379 *** [0.0135] (0.0000) 
  δ{1} -0.1850 *** [0.0197] (0.0000) 
  δ{2} 0.2683 *** [0.0125] (0.0000) 
  δ{3} 0.9088 *** [0.0138] (0.0000) 
  φ{1} 0.0167 * [0.0087] (0.0558) 
 
This table presents the results of OLS regression and EGARCH (3,1) estimations of intra-daily Euro/US Dollar exchange rate 
variations (∆Si,t) on interest rates yields (∆yi,t), stock market indexes returns (∆Ii,t), macroeconomic scheduled news for Euro-Area, 
Germany, United States and United Kingdom, unscheduled news and relative lags between January 2003 and February 2008. The 
model is first regressed for the entire sample period. Only variables with significant coefficient are retained and then used in second-
stage estimations. The variables, except for unscheduled news, are standardized using the sample period standard deviations. The 
label _POS after the macroeconomic news name denotes variables based on realized positive surprises. Standard errors for 
coefficients estimates are in brackets, p-values in parentheses and lags 1,2 and 3 for eight, sixteen and twenty-four hours intervals are 
in braces. The models include positive variations in lags 1 and 2 for the Euro/Dollar exchange rate. In the conditional variance 
equation of EGARCH models,  (j=1) is the magnitude parameter,  (l = 1,2,3) the GARCH parameters and  (j=1) the asymmetry 
parameter. (***) = statistically significant at a 1% level, (**) = statistically significant at a 5% level, (*) =statistically significant at 
10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
APPENDIX 2 
The taxonomy of unscheduled news changes through time, as market-moving news 
appear and disappear quite swiftly. A good example is the recent (second half of 
2013) fuss about the “tapering” issue of the quantitative easing by the Fed. Sharp 
movements of exchange rates, bonds and stocks occurred in response to expected or 
unexpected hints of tapering, or lack of them, in any FOMC communiqué or talks 
and statements by FOMC members or by Governor Bernanke. What is relevant on 
this topic is the frequently inconsistent and unpredictable reactions by financial 
markets. A reasonably complete taxonomy, at this time (as the future can bring some 
more), could be the following one, with examples in two tables, later on.  
A) Scheduled policy statements (like the press conferences of ECB Governors, or the 
Humphrey-Hawkins testimonies by US Fed Chiefs) of uncertain content on US or 
internationally sensitive issues. In most recent times, the reactions to these generally 
unequivocal messages (at least in the “packaging”) have become highly volatile. 
Delayed effects in the following days are frequent.  
B) Unscheduled policy statements or simple opinions in interviews or in question 
and answer sessions at the end of formal press conferences (other than those by ECB, 
Fed, BoJ, etc., in this latter case). 
C) Uncertain interpretations of monetary policy decisions already taken or about the 
wording used in official press releases(typically those by the Fed) or in the FOMC 
minutes. 
D) Terrorist events deemed to be influential on policy decisions, commodities price 
developments (especially oil) or international mobility of factors of production. 
E) Institutional or personality events (Government or Parliamentarian, central bank 
officials, etc.) involving leading policy makers, potentially able to cause policy 
changes. 
F) Events or sequence of events which may lead – or actually leading – to important 
policy shifts or to unwelcome market developments, or polarization of expectations 
of them for the future. 
G) Occasional or short term market positioning produced by market sentiment or by 
ambiguous interpretation of future events. 
H) Public interventions by Central Banks in the foreign exchange market or 
statements announcing or threatening them (Japanese Monetary Authorities are a 
good example). Simple discussions about exchange rates or even mentions of them in 
official statements or interviews, by central banks’ Governors or high-ranking 
officials, belong to this group.  
I) Unexpected – or moderately so - changes of official interest rates or strong 
expectations about their changes whenever they remain invariant.  
J) Communication to the markets of economic indicators considered to be 
occasionally important in particular situations , in relation to macroeconomic or 
60 
 
market trends; these are generally amongst statistically non-significant scheduled 
news, getting suddenly and briefly popular; German scheduled news typically belong 
to this lot. 
K) A contemporaneous - or sequential in the very short term - publication by the US 
and the Eurozone of minor macroeconomic indicators, typically statistically non-
significant scheduled news, when arriving in isolation, but able to produce effects 
when they arrive in clusters. 
L) Unexpected – or moderately so - upgrading or downgrading by Rating Agencies 
of official financial Institutions or of the entire public debt issued by sovereign 
countries. Typical events in the recent Eurozone financial crisis.  
M) Market or policy events connected to the post-2007 international financial crises 
generated by the subprime mortgages  defaults (connected to derivative products) 
and Eurozone sovereign debt problems.    
The unscheduled events
39
, used in this paper are described by the A-M typology 
above. They were extracted from a large archive of daily events dating from 1998 
(and before, see Tivegna and Chiofi, 2004) until today. This unique hand-collected 
archive of news – called informally Newsmetrics – contains, each day, on average 
between ten and fifteen daily articles and extended newsflashes from the Financial 
Times, the Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg News, Reuters and Dow Jones 
Newswires
40
. The richness and completeness of Newsmetrics has helped to isolate 
the “main” news of each time zone (not “of the day”)41. 
Tables A.1 and A.2 contain examples of the kind of unscheduled news used in this 
paper. Table A.1 makes reference to a period of two months in 2003 (May and June). 
Table A.2 covers eleven months in 2013, till November. Newsmetrics has grown up 
out of a daily collection of events. This latter table has a few items which are not 
coded as  unscheduled news. Their role is to reinforce the decision to propose an 
event as an unscheduled news and give more clue on it. So they are indicated with a 
“CONN”, meaning  they are connected with the coded unscheduled news 
immediately following them. Besides, they help establishing more accurately the 
                                                          
39
 Here again we stress the unscheduled nature of these news does not originate from being 
unexpected on the basis of a calendar of events. The random occurrence is an important factor. But 
not only that. The content of  unscheduled  news is generally unknown and the reaction – once this 
content appears – can be totally  unpredicted and even unpredictable. It happens frequently, with this 
kind of events, that the content of an unscheduled news, occurring at a scheduled time, is strongly 
expected. If this content deviates from expectation, the market reaction can be wild and – again – 
totally unpredictable. 
40
 The above reliance mostly on newspaper articles deserves some extra speculation. In fact, the very 
idea of a tri-partition of the GTD came about by the news search process employed here and in 
previous studies, Fornari et al. (2002), Tivegna and Chiofi (2004) and Cagliesi and Tivegna (2006). 
An important issue remains open: the exact allocation of an event to one of the three time zones 
(ASTZ, ETZ, ATZ). The articles are dated but generally make reference to the entire day. Some 
external information, some experience was used to make the time allocation of the news. In a few case 
it was necessary to make reference to the time stamp of Bloomberg newsflashes. 
41
 So, for instance, in recent times, the communication of ECB council decisions on interest rates to 
financial markets (at or a little before 1PM, CET, well within ETZ) does not move Euro-Dollar that 
much. The ECB press conference, generally at 2:30PM CET, is in ATZ and assigned to this area, even 
though it is the most European event for financial markets, after the beginning of the Euro era in 1999. 
And the real reaction occurs there. 
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sign of the news. Some effort was made to keep the collection criteria as 
homogeneous as possible through time. 
The basic selection criterion was: 
1) compute an eight-hour standardized €-$ rate of change of the 6AM value (with 
respect to 10PM in the previous day, for ASTZ), of the 2PM value (with respect to 
6AM, for ETZ) and of the 10PM  value (with respect to 2PM, for ATZ), all at 
Central European Time (CET), exchange rates; 
2) spot the time zones where this standardized rate of variation exceeds 1.2 – 1.5; 
3) look – in Newsmetrics - whether an explanation exists, within one of the  items of the  
A – M taxonomy reported above; 
4) if an explanation is found, then an unscheduled news - Euro-positive or Euro-negative 
- code is assigned to the event: ASTZ/P(N), ETZ/P(N), ATZ/P(N); 
5) no explanation, no news. 
Needless to say various borderline situations occurred, especially for the news 
typologies G, J and K. In this respect some “subjective bias” in the selection process 
could be present. With some experience insight, it can be said that the overall market 
and policy situation - and the connected “mood” - play an important role in the 
assignment of the unscheduled news typology to an event. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
Table A2.1 
 
Description of unscheduled news (05/2003-06/2003) 
This table contains a sample of unscheduled news collected from various newspapers sources between May 
2003 and June 2003. The first two columns indicate the date and weekday of release. The text of the news 
is contained in column 3. Each news is assigned to one of the three time zones (ASTZ, ETZ, ATZ) and 
associated with the expected impact on the €-$ exchange rate, Euro-positive, P, Euro-negative, N (column 
4). The reference to the A-M taxonomy, written above, is reported in column 5, the sources are in column 
6.  They are: WSJ: Wall Street Journal , BLO: Bloomberg News, FT: Financial Times.  
 
Date Weekday Text Category/Sign Typology Source 
      
06/05/2003 Tuesday The dollar fell sharply against the euro Tuesday, after the  
Federal Reserve kept interest rates intact. 
ATZ/P  (C) WSJ 
12/05/2003      Monday The dollar fell to $1.16 against the euro for the first time in 
more than four years after Treasury Secretary John Snow 
suggested (ABC Television, on Sunday) the U.S. isn't 
concerned with the currency's 21 percent slide in the past 
year. 
ATZ/P  (B,H) BLO 
14/05/2003     Wednesday        The German economy, Europe's biggest, shrank in the first 
quarter of 2003 by 0.2 per cent, according to official data  
released on Thursday. The news raises the prospect that  
Germany will slip into recession - as defined by two 
successive quarters of contraction - this year. 
ETZ/N  (J) FT 
15/05/2003      Thursday The Eurozone economy teetered on the brink of recession 
in the first three months of the year, according to figures 
released on Thursday that will intensify pressure on the 
European Central Bank to cut interest rates. 
ETZ/N  (K,J) FT 
16/05/2003      Friday After range-trading early in the European session, the 
greenback began sliding across the board. The foreign 
exchange markets appear to be going through one of their 
occasional regime changes. Strategists said there their 
occasional regime changes. Strategists said there was no 
one reason to explain the dollar's renewed weakness, but 
noted sentiment towards the currency had remained 
bearish 
ATZ/P  (G) FT 
19/05/2003 Monday The dollar fell to a series of lows across the board on 
Monday after weekend comments by John Snow, the US 
Treasury secretary, were seen as underlining the US 
administration's relaxed attitude towards the dollar's fall. 
After the G7 and G8 meetings ended on Sunday, Mr Snow 
described the dollar's fall as a "modest realignment". 
ETZ/P  (B,H) FT 
20/05/2003 Tuesday The dollar fell late Tuesday on news that the U.S. 
government decided to raise the nation's terror alert level 
back to orange, or "high," from yellow, or "elevated”. 
ATZ/P  (D) WSJ 
23/05/2003 Friday The euro rose above its 1999 launch levels on Friday as 
the dollar tumbled on a combination of rising risk aversion 
on fresh terrorist fears and thin markets ahead of the long 
weekend in both the UK and the US. Its sudden move 
higher surprised traders, who said the speed was 
exacerbated by stop-loss selling - automated orders 
triggered when a currency pair reaches a particular level, 
above the euro's previous high. (in ETZ) 
ETZ/P  (D,G) FT 
23/05/2003 Friday The euro continued its upward march against the dollar 
Friday, finishing within striking distance of its historical 
high just under $1.19.Thin market conditions could hinder 
further progress until full-scale global trading resumes on 
Tuesday after the long weekend in both the U.S. and the 
UK. (in ATZ) 
ATZ/P  (G) WSJ 
27/05/2003       Tuesday The euro reached a lifetime high against the dollar and hit 
fresh record highs against the yen and sterling on Tuesday 
as negative sentiment towards the US currency prompted 
investors to turn to the euro. 
ETZ/P (G) FT 
28/05/2003 Wednesday The euro on Wednesday eased off Tuesday's lifetime highs 
against the dollar and sterling as investors booked profits 
on the single currency's recent sharp gains. The euro was 
at $1.173 against the dollar by midsession in New York 
after hitting a lifetime high at $1.1932 on Tuesday 
ETZ/N  (G) FT 
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29/05/2003 Thursday The dollar's rally appeared to have come to an abrupt halt 
on Thursday after investors shrugged aside an upwards 
revision to US growth data and focused instead of soft 
labour market figures. 
ATZ/P   (G) FT 
30/05/2003 Friday The dollar rose the most in eight weeks against the euro in 
New York trading after President George W. Bush said he 
will express support for a ‘strong dollar'’ at a weekend 
meeting of the leaders of the largest industrial nations. 
DUSN  (B,E,H) BLO 
02/06/2003 Wednesday The dollar eased up after strengthening sharply against the 
euro in early Monday trading on supportive comments 
from President Bush over the weekend. Growing 
speculation of a more aggressive rate cut by the European 
Central Bank also fueled the dollar's early strength. 
JTZ/N   (B,E,G,H) WSJ 
05/06/2003 Thursday The euro was the market’s main focus and it rallied 
sharply after the ECB cut interest rates by half a 
percentage point, meeting analyst’s expectations. (in ETZ) 
ETZ/P  (I) FT 
05/06/2003      Thursday The dollar plummeted across the board Thursday after the 
European Central Bank cut its short-term interest rates half 
a percentage point and weak U.S. data pointed to future 
pitfalls ahead of a keenly-awaited U.S. employment report. 
(in ATZ) 
ATZ/P (I) WSJ 
10/06/2003 Tuesday The German Bundesbank has downgraded its growth 
forecast for 2003, in a move likely to create further 
embarrassment for the government. 
ATZ/N (L) FT 
11/06/2003 Wednesday The euro gained against the dollar on Wednesday as 
Eurozone officials played down the likelihood of further 
rate cuts 
ETZ/P  (B) FT 
11/06/2003 Wednesday The dollar softened against its trans-Atlantic counterparts 
on continued expectations of a U.S. interest-rate cut. 
Recent comments by Federal Reserve officials have fueled 
speculation of a rate cut at the central bank's June 24-25 
policy meeting, with the market looking for additional 
indications Wednesday. 
ATZ/P  (B) WSJ 
13/06/2003 Friday  The dollar dipped to its lowest levels of the day against the 
euro after a fall in consumer confidence took the market 
by surprise and sparked further speculation of a rate cut by 
the Federal Reserve later this month. 
ATZ/P  (F) FT 
18/06/2003 Wednesday The dollar advanced steadily on Wednesday as investors 
lowered expectations of the likelihood of a half-point 
interest rate cut by the Federal Reserve next week 
following strong data on Monday and Tuesday 
ATZ/N  (K) FT 
19/06/2003    Thursday The dollar rose to a month high against the euro on 
Thursday as fears that the US Federal Reserve will cut 
interest rates by a half point eased. 
ATZ/N (I) FT 
20/06/2003     Friday The dollar rallied broadly against its rivals Friday on 
profit-taking and adjustments of positions as some 
investors shifted back to expectations that the Federal 
Reserve may cut interest rates by 25 basis points at next 
week's meeting. 
ATZ/N  (I) WSJ 
23/06/2003      Monday The dollar rallied to its strongest in a month against the 
euro and made ground against other currencies as investors 
began to price in a smaller rate cut and a relatively positive 
statement from the Federal Reserve when it announces its 
policy decision on Wednesday 
ATZ/N  (I,G) FT 
26/06/2003 Thursday The dollar rocketed higher to finish the day around its 
session peaks after the Fed Reserve's smaller-than- 
expected interest-rate cut and more-upbeat comment. 
ATZ/N  (I) WSJ 
30/06/2003 Monday European central bankers, via the Bank for International 
Settlements, on Monday backed U.S. acceptance of a 
weaker dollar to stimulate the U.S. economy. 
ATZ/P  (A) WSJ 
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Table A2.2 
 
Description of unscheduled news (12/2012-11/2013) 
This table contains a sample of unscheduled news collected from various newspapers sources between 
December 2012 and November 2013. The first two columns indicate the date and weekday of release. The text 
of the news is contained in column 3. Each news is assigned to one of the three time zones (ASTZ, ETZ, ATZ) 
and associated with the expected impact on the €-$ exchange rate, Euro-positive, P, Euro-negative, N (column 
4). The reference to the A-M taxonomy, written above, is reported in column 5, the sources are in column 6.  
They are: WSJ: Wall Street Journal , BLO: Bloomberg News, FT: Financial Times.  
 
Date Weekday Text Category/
Sign 
Typology Source 
      
30/12/2012 Sunday Last-ditch talks in Congress over the US budget have faltered a day 
before the deadline for a deal, leaving financial markets facing the 
prospect of entering the new year in a highly unstable economic 
environment. 
CONN (F) FT 
02/01/2013 Wednesday The last-minute deal over the US fiscal cliff triggered a lift in   
equity markets around the world as the threat of sharp tax rises and 
spending cuts tipping the world’s biggest economy into a new 
recession receded. But the rally in the wake of the deal may not last 
long, as the White House and Republicans are already positioning 
themselves for a series of even greater confrontations over the 
budget in the early months of the year. 
CONN 
 
(F) FT 
02/01/2013 Wednesday Perceived riskier currencies like the Canadian and Australian 
dollars climbed Wednesday, a day after the U.S. Congress reached 
a deal to avert the so-called fiscal cliff. Investors poured into 
various risk assets on the hopes that Tuesday's last-minute deal in 
the U.S. would help the world's largest economy avoid a recession 
in 2013. The yen and to a lesser extent the U.S. dollar—the 
markets' perceived safe havens—were hurt by the early-year 
trading. 
ASTZ/N (F) WSJ 
03/01/2013 Thursday Officials at the US Federal Reserve are split on whether to keep 
buying assets until the end of 2013, according to the minutes of 
their December meeting. The minutes show the new front line for 
debate on the rate-setting Federal Open Market Committee and 
give the first indication of how big the Fed’s third round of 
quantitative easing – so-called QE3 – may be in total. 
ATZ/N (C) WSJ 
03/01/2013 Thursday The dollar rose broadly against other currencies after comments 
from the Federal Reserve suggested central bank officials may halt 
bond-buying programs that have been crucial in buoying the 
economy as early as this year. Minutes of the Fed's Dec 11-12 
policy meeting revealed that some officials supported an 
immediate halt to the program—in which the central bank pumps 
$85 billion per month into the economy through securities 
purchases—while others pushed to continue the buying until year 
end. The Fed has previously said it would continue the asset 
purchases, known as quantitative easing, until the unemployment 
rate improves, without specifying any period of time. 
ATZ/N (C) FT 
10/01/2013 Thursday The European Central Bank hailed a “normalisation” in financial 
market conditions on Thursday as its governing council voted 
unanimously to keep rates on hold, signalling confidence that the 
eurozone would stage a gradual recovery from recession later in the 
year. The euro rallied against the US dollar, gaining 1 per cent on 
the day to touch $1.3195 as Mario Draghi, ECB president, spoke at 
a regular monthly press conference after its decision to leave its 
main refinancing rate unchanged at 0.75 per cent. While cautioning 
that risks to growth “remain on the downside” in the eurozone, Mr 
Draghi started the year in upbeat mood, checking off a list of 
indicators of financial stress that had improved since the middle of 
last year when fears of a euro break-up peaked. 
CONN (A) FT 
10/01/2013 Thursday The euro rose above $1.32 against the dollar after the European 
Central Bank kept interest rates on hold and signalled a more 
positive outlook for the eurozone. The single currency gained 1.2 
per cent to touch $1.3224 after Mario Draghi, ECB president, 
ATZ/P (A) FT 
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forecast that the eurozone would return to growth this year and said 
the decision to keep the eurozone’s main refinancing rate steady at 
0.75 per cent had been unanimous. While the ECB had not been 
expected to lower rates, investors and analysts had focused on the 
policy statement from the ECB for indications of a cut. 
12/01/2013 Saturday Greece’s parliament approved fresh tax reforms early on Saturday 
after a noisy session in which opposition lawmakers claimed the 
coalition government had “hijacked the democratic 
process”.Yannis Stournaras, the technocratic finance minister, 
defended the adoption of emergency parliamentary procedures to 
push through measures on grounds that international creditors’ 
deadlines for handing out €14.7bn of aid by March were fast 
approaching. 
CONN (M) FT 
14/01/2013 Monday Risk-related currencies rose against the US dollar on Monday as 
foreign exchange markets started the week on a positive note, with 
the euro making further gains and the Japanese yen continuing to 
weaken. The single currency hit a fresh high for the year against 
the US currency, rising 0.2 per cent to touch $1.3403, its strongest 
level since February, as optimism on the euro continued following 
the European Central Bank’s decision last week not to cut interest 
rates. 
ASTZ/P (A,M) FT 
30/01/2013 Wednesday The euro hit a 14-month high against the dollar, shrugging off a fall 
in Italian business confidence. There was also a contraction in 
Spanish economic growth and investors continued to rebalance 
towards the single currency. The euro rose 0.6 per cent against the 
US dollar to $1.3579 after an economic sentiment indicator from 
the European Commission showed a better than expected rise in 
January. The single currency remained near that level after the 
Federal Reserve signalled no deviation from its highly 
ETZ/P (J,A) FT 
07/02/2013 Thursday Mario Draghi, European Central Bank president, on Thursday 
verbally intervened in what some policy makers fear has the 
makings of a global currency war, sending the euro to its lowest 
level against the dollar in nearly two weeks. The recent strength of 
the euro has alarmed European businesses and politicians since a 
sustained rise could kill off early signs that the battered eurozone 
might return to growth this year as exports pick up. But with 
central banks around the world adopting ever looser monetary 
policies and in some cases, like Japan, bowing to overt political 
pressure to do so, concerns have grown of a series of competitive 
devaluations dubbed a currency war as nations try to ensure their 
exports remain competitively priced. After the ECB’s monthly 
interest rate-setting governing council kept rates on hold at 0.75 per 
cent, Mr Draghi reiterated that the bank’s mandate was to target 
inflation – or maintain price stability – and not the exchange rate. 
But he added: “We want to see if this appreciation is sustained and 
if it alters our assessment of price stability. ”He also issued a veiled 
rebuke to François Hollande, France’s president, who this week 
called for a “managed exchange rate” – comments that had little 
effect on the euro. “President Hollande. Well, we should always 
remember that the ECB is independent,” he said. “We heard all 
over the world now talking up, talking down currencies. The 
ultimate judgment of the effectiveness of this strategy is to see 
what markets make of these statements. ”The euro fell below $1.34 
against the dollar for the first time since January and suffered 
heavy losses against the UK pound and the Japanese yen. 
ETZ/N (A,H) FT 
20/02/2013 Wednesday The US Federal Reserve is backing away from open-ended asset 
purchases as officials grow nervous about the dangers of a bigger 
balance sheet. According to the minutes of its January meeting 
released on Wednesday, “many” officials are concerned about the 
costs and risks of further asset purchases, as the Fed buys securities 
at a pace of $85bn a month. The minutes suggest that QE3 – as the 
Fed’s third round of quantitative easing is known – could end 
earlier than previously thought and is no longer a truly open-ended 
programme. 
CONN (A) FT 
20/02/2013 Wednesday The dollar rallied after minutes from the Federal Reserve's latest 
meeting prompted investors to raise expectations that the central 
bank may wind down its bond-buying program sooner than 
expected. The Fed's statement showed that "a number of 
participants" in the January policy meeting discussed the 
possibility that the bank may need to taper its bond buying even 
before the job market improves. The U.S. central bank is currently 
buying $85 billion a month in assets, pumping dollars into the 
economy to keep interest rates low and stimulate growth. Slowing 
ATZ/N (A) WSJ 
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the pace of those bond purchases, or ending the program 
altogether, might allow the dollar to rise. " 
25/02/2013 Monday The euro fell dramatically as concern about Italy's election stoked 
investor anxiety about a return of political risks in the euro zone. 
The single currency abruptly reversed gains notched in earlier 
trading after voter surveys in Italy pointed to a tight race. The euro 
had its biggest one-day decline against the yen since May 2010. 
Early exit polls in Italy indicated a center-left coalition led by 
Democratic Party leader Pier Luigi Bersani was on track to win a 
majority in Italy's lower house, but later polls indicated that former. 
Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's center-right coalition might win 
in the upper house. That divide, if confirmed by the final vote tally, 
could put in doubt the country's ability to continue with key 
economic reforms, potentially pushing it toward a new election as 
early as this summer. 
ATZ/N (M) WSJ 
07/03/2013 Thursday The euro rose more than 1 per cent against other major             
currencies after the European Central Bank kept interest rates on 
hold and said its monetary policy would remain “accommodative”. 
The single currency hit its strongest level against the dollar in a 
week at $1.3116 even as the ECB downgraded its growth forecasts 
for the year and said an interest-rate cut had been discussed, as 
expectations the central bank might cut rates Thursday were 
dashed. 
ATZ/P (A) FT 
18/03/2013 Monday Cypriot authorities scrambled to renegotiate the terms of a €10bn 
bailout by moving to scrap its controversial levy on small account 
holders and instead seizing more from larger depositors and 
businesses. The islands’ banks were ordered to stay closed for two 
more days to avoid a bank run, as the government delayed for the 
second day running a parliamentary vote on the deal struck with 
eurozone officials and the International Monetary Fund over the 
weekend. 
CONN (M) FT 
18/03/2013 Monday The euro fell to its weakest level in three months against the US 
dollar as investors reacted to news that a proposed eurozone bailout 
of Cyprus would involve a tax on bank savers. The single currency 
dipped to $1.2880 in Asian trading but later stabilised to trade 
above $1.2950 as reports emerged that politicians in Cyprus were 
considering amending the deal to relieve the pressure on small 
depositors. 
ASTZ/N (M) FT 
19/03/2013 Tuesday The euro dropped to a 16-week low against the dollar on Tuesday, 
weighed by uncertainty over the details of an international bailout 
for Cyprus. Cyprus's parliament on Tuesday rejected a proposal to 
tax the country's bank deposits, part of an international €10 billion 
($13 billion) rescue package for the island nation. 
ATZ/N (M) WSJ 
20/03/2013 Wednesday The US Federal Reserve kept its foot on the monetary accelerator 
but made a slight change to its language on its third round of 
quantitative easing that puts greater weight on the costs and risks. 
Asset purchases under QE3 will continue at a pace of $85bn a 
month and the US central bank expects to keep interest rates low 
until the unemployment rate falls below 6.5 per cent from the 
current 7.7 per cent, the Federal Open Market Committee said at 
the end of a two-day meeting in Washington. 
ATZ/P (A) FT 
25/03/2013 Monday News that a bailout had finally been agreed in the early hours of 
Monday sparked an initial rise in European stock markets and 
peripheral government bonds. The reason was relief that Cyprus 
had avoided a full-scale bank collapse. But the relief proved short-
lived. After early gains, the euro fell below $1.29 against the dollar 
as traders digested the potential effects of capital controls and the 
risk of contagion across Europe’s banking system. Fears that the 
Cyprus rescue, which includes a “haircut” for large depositors, 
would set a precedent for similar action in other troubled eurozone 
countries had been one of investors’ main concerns. Little wonder, 
then, that markets retreated when Jeroen Dijsselbloem, head of the 
eurogroup of finance ministers, said the Cypriot rescue marked a 
watershed in how the region deals with failing banks. Investors are 
worried, too, that capital controls in Cyprus will taint the banking 
system in other struggling eurozone countries. 
CONN (M) FT 
25/03/2013 Monday The euro lost earlier gains on Monday as investors digested the 
fallout from a last-minute bailout deal to save the banking sector in 
Cyprus late on Sunday night. The single currency when Jeroen 
Dijsselbloem, head of the eurogroup of finance ministers, said the 
Cypriot rescue marked a watershed in how the region deals with 
failing banks. The deal includes a tax on depositors, while controls 
are expected to be imposed to prevent capital flight when the 
ASTZ/P (M) FT 
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country’s banks reopen on Tuesday. The euro fell more than 1 per 
cent to $1.2829, wiping out all its earlier gains on initial optimism 
after the news the deal had been struck. 
25/03/2013 Monday The euro fell to a four-month low against the dollar on Monday on 
concerns that Cyprus's bailout deal may set a precedent for future 
euro-zone bank restructurings. Cyprus secured a €10 billion ($13 
billion) bailout from international creditors early Monday, avoiding 
an exit from the euro zone after a week of tense negotiations. The 
deal will downsize the island nation's largest banks and impose 
losses on deposits with more than €100,000, an unprecedented 
move that will hit senior bank bondholders, who had been 
previously protected throughout the euro-zone debt crisis. The euro 
initially rose after the deal was announced but weakened as the 
New York session started, accelerating losses after Eurogroup head 
Jeroen Dijsselbloem reportedly said Cyprus represents a template 
for resolving future euro-zone banking problems 
ATZ/N (M) WSJ 
04/04/2013 Thursday The euro rose after Mario Draghi, president of the European  
Central Bank, said that the recent bailout of Cyprus was not a 
template for other countries in the eurozone and that the ECB was 
able to cope with serious crises in the single currency bloc. The 
euro initially fell to its lowest level in a week after Mr Draghi 
noted that weak economic activity in the eurozone had continued 
into the first part of the year and said the central bank would retain 
its accommodative monetary stance for “as long as needed”. As 
expected, the ECB kept interest rates on hold at 0.75 per cent. But 
the euro later rose close to $1.29 against the dollar after Mr Draghi 
sought to damp concerns that the bailout of Cyprus raised the 
spectre of a country leaving the euro, stating that  those who 
speculated about a break-up of the eurozone vastly 
underestimated” the will of policy makers to hold it together. The 
euro rose 0.2 per cent against the dollar to $1.2888.  
ATZ/P (A,M) FT 
09/04/2013 Tuesday The US dollar was weaker across the board after traders interpreted 
comments from Ben Bernanke, chairman of the US Federal 
Reserve, in a speech on Monday night as a sign that the US was 
unlikely to end its programme of bond-buying to ease monetary 
policy any time soon. 
ASTZ/P (B) FT 
02/05/2013 Thursday The euro fell for the first time in five days against the dollar after 
European Central Bank President Mario Draghi said policy makers 
may take the unprecedented step of charging banks to hold excess 
reserves. The single currency dropped against all except one of its 
16 most-traded peers as the ECB cut its main refinancing rate and 
Draghi said policy makers had an open mind on a negative deposit 
rate. 
ATZ/N (A) BLO 
10/05/2013 Friday The dollar soared against other major currencies, after Thursday's 
breach of ¥100 yen acted as a catalyst for a broad rally in the 
greenback. The greenback hit its strongest level since October 
2008 against the yen, trading as high as ¥101.99 in New York 
trading. It also notched an eight-month high against the Swiss franc 
and a one-month high against the euro. 
ETZ/N (G) WSJ 
22/05/2013 Wednesday The U.S. dollar rallied as Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke 
said the Fed could begin tapering its bond-buying program in the 
"next few meetings." That decision will depend on economic data, 
he said. The next Fed meeting is scheduled for June 18-19. The 
ICE dollar index, a gauge of the greenback's movement against six 
other major currencies, rose to 84.34 from 83.877 late Tuesday in 
North America. The dollar index had earlier fallen as low as 83.46, 
according to FactSet. The WSJ Dollar Index, an alternative 
measure of the currency's moves against a slightly wider basket, 
rose to 75.91 from 75.42 late Tuesday. Minutes from the April 30-
May 1 meeting released Wednesday showed a "number" of 
officials were ready to taper purchases as soon as June, although no 
consensus was reached. While the Federal Open Market 
Committee minutes didn't get a lasting dollar reaction, they were 
significant because they mentioned June as a potential date for 
easing, said Colin Cieszynski, senior market analyst at CMC 
Markets. 
ATZ/N (B,C) WSJ 
06/06/2013 Thursday A combative Mario Draghi, president of the European Central 
Bank, strongly defended one of his bank’s most unorthodox and 
controversial moves of the eurozone crisis as “probably the most 
successful monetary policy measure undertaken in recent times”. 
Speaking after the ECB kept its main refinancing rate on hold at 
0.5 per cent and decided to keep any other non-standard measures 
“on the shelf”, Mr Draghi said an absence of deflationary risks in 
CONN (A) FT 
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the eurozone and a stock market rally were the fruits of the bank’s 
outright monetary transactions, or OMT scheme, announced last 
September. 
06/06/2013 Thursday The dollar suffered a sharp fall on Thursday as concerns over how 
much longer the Federal Reserve would keep pumping liquidity 
through the global financial system led investors to sell off the US 
currency. The move followed a euro rally after the European 
Central Bank kept interest rates on hold at its monthly meeting and 
raised its forecasts for growth in the eurozone next year despite 
scaling back its expectations for 2013. This spurred further dollar 
selling in the world’s largest financial market as the currency 
breached technical support levels. The dollar index fell nearly 2 per 
cent while the US currency dipped 3 per cent against Japan’s yen 
to move below Y96. 
ATZ/P (A,C) FT 
09/06/2013 Sunday One of the bitterest fights in monetary policy lands in court this 
week as Germany’s highest legal authority hears evidence over 
whether the European Central Bank’s pledge to save the euro last 
year undermined the constitution. 
ASTZ/N (M) FT 
19/06/2013 Wednesday Ben Bernanke, Federal Reserve chairman, offered the firmest 
timeline yet for tapering US central bank asset purchases, saying 
that the central bank’s $85bn monthly programme could be slowed 
this year and end altogether around the middle of next year. In a 
statement following the latest meeting of the Federal Open Market 
Committee, Mr Bernanke said it would be “appropriate to 
moderate the monthly pace of purchases later this year,” assuming 
the Fed’s expectations for an improved economic outlook held 
true. He added that there would be “measured steps through the 
first half of next year” to slow asset purchases, which would end 
“around midyear”. Mr Bernanke also said the bond buying could 
end once the unemployment rate fell below 7 per cent. It was 7.6 
per cent in May. 
CONN (A,B) FT 
19/06/2013 Wednesday The dollar surged after Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke 
took a more optimistic view of the economy and outlined a 
potential timeline for ending the central bank's bond buying. In a 
statement accompanying the central bank's monthly monetary 
policy meeting, Federal Reserve officials upgraded its assessment 
of the economic recovery, saying unemployment may fall to 6.5% 
by the end of 2014. 
ATZ/N (A,B) WSJ 
20/06/2013 Thursday The International Monetary Fund is preparing to suspend aid 
payments to Greece by the end of next month unless eurozone 
leaders plug a €3bn-€4bn shortfall that has opened up in Greece’s 
€172bn rescue programme, according to officials involved in 
management of the bailout. The gap emerged after eurozone central 
banks refused to roll over Greek bonds they hold, and comes amid 
signs that even the scaled-back privatisation plan Athens agreed to 
last year is falling behind schedule. Officials involved in the Greek 
talks emphasised that, unlike previous slippages in the bailout, the 
fault did not lie with Athens but rather in other eurozone capitals. 
ASTZ/N (M) FT 
20/06/2013 Thursday The dollar surged against counterparts worldwide ranging from 
Australia’s currency to Turkey’s lira as the Federal Reserve’s 
signal it is getting closer to reducing monetary stimulus pushed 
volatility to the highest in a year and spurred losses in carry trades. 
The U.S. currency strengthened versus all of its 16-most-traded 
peers and Deutsche Bank AG’s G10 FX Carry Basket index fell to 
the lowest level since October as Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke 
yesterday outlined the case for reduced monetary stimulus this year 
if the U.S. economy keeps improving. 
ETZ/N (A,B) BLO 
21/06/2013 Friday The Greek government of Antonis Samaras saw its parliamentary 
majority shrink to a handful of votes on Friday after a junior 
coalition partner quit over the closure of the state broadcaster, 
imperilling his ability to continue with tough bailout reforms. 
Although Mr Samaras may be able to count on a handful of 
independent members of parliament for support, the departure of 
the Democratic Left party left Mr Samaras’ New Democracy and 
centre-left Pasok with a mere three seat majority. 
ATZ/N (M) FT 
24/06/2013 Monday The dollar continued its march forward in the wake of the Federal 
Reserve’s plans to tighten monetary easing with the US currency 
hitting its strongest level in more than two weeks. The dollar index, 
which weighs the US currency against a basket of counterparts, 
gained 0.4 per cent to trade above 82.50, its strongest level since 
the start of the month. Higher-yielding developed market 
currencies made heavier losses against the dollar. 
ASTZ/N (G) FT 
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26/06/2013 Wednesday The euro dipped below $1.30 against the dollar for the first time in 
more than three weeks after Mario Draghi, European Central Bank 
president, said that the eurozone central bank would retain its 
accommodative stance for the foreseeable future. The euro fell 0.7 
per cent to $1.2985 as investors contrasted the ECB’s dovish 
message with that of the Federal Reserve, which plans to tighten 
monetary policy later this year if the US economy improves. 
ETZ/N (A) FT 
04/07/2013 Thursday The European Central Bank and the Bank of England both took the 
unorthodox step of offering explicit guidance on low future interest 
rates on Thursday, in what amounted to a transatlantic rejoinder to 
hints of tightening by the US Federal Reserve. Dropping a 
longstanding policy of never “pre-committing” to future interest 
rate decisions, Mario Draghi, ECB president, ruled out any rate 
increase for an extended period, reflecting nervousness about the 
economic outlook for the bloc .In London, Mark Carney, the Bank 
of England’s new governor, introduced a similar element of 
“forward guidance” into a statement on the economy by saying the 
market’s recent expectations of rate rises in 2015 “were 
unwarranted”. 
CONN (A) FT 
04/07/2013 Thursday The euro hit its weakest level since May after the European Central 
Bank said it expected interest rates to remain at or below their 
current levels for an extended period of time. The single currency 
fell nearly 1 per cent to dip below $1.29 after Mario Draghi, ECB 
president, said the restrained outlook for inflation, weakness in the 
eurozone economy and subdued monetary dynamics had led the 
central bank to inject a downward bias to interest rates. Mr Draghi 
said the decision to give forward guidance on interest rates, which 
was taken unanimously by the ECB governing council, was “a very 
significant step forward” for the central bank. 
ATZ/N (A) FT 
09/07/2013 Tuesday The euro slid to a three-month low against the dollar after an 
official at the European Central Bank signalled it may remain 
accommodative for more than a year, further diverging from policy 
in the U.S. Europe’s shared currency slid versus most major peers 
after Reuters reported ECB Executive-Board Member Joerg 
Asmussen said the bank’s forward guidance, which is that interest 
rates will stay low for an extended period, goes beyond 12 months. 
ATZ/N (B) BLO 
10/07/2013 Wednesday The dollar fell against the yen and euro after minutes from the 
Federal Reserve's June meeting failed to clarify when the central 
bank would end its bond purchases. The minutes showed Fed 
officials divided about the timing of a reduction in bond-buying, 
with half of Fed officials believing the central bank should end the 
stimulus program by the end of this year. Other Fed officials said 
the labour market hasn't improved enough to begin tapering so 
soon. That disappointed traders hoping for a clearer timetable, and 
sent the dollar lower against its rivals. 
ATZ/P  
ASTZ/P 
(T+1) 
(A) WSJ 
05/09/2013 Thursday Mario Draghi, European Central Bank president, expressed 
extreme caution about the eurozone’s nascent economic recovery 
as the bank’s governing council kept rates on hold on Thursday and 
reiterated its pledge that it would not tighten for an extended 
period. Although he stressed that the bank was “particularly 
attentive” to money market conditions, where expectations of 
future overnight interest rates have edged upwards as excess 
liquidity in the banking system falls, Mr Draghi if anything stepped 
back from previous suggestions that the ECB would take action 
under certain predictable circumstances. “I am very, very cautious 
about the recovery, I can’t share the enthusiasm,” he said at a 
monthly press conference. “These shoots are still very, very green. 
”The eurozone exited an 18-month recession in the second quarter 
when it grew 0.3 per cent. But in spite of the improvement, the 
euro area remains weighed down by record joblessness and output 
is well below the level at which it entered the crisis. The ECB chief 
said there had been a discussion about cutting interest rates at the 
governing council meeting, with some among the 17 national 
central bank governors and six ECB executive board members 
suggesting the fragility of the recovery merited discussing a cut 
and others arguing that the improvement itself meant no cut should 
be debated. 
 
CONN (A) FT 
05/09/2013 Thursday The euro fell after European Central Bank President Mario Draghi 
reiterated that interest rates would remain “at present or lower 
levels for an extended period of time” and revealed there had been 
a discussion on the possibility of  further rate cuts. 
ATZ/N (A) FT 
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16/09/2013 Monday The dollar fell to a one-month low as the exit of former Treasury 
Secretary Lawrence Summers from the race to lead the Federal 
Reserve damped bets for an early end to expansionary monetary 
policy. The U.S. currency weakened as Summers’s decision fuelled 
speculation the Fed will be more cautious to remove monetary 
stimulus, which tends to weaken a nation’s foreign exchange. 
ASTZ/P (E) BLO 
18/09/2013 Wednesday The US Federal Reserve sprung a surprise on markets by keeping 
its asset purchases steady at $85bn a month as it cut growth 
forecasts for 2013.Despite expectations that the Fed would start to 
taper its third round of quantitative easing, the rate-setting Federal 
Open Market Committee said it would “await more evidence that 
progress will be sustained before adjusting the pace of its 
purchases”. 
ATZ/P (A,I) FT 
02/10/2013 Wednesday The euro jumped to an eight-month high against the dollar on 
Wednesday after the European Central Bank held out the 
possibility of more cheap loans for banks and Italy’s Prime 
Minister Enrico Letta survived a confidence vote. Mario Draghi, 
ECB president, told reporters after the central bank’s decision to 
leave interest rates unchanged that it remained ready to take more 
action if needed – leaving open the possibility of a third longer-
term refinancing operation. Moreover, he voiced no concern about 
the level of the euro. The single currency rose as high as $1.3606 
during his press conference. “A lot of people expected Draghi to 
repeat what he did back in February when he expressed his concern 
at the level of the euro versus the dollar,” said Kathleen Brooks at 
Forex.com. 
ATZ/P (A,M,H) FT 
15/10/2013 Tuesday The dollar gained versus the euro for the first time in three days as 
the House and Senate worked on competing plans to end the two-
week government shutdown and keep the U.S. from exhausting its 
ability to borrow money. 
ETZ/N (F) BLO  
17/10/2013 Thursday The U.S. dollar sank, U.S. Treasury prices rallied and gold shot 
higher after lawmakers reached a last-minute deal to avoid a U.S. 
debt default, as investors anticipated that lingering uncertainty in 
Washington would push back the Federal Reserve's plans to wind 
down stimulus efforts. The 11th-hour deal struck late Wednesday 
in Congress will reopen the government, but investor relief turned 
to concern about the 16-day fight's toll on the world's largest 
economy. Many analysts have pushed back their expectations for a 
reduction in Fed bond buying—once viewed as certain to begin in 
September—until the first quarter of 2014.In addition, investors 
remain wary that U.S. lawmakers will go through a similar political 
standoff in early 2014, further muddying the growth outlook.  
ETZ/P 
ATZ/P 
(F) WSJ 
31/10/2013 Thursday The euro fell sharply on Thursday after data showing eurozone 
inflation at its weakest in nearly 4 years prompted speculation that 
the European Central Bank could soon take action to avert the risk 
of Japan-style deflation. The euro has been one of the strongest 
major currencies this year, supported by a hefty current account 
surplus, a resumption of capital inflows to equity markets and a 
broader perception that its long-term survival is no longer in doubt. 
Moreover it has also regained a role as a haven currency as 
uncertainty over US monetary policy and aggressive monetary 
easing in Japan reduced the attractions of the dollar and yen. 
ETZ/N 
ATZ/N 
(J,G) FT 
01/11/2013 Friday Investors' love affair with the euro has come to an abrupt end. The 
single currency traded at $1.3488 early Friday in ATZ/N New 
York, down 2.5% from a nearly two-year high of $1.3833 a week 
ago. Much of those losses have come since. Thursday, when the 
euro zone reported that inflation cooled to a four-year low in 
October, while joblessness climbed to a record high. Some now 
expect that anemic euro-zone inflation reading will spur the 
European Central Bank to cut rates at its meeting next week. 
Meanwhile, better-than-expected U.S. manufacturing data raise the 
odds of the Fed cutting its bond purchases in December. 
ETZ/N (J,G) WSJ 
07/11/2013 Thursday The European Central Bank on Thursday responded to fears of 
deflation across the eurozone by unexpectedly cutting rates to a 
record low and insisting it had more weapons in its “artillery” to 
prevent price falls. Mario Draghi strengthened his reputation as a 
far bolder ECB head than his predecessor, presiding over a cut 
which left the central bank’s benchmark main refinancing rate at 
0.25 per cent and sent the euro tumbling against the dollar. .A fall 
in inflation last month to less than half the ECB’s target of just 
under 2 per cent has heightened concerns that disinflation, or even 
a period of Japan-style deflation, could add to the currency bloc’s 
economic woes. Though most analysts thought the ECB would 
ETZ/N 
ATZ/N 
(I) FT 
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wait until December to cut, Mr Draghi said there was now a 
possibility that the bloc could “experience a prolonged period of 
low inflation”. The euro initially recorded its sharpest fall in almost 
two years. While it later clawed back some of those losses, it 
remained down about 0.8 per cent by late afternoon in London, 
trading at $1.34.Investors applauded the decision, sending 
European stocks up to five-year highs at one point and eurozone 
bond yields tumbling. 
20/11/2013 Friday The US Federal Reserve is considering cutting the interest it pays 
to banks on their reserves in a dramatic move to offset an eventual 
slowing of its $85bn-a-month asset purchases. The central bank 
offered no new hints on when it could “taper”, reiterating that it 
was still expecting such a move “in coming months” but the 
discussion of alternatives at the rate-setting Federal Open Market 
Commitee suggests it is keen to slow its buying.  
CONN (A,I) FT 
20/11/2013 Friday The dollar rose against most major peers as Federal Reserve 
officials said they might reduce their $85 billion in monthly bond 
purchases “in coming months” as the economy improves, minutes 
of their last meeting show. The euro dropped from a four-year high 
versus the yen as the European Central Bank is considering a 
negative deposit rate if more economic stimulus is needed, 
according to two people with knowledge of the debate. 
ATZ/N (A,I) BLO 
 
